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i 
ABSTRACT 
CEO competence and development is a continuing concern in the NHS. As a 
key feature of any CEO leadership role is responsibility for organisationally 
critical decisions, and there is an increasing recognition of the role context plays 
in effective leadership behaviour.  This study examines the role of contextual 
intelligence in relation to PCT CEO decision making behaviour. To do this, the 
research addresses four questions: a) what does the literature say about CEO 
contextual intelligence? b) what factors do PCT CEOs say they take into 
account in different decision making contexts? c) what contextual factors do 
they actually take into account? and d) what impact do the contextual factors 
have on their decision making behaviour.  A systematic literature review 
resulted in a model of CEO contextual intelligence for CEO decision making. 
Semi-structured interviews with 24 PCT CEOs in a NHS region about factors 
influencing their decisions on generic strategies, national policies, regional 
strategies and local plans revealed a hierarchy among contextual factors 
applying to different decision strata. Semi-structured interviews and analysis of 
CEO diaries two months later of the same focal decisions show the real critical 
factors to be:- national policies themselves, the Strategic Health Authority  and 
the decision making process, for regional strategies; and Top Management 
Team and structure for local plans.  
Altogether, the research reveals that the PCT CEO’s decision making context is 
rationally bounded; the relevant contextual factors differed significantly from the 
literature derived model; the actual factors in practice differed from what were 
espoused; choice of factors vary depending on decision trigger strata which 
links to degrees of CEO autonomy; and macro level factors which were 
indicated as significant from the systematic review were in fact ignored in 
practice. A PCT CEO model of contextual intelligence is developed together 
with a two dimensional model of underlying structures guiding PCT CEO 
decision making behaviour. The findings have implications for governance 
structures in the NHS, CEO decision making and senior leader development in 
ii 
the NHS in the context of the 2012 Health and Social Care Act. Areas for further 
research in public sector, NHS and contextual intelligence are also identified. 
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 1 
1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH 
1.1 Introduction 
I embarked on my Doctor in Business Administration (DBA) studies in 2004 
when working as a Strategic Health Authority (SHA) Director of Performance. At 
the time, I had been in post for two years, since the inception of the SHA. A key 
strategic objective of the SHA was to ensure the delivery of national priorities 
and targets set by the Department of Health (DH) to which it was accountable, 
and performance was judged on the basis that constituent organisations 
delivered these requirements. For some time, the SHA had been concerned 
with issues of underperformance in a number of NHS Trusts and Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs) and I was constantly asked to explain this variability in 
performance between organisations that seemingly have the same set ups, and 
for all sense and purpose, do the same things. I was also asked what I was 
going to do about it. The timing coincided with a new chief executive officer 
(CEO) starting at the SHA. One of the first actions taken by the new CEO was 
to bring new CEOs into the underperforming PCTs. I was aware from internal 
discussions and those the SHA had had with the DH that, where there were 
concerns or indeed successes with organisational performance, they were 
usually attributed to the CEO. This stimulated my interest in understanding the 
behaviour of CEOs working in the National Health Service (NHS), particularly 
how they take decisions that impact on organisational performance.  
To me, the NHS’ heroic expectations of its most senior managers, how these 
individuals carry out their roles, and how their performance can be improved, 
are worthy of further research. I chose to study for an executive doctorate as I 
wanted to gain this knowledge in a robust way that is applicable to practice. The 
study took over eight years due to disruptions in employment (see Appendix A) 
during which time the  job of CEO  in the NHS developed a reputation for high 
turnover and an impending succession crisis, which further reinforced the value 
and  direction of focus for research. Although the NHS organisational landscape 
has and is changing and some of the relevant academic work has developed 
through this extended period of time, influencing my knowledge and thinking  as 
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a researcher and practitioner,  for practical reasons, I have chosen to leave as 
written, the early parts of the research as they were relevant both practically 
and academically at the time but would ask the reader to see them in their 
temporal context. This Linking Document will hopefully give a sense of the 
evolution in my thinking. 
1.2 The business case 
As the executive primarily responsible for managing the performance of 18 NHS 
Trusts and PCTs within the SHA area, I had observed wide variations in 
performance, as judged by the meeting of national targets and standards, in 
organisations operating under very similar circumstances. In my experience, 
when an NHS organisation fails, the custom and practice were to install a new 
CEO, and move the previous incumbent into another senior role in the NHS. 
This practice of recycling senior leaders has been criticised by both insiders and 
outside commentators as rewarding rather than helping to improve poor 
performance. Irrespective of whether the practice is appropriate, changing the 
CEO when everything else stays the same implies the ultimate responsibility 
being attributed to the role. As the key feature of any CEO job is leading his 
organisation to deliver the corporate objectives, it follows that organisational 
performance stems from how the CEO behaves in the contexts in which he 
operates. In the context of the NHS generally, and PCTs in particular, this can 
be observed in the coping behaviours of CEOs as they juggle the conflicting 
demands of operating in a complex system. There is also the issue of 
development for both the outgoing and incoming CEOs in learning the lessons 
of why things didn’t work before so that both can be successful in their new 
roles. With decision making being central to the role of a CEO, I was interested 
in understanding what factors influenced CEO decision making in NHS Trust 
and PCTs. If decision making is a core CEO capability, the SHA as an 
organisation, and I, as the responsible executive, need to better understand 
how we can prepare aspirant CEOs through development for the role as well as 
support existing CEOs in their decision making capability so as to improve the 
 3 
performance of their organisations, not least because I also aspired to forge a 
career leading NHS organisations.   
When the research was first conceived, the NHS was undergoing structural 
change as a result of the White Paper “Commissioning a patient-led NHS” 
(CPLNHS) (Department of Health, 2005). The CPLNHS policy aimed to 
transform the NHS from being a provider driven organisation to a commissioner 
driven system. In a letter to CEOs of NHS organisations, the CEO of the NHS 
Nigel Crisp (2005) set out the proposed changes. They included 
reconfigurations of PCTs and SHAs, the creation of Practice Based 
Commissioning (PBC), changes to PCT-managed service provision, and 
preparing NHS Trusts (providers) to move towards NHS Foundation Trust 
status by 2008. As a result of the SHA restructure, I was seconded to be interim 
CEO in a PCT which, at the time, had had five changes of CEOs in two years 
and had recorded a large financial deficit resulting in the first public interest 
report for a PCT (Audit Commission, 2005). I was appointed to the permanent 
job after turning around the organisation.  The relevance of studying PCT CEO 
behaviours was reinforced during this period, when it became clear to me that 
the role of CEOs in PCTs  was subject to complex, diverse , critical  and 
potentially conflicting demands but was crucial to the success of the PCTs. 
While the  role of CEOs in the corporate sector have been widely studied and 
there is no shortage of academic and practitioner literature on what makes a 
successful CEO, I could  find no  such research on PCT CEOs. This research 
was therefore conceived to fill the evidence gap, by providing detailed evidence 
about the ways in which CEOs in PCTs make decisions and behave coping with 
the many competing demands to deliver the functions of PCTs. 
1.3 The structure and functions of PCTs 
It is important in seeking to understand CEO decision-making behaviour where 
context and contextual intelligence is anticipated to be potentially critical that the 
context the PCT itself presents by virtue of its structure and functions is 
understood.  
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PCTs are a type of NHS trusts that have formed an integral part of the NHS in 
England. The establishment order for PCTs laid down by legislation (National 
Health Service Act, 2000) sets out the statutory functions which PCTs are 
legally required to meet. These functions can be grouped under three headings: 
improving the health of the population by taking strategic decisions that reflect 
the health needs of local people; commissioning primary care, community 
services and secondary care services; and providing community services. PCTs 
are statutory bodies serving discrete geographical populations ranging from 
170,000 to over 1million. In total, there were 302 PCTs across England until 
2006 when the number was halved. Collectively, PCTs are responsible for 
spending around 80% of the total NHS budget. Operating within a national 
framework, PCTs are the local health authorities and have to comply with 
statutory duties, national policies and initiatives that are issued by the 
Department of Health (DH) or the SHA. SHAs are the regional headquarters 
through which PCTs are accountable to the Secretary of State. PCTs use their 
annual allocated budgets that are calculated based on weighted capitation to 
pay for NHS services. Service providers, in the main, are GPs who provide 
primary care, PCT provider arms which provide community services, and NHS 
Trusts and NHS Foundation Trusts which provide secondary and tertiary care. 
PCTs are managed by a team of executive directors led by a CEO. Executive 
directors are members of the PCT Board, which also has non executive 
directors (NEDs). One of the NEDs chairs the PCT Board. A key member of the 
PCT Board is the chair of the Professional Executive Committee (PEC). The 
PEC forms part of the governance structure of PCTs and provides clinical 
insights into commissioning decisions. The above structures comprised the PCT 
organisational context when the CPLNHS White Paper was published in 2005.   
The main structural and functional changes introduced by the CPLNHS policy 
were aimed at strengthening the commissioning function, in particular by the 
introduction of Practice Based Commissioning (PBC). Under PBC, GP practices 
took on responsibility for indicative budgets devolved from PCTs for 
commissioning hospital and community services although responsibility for 
contract management stayed with the PCT. The DH saw it as a way of aligning 
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clinical and financial responsibilities and PCTs were given a year to fully 
implement PBC. For PCTs, the nuances around responsibility for 
commissioning functions, including a re-statement of their core functions, were 
set out in pages 6-7 of Nigel Crisp’ (2005) letter: 
The Department can confirm that it expects PCTs to make 
arrangements for 100% coverage of PBC by no later than the 
end of 2006 (paragraph 20) 
PCT will ensure access and choice to a range of high quality 
health services and ensure that the Government’s commitments 
to health, reducing health inequalities and health services are 
delivered for local people (paragraph 21) 
As custodians of their population’s health budget, they are 
responsible for ensuring prioritisation and value for money in 
ways which have maximum impact on health and secure all 
necessary health services (paragraph 22)  
Their functions, which can be provided by external agencies, 
partners and consortia working on their behalf, will remain as 
follows (paragraph 23): 
 Improving the health of the community and reducing 
inequalities 
 Securing the provision of safe , high quality services 
 Contract management on behalf of their practices and 
public 
 Engaging with local people and other local service 
providers to ensure patient views are properly heard and 
coherent access to integrated health and social care is 
provided 
 Acting as provider of services only where it is not possible 
to have separate providers- and with arrangements for 
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separating out decisions on commissioning from provider 
management 
 Emergency planning 
PCTs will be accountable to their local communities and to the 
Secretary of State through Strategic Health Authorities 
(paragraph 25) 
It is clear that in order for PCTs to deliver their core functions and to implement 
the policy changes as prescribed by Crisp, the PCT as an organisation is tasked 
with decision making and change in respect of multiple and potentially 
conflicting goals and would have to attend to the interest of a wide range of 
stakeholders. Crisp’s letter also set out in detail the functions of the SHA, which 
include performance management of PCTs (paragraph 26).  
The fact that the CEO of the NHS would send a letter to Trust and PCT CEOs 
asking them to implement quite fundamental structural changes within a very 
short time scale and expecting compliance, gives an indication of how policies 
developed by DH are then implemented in the NHS. The approach is essentially 
that of “command” that carries a strong flavour of Taylorism. It is a bureaucratic 
response which has, at its core, the notion that management needs to control 
the workforce by specifying in some detail what is to be done, how it is to be 
done, and in what quantity it is to be done. This approach, oriented to efficiency 
and predictability (Harrison et al, 1992), was first noted by Pollitt (1990) as 
having been applied to the UK public services, including the NHS, since the late 
1970s and 1980s. Three decades on, and at the time of writing, the practice 
appears to be alive and well. This is illustrated not only by the implementation of 
the CPLNHS policy but is being repeated in the current restructure facing the 
NHS. PCTs (and SHAs) will be abolished in 2013 as a result of the Health Act 
2012, which was enacted to implement the White Paper “Liberating the NHS” 
(2010). The majority of PCT commissioning functions are to be taken over by 
new Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), with the exception of primary care 
commissioning which will be the responsibility of the new NHS Commissioning 
Board (NHSCB). The NHSCB will have regional offices that will take over some 
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of the SHA functions and sub-regional Local Area Teams (LATs) that will 
continue to provide strategic system oversight to clusters of CCGs. Far from 
being liberated, the shadow CCGs are finding their position within this complex 
infrastructure to be at the bottom of an even more bureaucratic hierarchy than 
the outgoing structure, and their autonomy tightly controlled by the NHSCB. 
This has implications for the new CCG leaders in how they lead their members 
while interfacing with a myriad of stakeholders and reporting up the chain.  
1.4 What does a PCT CEO do, and why study PCT CEO 
decision-making behaviour? 
In studying PCT CEO decision making behaviour and drawing on previous work 
on CEO behaviour, it is necessary to understand the PCT CEO role and how it 
is similar or different from that of CEOs in other sectors.  Definitions of chief 
executive or CEO are surprisingly sparse. An Abi-Proquest literature search for 
“chief executive” and/or “CEO” and “definition” yielded 18 papers, which, bar 
two, focused on CEO compensation and succession, and did not define ‘CEO’. 
Of the two that attempted to define the CEO, Zhi (2009) examined the legal 
status and legal liability of CEOs in the USA and found  wide and generalised 
use of the term CEO internationally, with CEOs established not only in 
companies but also existed in various kinds of institutions including universities, 
Olympic Committees and state agencies. He argued that the CEO was the 
product of American corporate structural reform and innovation from the 1960s 
in response to inefficient decision making by the board of directors due to a 
disjunction between the management and decision level. The emergence of the 
CEO enabled some of the board decision making powers to be devolved to 
management level. The CEO therefore has not only a manager’s authority of 
office but also some part of the authorities of the board, making the CEO an 
organisation’s most senior manager. The second paper, by Wibowo and Kleiner 
(2005), examines who can be classified as a CEO. The authors found that the 
actual title might be different in different organisations but describes the CEO as 
having responsibilities to maintain and implement the company’s goals, and 
being responsible for the success and failure of an organisation. With the 
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paucity of academic literature, a Wikipedia search defined the CEO as “the 
highest ranking corporate officer (executive) or administrator in charge of total 
management of an organisation” and typically has the following responsibilities: 
communicator, decision maker, leader, and manager. It describes the following 
CEO roles: “The communicator role can involve ….. management and 
employees; the decision making role involves high level decisions about policy 
and strategy. As a leader, the CEO advises the board of directors, motivates 
employees, and drives change within the organisation. As a manager, the CEO 
presides over the organisation’s day to day, month-to-month, and year-to-year 
operations”. What the limited evidence shows is that CEO is a widely used term 
but the actual definition is hard to pin down.  However on the basis of the 
common usage Wikipedia definition   PCT CEOs do fulfil the generic criteria of a 
CEO role.  
In the absence of a body of literature from which to draw further insight about 
PCT CEO - specific role and behaviour, I decided to look to the broader 
literature on CEO. The relevance of findings here depends on the extent to 
which CEO roles in the public and private sectors on which the literature is 
based, are similar or different from the PCT CEO role.  Since the mid 1970s, 
various UK governments had tried to introduce an internal market into the public 
services. For the NHS, it is really in the last decade that policies to promote 
competition have led to more tangible private sector involvement.  These moves 
increase the need to think where and how each unit can compete and 
collaborate effectively for service provision with particular populations and 
where provision might more effectively ‘outsourced’. PCTs, like much of the rest 
of the NHS today, still operate in the public sector that is characterised by tight 
centralised control and a strongly unionised workforce. There is a hierarchy 
issuing instructions but delivery is still achieved through a large number of 
loosely coordinated operational units, with a mixture of contracting out and 
partnership arrangements at the margin. The majority of staff still hold some 
deeply rooted cultural assumptions about power relationships, markets and the 
private sector.  Significant service change proposals can be expected to draw 
controversy, and the general public remains unwilling to “de-politicise” the NHS.  
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Dealing with these issues is integral to a PCT CEO’s role as it is to other public 
sector CEO jobs. And in common with those, the service user is increasingly 
positioned as ‘the customer’ whose service experience, outcomes and 
satisfaction, are sought and are increasingly relevant to effective provision and 
performance of the provider.  
I have discussed the aspects of a PCT CEO role that are generic to all CEOs. 
Nonetheless, there are other aspects of the PCT CEO job that differentiate 
them from their private sector counterparts. The PCT CEO does not have to 
worry about generating revenues, as income comes from taxpayers and the 
PCT receives this from the government in the form of an annual budget. They 
have to work with an arguably wide number of stakeholders and interest groups 
to achieve organisational goals that are ultimately about the provision of 
healthcare to their population within available resources. With the NHS being 
the most loved institution among the general public in UK, any strategic change 
can be high profile and draws political attention. As an integral part of the NHS, 
PCTs have to operate according to the rules and instructions issued by DH and 
other related arm’s length bodies. They also have to meet nationally set targets 
and standards, the performance of which is closely monitored by DH. Finally 
although every PCT has a board of directors led by a chairman, the role of the 
PCT Board is primarily for governance purposes.  PCT CEOs are accountable 
to the CEO of the NHS for the performance of the PCT in a direct line of 
accountability.  In summary, the essence of the CEO role in terms of generic 
CEO responsibilities is similar. So whilst the job of PCT CEO may have some 
particular defining features that appear different from that of CEOs in the private 
sector, the parallels are clear and they differ mainly in the degree of job 
complexity.  
1.5 Decision making in PCTs and CEO behaviours 
As local health authorities, PCTs take decisions that have critical impact on 
population health.  This has implications for how decisions are taken in PCTs.  
Of course in this dynamic and complex environment the CEO is not the sole 
decision maker. Beside the CEO, there are others involved in decision making 
 10 
in PCTs (McDonald, 2004) and indeed middle managers are becoming 
increasingly engaged in shaping PCT strategic decisions (Checkland et al, 
2011).  However as the executive ultimately responsible for the decisions and 
their implementation and accountable for the success or failure of their 
organisations (Mayo and Nohria, 2005) how the CEO chooses to engage 
him/herself and others in and influence decision-making is key.  Before we can 
research PCT CEO decision making behaviour however, it is pertinent to first 
clarify what being a PCT CEO means in practice and the expectations of PCT 
CEOs.  
It is helpful here to distinguish between role expectations, received role and role 
behaviour. In a critical review of the literature, Hales (1986) made the 
conceptual distinctions between what stakeholders expect about the manager’s 
performance in the job including behaviours that partially define the job (Katz 
and Kahn, 1978), how the manager believes she ought to behave in response 
to the messages she has perceived and which then influences her own 
perception of the job (Levinson, 1959), and the enactment or “emergence 
perspective” of decision making behaviour and action in response to their 
conception of how the job should be done (Fondas and Stewart, 1994).  The 
three perspectives have been labelled by their respective authors as “role 
expectations” (Katz and Kahn, 1978), and “received role” and “role behaviour” 
(Levinson, 1959). 
The role expectations of the PCT CEO are set out in the PCT CEO job 
descriptions (an example is included in Appendix A) and the Accountable 
Officer Memorandum (Appendix I) which were drawn up by the DH based on 
what PCTs were set up to do when they were created in 2002. The 
“accountable officer” status makes clear that the PCT CEO will be held to 
account for the financial performance of his organisation. The overriding 
objective of PCTs is to use their annual budget allocated by DH to commission 
healthcare for their local populations from NHS Trusts or Foundation Trusts 
other non NHS providers, and GPs.  
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According to a King’s Fund report (Lewis, 2004), the term commissioning is 
used “liberally and variably within the NHS” (p3) but in practice include the 
following key functions: identifying effective and appropriate health service 
response to assessed patient needs; delivering national and local health care 
priorities, health service planning; contracting with service providers for the 
delivery of those services and allocating available resources against competing 
priorities. PCT CEOs are responsible for ensuring that their PCTs deliver these 
functions, which they normally delegate to a senior or top management team.  
In 2006, the number of PCTs was reduced to 152 in order to achieve cost 
savings and improved commissioning from economies of scale. The 
reorganisation led to improved co-terminosity with local authorities in many 
places, resulting in closer working relationship between health and social care.  
The launch of “World Class Commissioning” (Department of Health, 2007), 
which consists of a vision statement and a set of organisational competencies 
PCTs had to demonstrate as evidence of their effectiveness as commissioners 
introduced an additional critical expectation. Between 2008 and 2010, every 
PCT had to undergo an annual process of external assessment against these 
World Class Commissioning competencies. Persistent under performance 
including a lack of progress would lead to the removal of the PCT CEO as 
organisational leader and accountable officer. These new expectations were 
added to existing SHA defined  performance appraisal framework for PCT 
CEOs, and to the annual performance assessment of PCTs conducted by the 
healthcare regulator, the Healthcare Commission (and its successor 
organisation, the Care Quality Commission) creating an expanding set of CEO 
role expectations.  However in practice, as revealed by an example of such a 
framework (Appendix B), CEO performance appraisal by the SHA only 
assessed certain parts of the PCT CEO job  thereby highlighting a priority in 
role expectations, and defacto defining what “really” matters, which for a PCT 
CEO, would be the “received role”. How the PCT CEOs then go about carrying 
out “the job” as reflected in role behaviours, is the subject of this research, 
examined from the perspective of contextual factors influencing CEO decision 
making behaviour. In 2010, the DH shifted its focus to improving productivity 
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and World Class Commissioning was discontinued just as the new conservative 
government proposed the abolishment of PCTs, whose commissioning 
functions would be passed to GP-led commissioning groups. Under the 2012 
Health Act, these Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) will be statutory 
organisations, led by a part-time clinical chair who is normally a GP, and 
supported by a full time manager with the job title of Chief Officer. As CCGs 
take over from PCTs as the new local offices of the NHS, there are clearly 
transferable lessons for the new leaders to be gleaned from this research.  
1.6 Overview of research approach 
The literature on the relationship between leader and context suggests that 
contextual intelligence of the CEO plays a potentially important role in the 
performance of organisations in the corporate sector (Mayo and Nohria, 2005). 
According to Mayo and Nohria, strategic decisions taken by CEOs in response 
to macro level factors are a determining factor in businesses success or failure. 
There is however little or no research that focuses upon CEOs in the NHS, and 
especially in PCTs, where the impact of macro level factors  in the external 
environment tend to be mediated at the Trust level by  the DH role, not the 
market, in setting everything from annual budgets and service scopes to 
standards and prices; performance is judged in different ways by different 
stakeholders based on a complex set of nationally determined indicators, not 
simply profit; and the Secretary of State remains accountable for the provision 
of health care to the population, to the taxpayers who are the ultimate 
shareholders. With PCTs spending up to 80% of the NHS budget, the roles of 
PCT CEOs are crucial, in that they lead the local office and providers will shape 
their services by the PCTs’ commissioning decisions with resultant impacts on 
population health outcomes.  This research was therefore designed to examine 
the decision making behaviours of PCT CEOs in how they cope with all the 
changing and diverse array of competing demands, stakeholder influences, and 
performance expectations that affect PCT decision making. The research 
design is therefore based on first articulating the concept of contextual 
intelligence, defined in this study as the ability to take account of relevant 
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contextual factors in decision making behaviour, followed by empirical research 
about the contextual factors CEOs in the NHS take account of when taking 
strategic decisions. The research is conducted in three interrelated projects:  
 
1. Project 1, which took place in 2005/6, consists of a systematic review of 
the literature to conceptualise a model of contextual intelligence relevant 
to CEO decision making.  
2. Project 2 involves interviewing a cohort of 24 PCT CEOs on the 
contextual factors they say they would take account of (in theory) in 
relation to specific focal decisions common to them all at that point in 
time. Data was collected in spring 2008 and the report written in 2009/10. 
This project offers the possibility of challenging, extending or amending 
the literature based model of CEO contextual intelligence in the context 
of the NHS. 
3. Project 3 examines the contextual factors the PCT CEOs actually took 
into account (in practice) in these focal decisions, using diary reports and 
observational studies. Data was collected in summer 2008.  The findings 
were compared with the literature-based model derived in Project 1 and 
with the “espoused” model from Project 2 to arrive at a NHS PCT CEO 
model of contextual intelligence and ultimately a richer understanding of 
PCT CEO decision-making behaviour in this complex organisational 
context, which is relevant to current and future practice in the NHS.  
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2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH PROCESS 
2.1 Philosophical perspective 
As the subject of enquiry is PCT CEOs and how they think and behave in 
decision making contexts, I have adopted the philosophical tradition of social 
constructionism. The overall aims are: a) to understand the concepts and 
structures underlying contextual intelligence  by studying decision-making in  a 
community of PCT CEOs; and b) to understand how contextual intelligence 
influences PCT CEO decision making.  
The focus of the research is on what the key players, individually and 
collectively, are thinking and feeling; as well as trying to understand and explain 
why they have different experiences, rather than search for external causes to 
explain their behaviour. The research design therefore exhibits the following 
distinctive features (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002): that the observer is part of 
what was being observed; human interests are the main drivers of science; the 
explanation is to increase general understanding of the situation; the research 
progresses through gathering rich data from which ideas are induced; concepts 
incorporate stakeholder perspectives with units of analysis possibly including 
the complexity of “whole situations”; generalisations through theoretical 
abstractions; and collecting data from a small number of cases chosen for 
specific reasons.  
2.2 Research strategy 
Project 1 “mapped the field” by a systematic review of previous research 
relevant to understanding contextual intelligence of CEOs. Data analysis 
involved qualitative synthesis of the collated evidence, followed by descriptive 
analysis of the papers reviewed, and the findings grouped under main 
conceptual terms and categories. The results were then synthesized to produce 
a literature-based model of contextual intelligence. 
Project 2 and Project 3 adopted an abductive research strategy to “produce 
social scientific accounts of social life by drawing on the concepts and 
meanings used by social actors and the activities in which they engage” 
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(Blaikie, 1993, p176). In both projects, the enquiry is about PCT CEOs’ decision 
making behaviour. PCT CEOs were asked to describe their actions in response 
to common focal decision contexts. Their accounts contain the concepts that 
the CEOs use to structure their world. By basing the enquiries on a set of pre-
determined scenarios, I hope to gather reflections from across the PCT CEOs in 
order to discover the meanings and theories that can then be pieced together to 
generate social theories around the concept of contextual intelligence with 
respect to decision making by PCT CEOs. 
2.3 Research design and data collection  
The research contains three projects - a systematic literature review and two 
empirical studies.  
Project 1 used a systematic review protocol to produce a comprehensive and 
replicable analysis and synthesis of the available evidence, from which to 
develop a conceptual model of CEO contextual intelligence. Using ABI-
Proquest and EBSCO as search engines, key words and search strings were 
applied to the databases. The key words for the search strings were “chief 
executives” and “CEOs”, “context”, “managerial cognition” and “organisational 
performance”, and the overlapping domains of “intelligence”, “sense making” 
and “NHS”. The emergent references were then reviewed against set selection 
criteria and quality appraisal to identify appropriate studies for data analysis. 
The literature review was supplemented by searching by key authors on 
Cranfield University library databases and Google Scholar.  
The research design for the empirical projects was both prospective (Project 2) 
and retrospective (Project 3) in relation to common focal decisions to enable the 
collection of data in a “before” and “after” way. Semi-structured interviews were 
used to elicit what the PCT CEOs saw as their decision making context and to 
study variations between individual conceptions of their context. Interviews were 
structured around common decision contexts (that faced all PCT CEOs in 
parallel) in the form of policies from DH and the SHA.  This design addressed: 
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 The need to identify individual differences in the number and frequency 
of contextual factors taken into account 
 Variations in decision making that come from responding to different 
types of decision contexts, that is, national, regional or local plans 
 Variations in individual conceptions of  the contextual factors  
Data from Project 2 came from the first round of face to face interviews 
conducted personally by me. The semi structured interviews used an interview 
guide to ensure consistency in questioning, with each interview lasting on 
average 1.5 hours. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Every CEO 
was asked four standard questions: 
a) What factors they take into account in making any (generic) important 
strategic decision 
b) What factors they take into account when making decisions about a key 
national policy 
c) What factors they take into account when making decisions about a new 
regional policy proposing service centralisation 
d) What factors they take into account when making decisions about the 
polyclinic plans for their PCT 
Data from Project 3 came from three sources: face to face interviews based on 
each PCT CEO’s electronic work diary covering a two month period, paper 
print-outs of the diary, and each CEO’s accounts of a significant strategic 
decision making event that occurred during the data collection period.  
Recognising  the difference between ‘espoused theories of action’ and ‘theories 
in use’ ( Argyris and Shon, 1974),  what the PCT CEOs reported as taking into 
account in Project 2 was followed in Project 3 by  study of what they did take 
account of  in practice. A gap of two months was deemed to provide sufficient 
timeframe for decisions to be progressed. The CEOs agreed to keep a diary for 
the two month period to provide an additional source of evidence of decision 
making activity. During the data collection period, an unanticipated and 
decision-making event concerning a major strategic decision was instigated by 
the SHA, which brought together all of the PCT CEOs (including me) to make a 
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“joint” decision. This provided a rare opportunity to participate and observe 
behaviour and later to explore in depth with the CEOs their experience of a 
critical decision making event. These findings provided additional insights into 
other factors influencing the decision making behaviour of PCT CEOs in 
practice.  
2.4 Selection of study population 
To minimise the effect of different SHAs having different regional strategies, the 
study focused on 24 permanent PCT CEOs operating within a single NHS 
region in England. The choice of SHA region was influenced by my own position 
as an incumbent PCT CEO in the region. Engaging colleagues as participants 
has the benefits of ease of access, a common language and understanding, 
and having insider knowledge of the CEOs’ operating environment. This is 
especially relevant when the study participants are elite professionals to whom 
access has traditionally been difficult. There are however potential risks relating 
to biases and ethics. Avoidance of potential bias was managed by strict 
adherence to agreed methods and being systematic in data collection, reduction 
and analysis. There were also risks relating to compromising subjects and to 
data quality. To avoid and mitigate these risks, potential participants were 
provided with an information sheet about the nature of the project, what was 
expected of them, how the research procedures may affect them and how their 
anonymity would be assured, as well as reassuring them that the information 
provided will be treated in strict confidence, that nothing would be attributable or 
identifiable, and of their right to withdraw at any time. The study satisfied the 
ethical standards laid down by Cranfield University Research Ethics Committee 
who gave approval to proceed. 
2.5 Data analysis 
Project 1 employs descriptive analytical technique which used standard data 
extraction forms to extract information from the reviewed papers in a consistent 
manner. Findings were then categorised by: top 10 journals contributing the 
most articles to the systematic review; year of publication; country of origin, 
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industry category, themes, and contextual analysis to reveal patterns of factors 
previously found relevant to a description of CEO decision-making context.  
Project 2 consists of a qualitative analysis of semi-structured interview data 
using NVivo8, a qualitative data analysis computer software package.  
Project 3 data were analysed in two ways: diary activities were assigned to 
decision making categories using Microsoft Excel, with data measured by 
frequency (count) and time spent (sum in hours). The approach assumed that 
both frequency and duration of exposure to contextual factors have 
commensurable influence on CEO decision making behaviour. Interview data 
relating to the joint decision making event were analysed taking an interpretive 
approach after applying NVivo 8 to individual descriptions of the event.  
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3 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
3.1 Summary of research findings 
Project 1, which consists of a systematic review enabled me to build a stratified 
“rainbow” model of contextual intelligence that extended an earlier model (Mayo 
and Nohria 2005) as shown in Figure 1. The different strata of the ‘rainbow’ 
represent layers of factors in the organisation and external environment from 
the CEO’s perspective. Within each stratum are categories of factors that have 
been found to be relevant to CEO decision making.  
Figure 1  A literature based contextual intelligence model for CEO 
 
 
What the diagram shows is that  
 the decision making world of a CEO is potentially complex  
 there are a large number of factors apparently relevant to effective 
decision making 
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 the factors range from consideration of the top team through to factors in 
the internal organisational environment to the external local environment 
to macro level factors 
 each stratum contains numerous factors, each of which can have sub-
factors of relevance 
 While only some literature was specifically derived from the public sector or 
healthcare settings, the identified factors clearly exist in the health care setting, 
as present in the context of the PCT CEO so that they are at least potentially 
relevant to PCT CEO decision making behaviour. 
Project 2 found the PCT CEOs to espouse the following decision making 
behaviour “in theory”: 
 There is a hierarchy in contextual factors that influence CEO decision 
making 
 Different factors are taken into account in different decision making 
situations 
 There is a group of critical factors that are always considered by PCT 
CEOs irrespective of decision making contexts. These are organisational 
strategy, stakeholders, goals and decision making processes 
 Some factors in each stratum were not mentioned at all in any decision 
scenario. This includes the whole macro level stratum 
 The contextual factors that most define PCT CEO decision making 
behaviour are source of decision trigger, local flexibility in decision 
making, extent of stakeholder involvement required, and degree of 
anticipated resistance. 
Project 3 found the PCT CEOs to exhibit the following decision making 
behaviour “in practice”: 
 Far fewer factors were taken into account, with decisions being made on 
a far simpler set of contextual factors 
 There is a clear distinction between factors taken account of in different 
types of decisions 
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 The factors that have the most impact are those constructed within the 
NHS (in contrast to macro level factors in the corporate sector) 
 The most important factors are “other significant organisations” (the SHA 
in particular), decision making processes, TMT and structure 
 There is an underlying layer of contextual factors relating to structures 
and rules of varying transparency. The CEOs’ tacit knowledge about how 
these operate in practice contribute to the effectiveness of CEO decision 
making behaviour.   
3.2 The context in which PCT CEOs make decisions 
The findings were consistent with what has long been argued about decision 
making in the public sector, in that there are key constraints on the decisional 
behaviour and the choices of public service managers compared to those in the 
private sector (Stewart et al, 1980; Ring and Perry, 1985; Dawson et al, 1995). 
For public sector organisations such as PCTs, having the government setting 
the operating contexts can mean a restriction on local flexibility and discretion, 
which can be problematic if the central directives do not match local aims and 
objectives. I found this with top down policy directives, and especially with non 
diktat policies or policies that were ambiguous. As an integral part of the 
national health system, PCTs are required to implement national policies, but as 
local health authorities, they also have local strategic objectives. In many ways, 
the PCT CEOs found it easier to deal with diktats, as what needed to be done, 
and by whom, are normally clearly prescribed. This makes decision making 
easier, as the organisation of work, including stakeholder engagement and 
governance structure, are clarified from the outset. Implementation takes on a 
“command” approach from DH through the SHA, with support from “regulatory 
bodies” or through “performance management”. For non diktat policies, the PCT 
CEOs would attempt to comply but should they find it difficult for whatever 
reasons, they will attempt to use appropriate evidence to negotiate for changes 
in scope and pace. Many CEOs described a routine for decision making. They 
will first assess the request from the perspectives of “sanctions for non delivery” 
and “degree of performance management” by DH or the SHA. They will also 
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assess the relative “priority of the policy” against other national requirements, 
and decide whether it is “do-able within the timeframe”, or to “negotiate for more 
achievable” deadlines. If they were unsure, the CEO would “check with the 
SHA” and also try to “find out what other PCTs were doing”. This behaviour 
highlights an additional constraint of the PCT CEO operating context, that of the 
“artificiality of time constraints”. The CEOs will consider the “strategic fit” of the 
new policy with existing strategies or plans, and whether it is possible to “re-
badge” or “adapt existing local plans”. As with the case of the RHS, the CEOs 
would use the opportunity afforded by top down requirements to expedite local 
strategy plans. They will want to be able to demonstrate to the SHA that their 
PCT is “complying” with the requirements, at the same time showing 
stakeholders that local priorities are still being met. Their priorities will be about 
“aligning strategic goals”, “managing key players” and “keeping abreast of 
issues in the local environment”, “establishing decision making processes” to 
structure the work, “demonstrating governance” and to “lock in” the strategic 
decisions. 
Another aspect of the context in which PCT CEOs work, and which the literature 
identified as additional differences in public service is the managerial attitudes 
to change (Dawson et al, 1995). I found this in the PCT CEOs’ response to the 
concept of polyclinics. According to Dawson, there is a tendency in the public 
service to criticise managerial mistakes. PCT CEOs know they were pursuing 
managerial agendas within a highly politicised context; and working in the 
spotlight of intense media interest resulting in uncertainty, turbulence and intra-
organisational defensiveness. As public bodies, PCTs have to demonstrate 
relative openness of decision making, which often result in the need to engage 
with a greater number of stakeholders. The local community and staff have long 
memories, and the history and ethos of local services need to be considered in 
any strategic planning decision or it runs the risk of resistance. The “availability 
of resources” is another obvious factor, especially at times of financial austerity. 
Other potential constraints are the “expectations of local players” of the “CEO’s 
leadership style” and “interference from the management tier above”. According 
to Goodwin (2006), as a result of the often strong external controls exerted on 
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public service bureaucracies, the penalties for failure are high, which add to the 
challenges for the strategic management of public services. 
Over and above explicitly recognised contextual factors the research revealed 
another dimension to the complexity of the CEO decision-making context in the 
degree of the transparency of rules and structures. These rules and structures 
are not merely physical entities but extend to the organisation of people, 
system, arrangement, design, framework, and patterns of how things work. 
Relationships between PCTs, SHA and DH are normally structured, while those 
of interpersonal nature between senior leaders tend to be informal and 
unstructured. The diary data showed significant organisations and key 
individuals involved in varying structures and modes of engagement. The away 
day saw PCTs and SHA organised in a formal hierarchical relationship, but the 
CEOs’ decision to merge PCTs still had to go through formal decision making 
process by the PCT boards as part of the governance structure. Even the social 
norms have elements of structure that resulted in standard behaviours among 
PCT CEOs. 
What was apparent from the data was that structures themselves also influence 
how they operate, governed by rules which also vary in their transparency. 
Explicit or formal rules include policies and legal requirements that are usually 
put in writing but even then may not operate accordingly. Formal structures 
normally have explicit rules but interpretation and flexibility of the rules may be 
known only to experienced insiders. The tacit knowledge of informal rules, 
which include norms and routines that guided PCT CEOs’ behaviour at the 
away day, are not written down but are apparent to any informed observer. The 
PCT CEOs knew from experience that new rules can be created, and existing 
rules changed or deleted, unilaterally and without prior warning by the SHA or 
DH. The process for decision making provided further opportunities for tacit 
rules to be exercised. Figure 2  shows a two dimensional model derived from 
the analysis of explanations of CEO decision-making behaviour, of structures 
and rules  influencing decision making behaviour on a regional strategy  on an  
away day event.  
 26 
Figure 2 A two dimensional model of underlying contextual factors of structure and 
rules 
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3.3 PCT CEO decision making behaviour in complex 
environments  
The ways PCT CEOs responded to the Regional Health Strategy (RHS) gave 
further insights into their decision making behaviour in complex environments. 
The RHS proposed two strategic changes to local health system: one, the 
centralization of certain specialist services, namely stroke and trauma, at fewer 
hospitals; and two, the setting up of community health service hubs called 
polyclinics. The PCT CEOs were aware that significant service changes, such 
as that proposed by both the centralisation and polyclinic strategies, require 
stakeholder support. The majority of PCT CEOs identified common stakeholder 
groups.  Internally, “staff” would be needed to implement the plans, which brings 
up the interplay between top management with middle managers. Externally, a 
number of organisations, post holders and individuals were identified as playing 
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one of more significant roles, either as implementers or critical supporters. For 
PCT CEOs, the most significant players include the “local hospital trust”, “local 
GPs”, and in some areas, the “local politicians” and “community groups”.  In 
contrast to organisations in the private sector, PCTs have a legal duty to 
publicly consult on major strategic changes that could affect its local population. 
In the consultation process, PCTs have to be able to demonstrate that they 
have taken account of the local context when making their decisions, which 
would explain why the CEOs reported prioritising strategic and information 
factors internally, and stakeholders and environmental factors externally. It 
would also explain why, even when a decision had been taken in private, as 
happened at the joint decision Away Day, the PCT CEOs still have to follow due 
process in governance terms. The research found PCT CEOs to be following a 
routine in the ways they balance central control against local accountability 
when taking this range of strategic decisions. The CEOs will want to ensure 
“appropriate governance” for the taking of any strategic decision. The more 
experienced CEOs said they set up “formal decision making processes” to give 
legitimacy to those decisions, and to stop unpopular decisions unravelling. 
Some said they used “programme management” and “business cases” to 
support the decision making process. Being able to demonstrate transparent 
governance processes are especially important if there were resource 
implications.  
3.4 Decision making when priorities compete 
On the occasions when they are faced with competing priorities and 
stakeholders with conflicting interests, the PCT CEOs will prioritise their time 
and efforts following a routine. They start by identifying where the requirement 
for action comes from, with those from the DH, SHA or regulators carrying the 
most weight. The CEOs then decide whether they were dealing with a “must 
do”, that is, diktat or edict from the DH. If yes, the CEOs would just proceed  
with the task of implementation. If no but the required action was aligned with 
the PCT’s own strategy, the CEOs would use the opportunity to step up the 
pace on local plans. If the answer is no and the required action does not 
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support local strategies, the CEOs would either ignore it, if possible, or attempt 
to negotiate with the SHA for alternative deadlines or deliverables.  Actions with 
targets or key performance indicators (KPIs) will prompt the CEOs to check the 
levels of current performance, and to attempt to negotiate the baseline to 
improve their achievability. If there were deadlines, the CEOs will want to know 
if the required action is do-able within the timescale; if not, they would want to 
know the degree of “flexibility” and to negotiate for a different pace of change. 
Finally, the CEO will consider implementation issues, starting with who within 
the PCT is going to lead the work, and who else needs to be involved to make 
the action happen. Internally, the CEOs would normally delegate the 
organisation of work to a member of the Top management Team who will work 
with middle managers to implement the plans. For major strategic decisions or 
where there are significant resource implications, the PCT Board will also need 
to be engaged for governance purposes. Externally, the CEO may focus her 
time and effort on engaging major stakeholders, notably key post holders in 
significant “other organisations” that need to be involved in implementation, 
such as GP leaders and CEOs of local hospitals and councils. In addition, there 
may be influential local groups and individuals such as local politicians. Finally, 
depending on issue, the PCT CEOs will assess the dynamics of the local 
environment in terms of place, facilities, infrastructure, demography and the 
resources required, including affordability. Figure 3 illustrates the PCT CEO 
decision making process that emerged from the empirical study. 
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Figure 3 PCT CEO decision making tree 
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3.5  Achieving top down requirements and local goal synergy  
One of the most important priorities identified by the PCT CEOs was to achieve 
synergy between top down requirements with local strategic goals.  The critical 
factors that are always or almost always taken into account in strategic decision 
making by the PCT CEOs are “organisational strategy”, “stakeholders” and 
“decision making process”. It is understandable that organisational strategy 
plays a major role in directing PCT CEO behaviours. Different stakeholders 
carry differential status, which can be classified into three groups. The most 
important group of stakeholders consists of other statutory organisations such 
as the “local council”, the “local hospitals”, “GPs” and the “SHA”; these players 
either have key roles in implementation or whose support is formally required.  
The next group of stakeholders consists of those who have a direct interest in 
the outcome. They include the GPs’ trade union, the “Local Medical 
Committee”, relevant “community groups” and “local politicians” who, because 
of their positional or expert power, can obstruct a decision. The final group of 
stakeholders are those who have a more remote interest in what is going on, 
namely the “public”, “patients” and “service users”. In addition to these 
considerations, the majority of CEOs would also take into account “structure”, 
“information”, “finance” and “operations” internally and “environmental factors”, 
“time”, “relationships” and “public engagement” externally. So far, all of the 
above factors are non specific and apply to all PCTs. CEO behaviours that are 
unique to each PCT include engagement of the “TMT” and “staff” such as 
middle managers, and dealing with cultural issues internally, and “patients” and 
“regulators” externally. Interestingly, macro economic factors are rarely 
mentioned. 
The emerging picture of PCT CEO decisional behaviour in how they do their job 
shows the following patterns. The higher up the reporting line a decision trigger 
comes from, the less likely the CEOs will question their validity and the more 
likely the CEOs will accept the requirement and focus on implementation. 
Directives from higher up the structure are also more likely to have targets or 
measurable objectives, which leave less room for manoeuvre or negotiation 
leading to a “just get on with it” attitude among the CEOs. In contrast, the more 
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locally developed the strategy, the greater is the need for the CEOs to engage 
with local stakeholders and to take into account local factors. Where decisions 
are contentious, or resistance are anticipated, there is a greater need to 
evidence good governance, which the CEO will demonstrate by using formal 
decision making processes. In trying to manage within a complex environment, 
the PCT CEOs would “look up” to the “centre” when dealing with top down 
requirements and “look out” to local stakeholders when responding to local 
plans. 
On the basis of the research findings, the following conclusions can be drawn.  
 The contextual factors taken into account by PCT CEOs relate directly to 
the decision context of national, regional or local policies, strategies or 
plans.  
 PCTs are required to implement national policies, which the CEOs 
prioritise over any other decision trigger.  
 The most important contextual factors for regional strategies are the 
SHA, due to reporting lines, and decision making processes, to 
demonstrate governance.  
 When taking strategic decisions on local plans, the CEOs focus on 
having the right structures for decision making and engaging 
stakeholders, especially significant local organisations such as the 
council, local hospitals and GPs.  
 In all cases, the CEOs delegate implementation to their TMT.  
 As a group, PCT CEOs demonstrate a uniform pattern of strategic 
decision making behaviours that reflect contextual intelligence as 
summarised in the new conceptual model in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4  A new model of contextual intelligence for PCT CEO strategic decision 
making (new rainbow model) 
 
3.6 Interplay between CEO behaviour and middle managers 
contribution to decision making in PCTs  
The need to have a better understanding of the interplay between CEO 
behaviour and the impact of others within the PCT such as middle managers in 
decision making was` referred to earlier in response to the growing recognition 
of the contributions that managers can and need to make for effective service 
provision decisions and concern about limitations upon that.  The research has 
shown that policy implementation in the NHS adopts a top down approach, from 
DH to SHA to PCT, and within the PCT, from the CEO to the Top Management 
Team who then presumably passes on the tasks to middle managers. A limited 
number of studies have examined the roles middle managers in the NHS play in 
policy implementation (Langley, 1986; Currie, 1999; Checkland et al, 2011). All 
acknowledged that a top down initiative is likely to restrict the influence of 
middle managers in policy development, however, the conception and 
implementation of strategic change is critical for the role of middle managers. 
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 Langley (1986) raised the issue of control and the importance of negotiation 
and persuasion in her study of formal planning in healthcare. She found that 
using planning as a mechanism of control being strenuously resisted by those 
outside top management. Currie (1999) in his study of the influence of middle 
managers in the business planning process in an NHS hospital found the 
middle managers modifying the implementation of deliberate strategy by 
contesting the performance indicators that form the basis of the business 
planning framework. In particular, they drew upon the inner and outer contexts 
of the organisation to question the legitimacy of the plans. Currie also shows 
that the middle managers are purveyors as well as recipients of change, and 
that they can have upward influence that adds value to the organisation, but the 
high degree of centralisation in the NHS can militates against their 
contributions. In terms of upward influence, roles taken by middle managers are 
“championing alternatives” (Floyd and Woodridge,1992) and “synthesizing 
information” (Nonaka, 1988). The former is seen as a product of divergent ideas 
from organisation thinking whereby there is persistent and persuasive 
communication of strategic options. The latter is more integrative, since middle 
managers interpret and evaluate information concerning internal and external 
events, which they then supply to top management. According to Shilit (1987), 
the primary role of middle managers is downward influence – that is the carrying 
out of the strategy, which they achieve by “facilitating adaptability”. That the key 
strategic role of middle managers is to align organisational action with strategic 
intention is also observed by Nutt (1987). Pettigrew et al (1992) refer the actions 
taken by middle managers to create legitimacy for their upward influence 
generally and their downward influence in adapting flexibility as the 
“management of meaning”. The concept was used by Pettigrew et al to describe 
the process designed to create legitimacy for one’s own ideas, actions and 
demands, and to question the legitimacy of the demands of one’s own 
opponents, and is a way actors in the change process mobilise the contexts 
around them, and in doing so, provide the legitimacy for change.  
The extent the concepts apply to the roles and behaviours of middle managers 
in PCTs was studied by Checkland et al (2011). The researchers use qualitative 
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case study methods to produce a detailed and theoretically informed picture of 
the interactions of PCT managers and draw from the results more general 
conclusions about the role of middle managers in PCTs and their impact on the 
functioning of the organisation as a whole. They identified a number of 
managerial roles enacted by PCT middle managers, some of which are 
identifiable from general managerial literature, but also identified a unique role 
performed by PCT middle managers who were responsible for Practice Based 
Commissioning (PBC), a national policy of engaging GPs in commissioning. 
The roles include managing information upwards, ensuring that particular 
interpretations were disseminated to the top management team; networking 
outside the PCT with groups whose needs and aims are not necessarily aligned 
with those of the PCT, although there were times when their painstaking work 
were over-ridden by top managers; and the unique role of “animateur” which 
saw PBC managers participating in high level meetings within the PCT as a 
result of their PBC role. Checkland et al conclude that the role of PCT middle 
managers is a difficult one and the way in which it is performed can have a 
significant impact upon the overall performance of the PCT.  
As the detailed literature described, middle managers have a contribution to 
make not only in policy implementation in PCTs, but also plays an important 
role in policy formulation and strategic planning. Their involvement in the 
organisational internal planning process can affect the quality of decision 
making in PCTs as well as how decisions are then implemented. The evidence 
also found that organisational practices can have a profound impact on the 
ability of managers to function in role. While it may be obvious that decision 
making and policy implementation in PCTs can improve significantly if middle 
managers are engaged in ways that maximise their contributions, what is 
interesting from my research findings are three folds. The first is that I found 
limited evidence of PCT CEOs taking account of the middle management’s 
contribution when decisions are taken in PCTs.  Only one in five PCT CEOs 
mentioned staff engagement when asked about contextual factors they would 
take into account in strategic decision making. When the diaries and interview 
transcripts were analysed, they show that none of the PCT CEOs had directly 
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engage with staff below board level on matters relating to national and regional 
policies as they have been delegated to the TMT, but the majority had spent 
some direct time with staff on issues relating to local strategy plans. This 
suggests that when decisions have largely been made further up the reporting 
line, PCT CEOs perpetuate this command chain within the PCTs which has 
implications for effective strategy and policy implementation.  This may not 
matter if there are processes within the PCT that enables middle management 
to input into the strategic planning process but knowing that organisational 
practices can impact on their effectiveness, the engagement of middle 
managers would benefit from having a more systematic approach within PCTs. 
Secondly, my research reveals that structures and rules vary in their 
transparency and tacit knowledge of operational practices beneath the surface 
is essential to effective management. This has implications for both the TMT 
(including the CEO) and middle managers as it indicates a need for the mutual 
learning of each other’s contextual intelligence as different data is needed for 
different types of decisions or in their implementation.  Thirdly, involving middle 
managers in the strategic planning and decision making processes of PCTs is 
not only beneficial from the organisational perspective in terms of better 
decisions through aligning strategy with operations, it is also developmental and 
motivating for middle managers as it brings them into direct contact with the top 
management team and widens their network.  
In conclusion, Checkland and colleagues are right to highlight the benefits of 
involving middle managers in PCT decision making activities. However, the 
current top down culture of the NHS suggests that there is some way to go 
before this benefit could be realised. At the PCT level, it requires a change in 
organisational practice that has to start with the PCT CEOs changing their 
decision making behaviour. With the advent of CCGs, these findings offer 
valuable insights to those responsible for establishing and leading CCGs.  
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4 CONTRIBUTIONS 
4.1 CEO coping behaviour in complex and ambiguous contexts 
The findings confirm the prevailing view of executive decision making , which is 
that executives are “boundedly rational” (Simon, 1976) and must satisfice rather 
than optimise (Eisenhardt, 1989). PCT CEOs do not take every potential factor 
into account in making decisions. 
As Project 2 and Project 3 found, PCT CEOs take account of far fewer 
contextual factors than those identified by the numerous studies cited in the 
systematic review (Project 1). In particular there was no evidence in thought or 
action in this PCT CEO context of certain factors in the literature derived 
Contextual Intelligence model for example size, and factors from the macro 
environmental strata were absent. It is argued that sensitivity to relevant 
contextual factors helps CEOs to take the most appropriate strategic decision 
for the benefit of their organisation, and accordingly, themselves. The ability to 
know which contextual factors matter for which strategic decision is what I have 
called contextual intelligence. Contextual intelligence enables the CEOs to 
apply tacit knowledge to play in relevant contextual factors into decision making, 
confirming that contexts can shape leader thinking and action (Mayo and 
Nohria, 2005). But whereas the research to date has failed to make a distinction 
between types of decision in analysing contextual considerations nor to find any 
particular relationship, this study has demonstrated that in the PCT CEO 
context there are distinctly different factors taken into account in taking different 
kinds of ‘strategic’ decisions.  
A further distinction provided by this study is that unlike CEOs in the corporate 
sector who need to be sensitive to macro environment level factors, CEOs in 
the NHS appraise their decision making contexts by what triggers the strategic 
decision and the implications for non compliance. Being statutory organisations, 
certain things need to happen before a strategic decision can be taken by 
PCTs, such as managing the dynamics of local environment, ensuring 
stakeholder support, and having proper decision making processes in place. 
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The NHS strategic decision making process may seem complex and 
bureaucratic, but it presents a pathway for the consideration and involvement of 
relevant contextual factors that are required for implementation.  
4.2 Extending the Contextual Intelligence literature  
The research reveals the extent of the complex and ambiguous environment in 
which PCT CEOs operate. Unlike their counterparts in the corporate sector who 
in the main are guided by macro level factors when formulating strategy, PCT 
CEOs operate in a more opaque world where a complex set of rules and 
structures of different transparencies govern strategic decision making. So PCT 
CEOs cope by simplifying the range of factors they take into account by 
prioritising politically according to the decision trigger and the consequences of 
non-compliance, and by being informed about and acquiring tacit knowledge 
about the formal and informal rules and structures of varying transparency. 
Importantly, their contextual intelligence appears to miss out on the potential 
contributions from managers at other levels. The CEOs do not routinely seek 
the inputs of middle managers in either the intelligence gathering process or 
when taking decisions. This is of concern when evidence shows that the 
involvement of middle managers can lead to better decisions and improved 
implementation. For PCT CEOs to improve both their decision making 
effectiveness and therefore the performance of their organisation, as a group, 
they need to change their behaviour with respect to how they involve other 
managers in decision making in the PCT. Instead of perpetuating the command 
and control model by issuing top down directives, they need to engage middle 
managers in building their contextual intelligence. This has implications for the 
current reorganisation of the NHS, especially in light of the ambition of the 2010 
White Paper to “liberate the NHS”. 
4.3 Theorising the role of contextual intelligence in PCT CEO 
decision making 
I used Whetton’s (2002) modelling-as-theorizing systematic methodology to 
build my model of how contextual intelligence contributes to PCT CEO decision 
making behaviour in the complex and ambiguous context of the NHS. Three 
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models were developed showing how the conceptualisation of the role of 
contextual intelligence in PCT CEO behaviour has evolved over the course of 
the research from Project 1 to Project 3. The first model is based on a 
conception of CEO contextual intelligence as conceived from the systematic 
literature review of Project 1. The second and third models represent “in theory” 
(as perceived by the CEOs) and “in practice” how contextual intelligence is 
found to play a role in PCT CEO decision making behaviour, as derived from 
the empirical findings of Project 2 and Project 3. 
Project 1, which led to the development of the first model, “Model 1” as shown 
in Figure 5, was prompted by the need to understand the role that contextual 
intelligence plays in relation to PCT CEO decision making behaviour and 
effectiveness.  While CEOs are ultimately responsible for all organisational 
decisions, their organisational leadership responsibilities require their specific 
personal attention to organisationally critical or strategic decisions. What they 
take into account and how in making these decisions, is the focus of this study.  
The initial literature review was designed to find out what was known about 
contextual intelligence in relation to CEO decision making and effectiveness. It 
revealed contextual intelligence as fundamentally about the scanning of a vast 
array of potentially relevant factors in the decision making environment.  
Scanning of the environment (box 2) to gather intelligence is prompted by a 
“strategic imperative” (box 1) creating a need for organisational decision or 
action that requires CEO attention. The CEO filters (box 3) and interprets (box 
4) the intelligence before arriving at a decision (box 5) which then leads to 
action (box 6). The “decision making” sequence is conceived as linear. In this 
model, derived from the literature, the role of contextual intelligence is a discrete 
consideration at the beginning of a rational decision making process initiated by 
a strategic imperative that could be externally or internally generated and 
brought to the attention of the CEO in a variety of ways. The detection of a 
strategic imperative then triggers environmental scanning. The literature review 
identified layers of explicit factors in the CEO’s environment which theoretically 
CEOs take into account in making important organisational decisions. There is 
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however limited insight provided by the literature about how these contextual 
factors were processed and how they influence decision making. Depicted in 
the rainbow model of contextual intelligence (page 19), each layer comprises of 
a number of potentially decision-relevant factors which the CEO scans.  
Figure 5   Literature based model of the role of contextual intelligence in CEO 
decision making 
 
 
The macro environmental factors were identified by Mayo and Nohria (2005). 
The local environmental factors include environmental dynamism (Lant et al, 
1992; Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Johnson & Hoopes, 2003; Beekun & 
Ginn, 1993; Oliver & Roos, 2005), finance or resources (Tucker et al, 2005; 
Rhodes & Keegan, 2005; Learmouth, 2005), politics (Blackler & Kennedy, 
2004), time, interest groups (Ring & Perry, 1985), decision making processes 
(Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Schwenk, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1992; Mintzberg et al, 
1990), time (Ring & Perry, 1985), relationships, goals, stakeholders and 
 41 
performance expectations (Euske, 2003) and regulators, government policy, 
culture, goals and other significant organisations (Goodwin, 2006). Of these, 
only decision making processes, performance expectations and other significant 
organisations emerge as being particularly important in PCT CEO decision 
making. On decision making processes, the sub factors relate to pace (Baum & 
Wally, 1992), time available (Dutton & Duncan, 1987), information processing 
capacity (Schwenk, 1988), complexity Schwenk, 1995), choice (Hambrick & 
Snow, 1977) and perceived degree of discretion (Carpenter & Golden, 1977). 
Performance expectations refer to targets and actions required by a policy. 
Other significant organisations include other NHS organisations, GPs, 
independent providers, the voluntary sector and councils. These organisations 
share a common feature of being public service providers in health and social 
care, as distinct from stakeholders who include subgroups that have 
expectations of the NHS.  
Factors seen to be of decision making relevance in the internal organisational 
environment are information management (Staw et al, 1981; Auster & Choo, 
2004; Walters & Priem, 1999), organisational strategy (Duhaime & Schwenk, 
1985; Thomas et al, 1991), size ( Hitt & Ireland, 1985), structure (Thomas et al, 
1991; Hitt & Ireland, 1985), systems (Bettis & Pralahad, 1995; Tucker et al, 
2005), relationships (Hellgren & Lowstedt, 1998), staff (Connor & Baker, 2003; 
Goodwin, 2006), culture ( Harris, 1994; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2006), 
organisational learning (Schwandt, 2005; Fiol, 1994), operational efficiency 
(Staw et al, 1981; Short et al, 2002; Garg et al, 2003) and Top management 
Team (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988;  Finklestein & Hambrick, 1990; Kaplan et 
al, 2003; Lant et al, 1992). In my research, interestingly, of all these factors, 
only structure and Top Management Team (TMT) were found to play significant 
roles in PCT CEO decision making and then only in relation to local plans. 
Organisational internal factors were not significant considerations for PCT 
CEOs when dealing with national or regional strategies. In contrast, structure 
appears to influence both CEO and staff interpretative schemes while the TMT 
has a role to play in issue interpretation (Gioia & Thomas, 1996).  
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Project 2 and Project 3 led to the development of Model 2 and Model 3, 
respectively. The models illustrate on one hand how PCT CEOs say they would 
use contextual intelligence and on the other how they do use contextual 
intelligence in practice, to mediate the competing policies, strategies and plans 
prior to taking decision leading to implementation.  
In Model 2 (Figure 6), based on the CEOs’ reports of what they would take into 
account, five constructs emerged of their decision making processes namely, 
“strategic imperative” (box 1), “environmental scanning” (box 2), “prioritisation” 
(box 3), “CEO decision” (box 4) and “implementation” (box 5). They are 
arranged from left to right to show a temporal dimension. Unlike Model 1, the 
relationship between the strategic imperative and implementation is mediated 
by the intermediate constructs of “environmental scanning”, “prioritisation” and 
“CEO decision. Prioritisation does not appear in Model 1 and is a refinement of 
the model. Environmental scanning and Prioritisation are both moderated by the 
“contextual intelligence” construct, which in contrast to Model 1, comprises of 
four main concepts: “Policy context” refers to policies, strategies and plans 
instigated at national, regional or local levels. According to CEOs, this context is 
a prime consideration in how to respond.  “Performance expectations” refers to 
the rules, targets, timescales and sanctions accompanying the policies. And 
“organisational internal context” and “local external context” contain a much 
more limited array of factors reported to be taken into account by PCT CEOs, 
than were identified in model 1. In that sense decision making is “boundedly 
rational”. A moderating construct is one that changes the relationship between 
the other two constructs when it is present (Baron and Kenny, 1986). In the 
case of PCT CEOs, decision making will take into consideration “performance 
expectations” when deciding how to prioritise competing policy requirements. 
“Prioritisation” is a process of filtering for decision competing contextual 
intelligence. The CEOs’ reports revealed a process of prioritisation which was 
depicted by a decision tree (Figure 3). The process follows a routine that 
enables decision relevant factors in the environment to inform decision making 
and implementation. 
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Figure 6 PCT CEOs’ perception of the role of Contextual Intelligence in decision 
making  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This model suggests that in describing how they think they make decision, the 
CEOs demonstrate a process of boundedly rational choice. According to Becker 
(1992), rational choice theory assumes individuals will maximise welfare “as 
they conceive it” (p 1). When faced with constraints, their choices will be guided 
by their stable preferences and they will balance costs against benefits to 
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the uncertain consequences of their actions. Rational choice theory provides an 
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rather than the implementation of local plans. Rational choice theory would also 
explain why the CEOs look “upwards” rather than “outwards”, as they need to 
focus their actions on those things that matter to the SHA and DH. However, as 
PCTs have their own local contexts, both within the organisation and external to 
the organisation in the local health economy that may not be aligned to 
wholesale implementation of national priorities, the CEOs will use their 
contextual intelligence to balance the competing priorities when deciding on 
implementation or compliance at the local level.  
So far, the model is assumed to hold for the self perceptions of decision making 
behaviour of PCT CEOs who are operating in the particular context of DH and 
SHA.  Project 3, which studied actual CEO decision making behaviour, provides 
further evidence to refine the model of the role that contextual intelligence plays. 
Project 3 found that PCT CEOs in practice did the following when taking 
decisions: Far fewer factors were taken into account, with decisions being made 
on a far simpler set of contextual factors. Different factors were taken into 
account in different types of decisions. The most important factors, as 
measured by the frequency and total amount of time CEOs expended on the 
factors, are “other significant organisations” (the SHA in particular), decision 
making processes, TMT and structure. Significantly, there is an underlying layer 
of contextual factors relating to “structures” and “rules” that inform how the 
moderators are interpreted. In themselves, the factors form part of the 
contextual intelligence. Structures is a term I have adopted to describe actual 
physical constructions such as organisational structures and committees, in 
contrast to rules which is a term I am using to describe procedures and routines 
governing human behaviour and practice at work. My research has shown that 
structures and rules can be both implicit and explicit, and having the knowledge 
about how they operate would improve individual CEO effectiveness. 
Experienced CEOs know that structures and rules can vary in their degree of 
explicitness and transparency so should not be judged on face value. They can 
also be unstable and so can be created, negotiated or changed without 
warning. Structures and rules are not only moderating constructs, they are also 
mediators, through providing the nuances behind the contextual intelligence. 
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Relationships and pace are particularly important mediators that may not be 
transparent. Using the polyclinic policy for example, some CEOs sounded out 
SHA managers to attempt to renegotiate expectations, while others spoke of 
“repackaging” existing local developments to give the impression of compliance.  
Where necessary, the CEOs would seek formal PCT Board approval for key 
strategic decisions as a rubber stamping exercise to demonstrate formal public 
accountability. It is the tacit knowledge about how these contextual factors 
operate in practice that contributes to the effectiveness of the CEO decision 
making behaviour.   
Model 3 (Figure 7) shows that, in practice, the role of contextual intelligence in 
PCT CEO decision making is more complex than originally envisaged. The 
decision making process is also non sequential. The model shows several 
refinements on Model 2. First, the position of “policy context” moves from 
moderator to mediator, as PCT CEO decision making is shown to be primarily 
instigated by the policy context which also sets the reference point for 
subsequent prioritisation process. Second, as contextual intelligence is found to 
play a role before, during and after decision making including throughout the 
implementation process, it has been removed as a discrete construct from the 
horizontal sequence and instead, set out in the background as a continuous 
consideration throughout a rational and political decision making process. Third, 
a limited number of contextual factors in the form of new moderating constructs 
were added to our understanding of the decision making process in practice, 
namely “decision-making processes”, “stakeholder management” and “Top 
Management Team (TMT)”. Unlike Model 2 which has the CEO implementing 
her decision singularly, in practice, once a decision has been made, it appears 
that she may delegate implementation to a TMT member. She would also seek 
to manage key stakeholders, in particular those from other significant 
organisations such as the council, GPs, hospital trusts and the SHA. These 
stakeholders have a moderating effect on implementation through their roles as 
participants, enablers (or resistors) and additionally in the case of the SHA, as 
the performance manager. Formal decision making processes allow the CEO to 
manage stakeholders and to demonstrate good governance. The decision 
 46 
making pathway between prioritisation and implementation is usually bi-
directional due to the nature of implementation being a dynamic process. It is 
also iterative.  
As policies, strategies and plans are implemented, new insights may come to 
light from contextual factors in either layer of the model, prompting the PCT 
CEO to review the original decision which will include repeating the prioritisation 
process. The cycles of prioritisation, decision and implementation (as shown by 
the red arrows) enable PCT CEOs to make appropriate adjustments in 
response to emergent contextual intelligence. An example of this decision 
making behaviour can be seen in the case of the polyclinic policy which 
proposed centralising large numbers of GPs in large purpose built health 
centres that will also provide diagnostic and treatment services currently 
provided in hospital outpatients. The policy was neither popular with GPs and 
hospitals nor with PCTs, many of whom could not afford to fund the capital 
investments. When the policy was first set out by the SHA, the performance 
expectations were unclear, so the majority of PCT CEOs chose to ignore it. 
Then the SHA set out the service specifications and timelines for 
implementation, causing several CEOs to re-prioritise the policy, and all to 
develop action plans. From the CEOs reports of actions taken by their PCTs, 
the action plans appeared to be wide ranging, and were influenced by their 
organisational and local contexts. Overall, a minority of PCTs embraced the 
policy; in those PCTs the policy was aligned with the existing PCT’s strategy. 
Some PCTs set the deadlines for implementation at a distant future in the hope 
that the policy will pass them by. Others modified existing local plans. Still 
others developed action plans that their CEOs felt would give an impression of 
compliance, despite there being no intention to implement the plan. A few 
months later, the SHA announced that some financial support could be 
available to support early implementers. This resulted in a few PCTs bringing 
forward their plans. It was not until the SHA included polyclinic implementation 
in the PCT CEO annual performance assessment framework that serious action 
planning took place across all PCTs. Eighteen months later, a change of 
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government led to the polyclinic policy losing favour and it was discarded by the 
SHA, followed quickly by the PCTs.       
The above example provides a mini case study of how top down policies are 
implemented in PCTs and the role of contextual intelligence in guiding PCT 
CEOs’ decision making behaviour. Compared to the literature based Model 1 
and the perceived practice in Model 2, what Model 3 shows is that the role of 
contextual intelligence in PCT CEO decision making is complex, multi-level and 
is a continuous and iterative process rather than discrete steps leading to a 
discrete decision and then implementation in a temporal sequence. Unlike the 
model derived from the literature which drew from studies in the private and 
public sector, the PCT CEO model of contextual intelligence shows a unitary 
purpose by the CEOs to focus decision making on policy implementation 
issues. While this may not come as a surprise, seeing PCTs are part of a 
national public organisation, what was unexpected was the general acceptance 
by PCT CEOs to the dual accountability position where the SHA trumps the 
PCT Board, and the significant amount of CEO time and effort that went into 
managing relationships upwards.  
The empirical research has revealed new insights into how contextual factors 
influence PCT CEO prioritisation, how the CEOs prioritise (as illustrated by the 
decision tree) and their decision response regarding implementation. In contrast 
to the array of potential contextual factors that were identified in Model 1, the 
research found that only a limited number of contextual factors have impact in 
practice. These factors are set in a hierarchy. The rainbow model of contextual 
factors derived from Project 1 is now distinguished by the role they play in 
prioritising decisions to be taken, how decisions not taken are managed, how 
different types of decisions are responded to, how they are implemented and 
what needs to be managed in the implementation context. These intelligences 
are summarised in Model 3. They include, in the background, structures and 
rules that can be neither explicit nor transparent, yet have an impact on 
implementation. Just knowing about contextual factors is not enough. The PCT 
CEOs also have to know when, and how, to play these contextual factors in. 
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New and aspirant PCT CEOs may need help in developing the contextual 
intelligence around how some of the structures and rules operate to improve 
their personal effectiveness in decision making and to facilitate the smooth 
implementation of a decision, .   
Figure 7 The role of contextual intelligence in PCT CEO decision making in practice 
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c) In practice, PCT CEOs do not follow a rational pathway when taking 
decisions; the range of contextual factors actually take into account is 
less than predicted by the literature but more than  the PCT CEOs 
thought they would take into account, with some of these factors being 
implicit and not transparent. As decisions in the NHS tend to be of an 
evolving nature, there may be times when the decision is not to take a 
decision, to delay taking a decision and to let events run their course, or 
to give the impression that a decision has been taken but with no 
implementation plans. This strategy is sometimes used by PCT CEOs 
and their boards in the hope that, with time, either the policy itself will be 
super ceded, or the context for taking the decision would have changed 
and enabling a more amenable decision to be taken. One experienced 
CEO described the strategy as “running on the spot”. What this means, 
in effect, is that decisions in the NHS are rarely made and final. Rather 
there is a continuing process of decision cycling, as new information 
changes the contextual intelligence informing CEO decision making, 
which in turn leads to the CEO changing his decision making behaviour.   
The findings raise a number of issues for practice. PCT CEOs have to balance 
the multiple and multi-level interests that are at stake in delivering the national 
agenda at the same time meeting local population health imperatives. To be 
effective, they have to appreciate the complexity of the system and to learn to 
navigate the NHS structures and rules with their varying transparencies, whilst 
acknowledging that the NHS is a top down driven system in which those at the 
top will always want to retain a degree of control. According to Harrison et al 
(1992), such an approach favours a centralised organisation run on hierarchical 
lines with the headquarters in control through direct command-type instructions 
to its constituent parts. The commissioning structure of the NHS reflects such a 
model, with SHAs and PCTs forming integral parts of the one unified 
organisation held together by uniform regulations and by a master plan 
developed at or near the top and then promulgated down the hierarchy. A “one 
size fits all” approach has the benefit of standardisation throughout the entire 
health system but runs the risk of losing local sensitivity and ownership of the 
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decision. Not only could it result in PCT CEOs not prioritising the right policies 
and plans due to their attention being focused on demonstrating compliance 
over whether the proposed change is needed by or would benefit the local PCT, 
it could also disenfranchise PCT boards and other stakeholders who may feel 
disengaged by the loss in local autonomy. Imposing a diktat of questionable 
relevance for a PCT could create at best a distraction for PCT managers, or at 
worst, leads to the wrong strategic decisions being taken with adverse impact 
on the local population health. PCT CEOs are expected to manage the situation 
of their dual accountabilities to DH and SHA, and to the PCT Board. What it 
therefore requires of PCT CEO contextual intelligence in the decision making 
process, where multiple and multi-level interests are at stake in delivering the 
national agenda and at the same time meeting local population health 
imperatives, is to appreciate the complexity of the system and to learn to 
navigate the NHS structures and rules with their varying transparencies. They 
could then apply this tacit knowledge to optimise the impact of their decisions, 
whilst acknowledging that top down priorities are likely to take priority. 
In the face of inherent conflicts between the local and national agenda, PCT 
CEOs have to be adept at recognising the decision-relevant contextual factors 
from the many legitimate factors that in theory could be taken into account. 
Given the conclusions above about CEO coping behaviours in complex, 
ambiguous, conflict ridden circumstances, there is a risk of an imbalance in 
organisational and personal interests and therefore a risk of inappropriate 
decision–making.  
Model 3 extended our understanding of the role of contextual intelligence in 
PCT CEO decision making by challenging one of the contextual assumptions of 
Model 2 (that PCT CEO decision making process is linear and in one direction) 
as it was derived from the findings of actual behaviour rather than espoused 
behaviour. However it is assumed to hold for PCT CEOs working in the same 
SHA and DH context. As current changes to the NHS have removed the PCT 
CEO role as well as changed the structure and roles and responsibilities, this 
does challenge the underpinning contextual assumptions of Model 3. It is 
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therefore important to consider the applicability, relevance and implications for 
the current NHS reorganisation.    
4.4 Implications for the current NHS reorganisation 
The 2012 Health and Social Care Act is reorganising the NHS commissioning 
structure with the creation of an independent NHSCB that is separate from the 
DH, several new NHS bodies, and replacing PCTs with CCGs and CSUs. 
CCGs will be the new local health authorities replacing PCTs. Figure 8 
compares the current and new structure of the NHS from April 2013. 
Figure 8 Current and new NHS commissioning structures of the NHS   
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rationale for the restructure stems from the government’s belief that PCTs are 
bureaucratic organisations that are too remote from patient care while decision 
making would be more effectively carried out by GPs who are closer to patients. 
To support GPs whose membership makes up the CCGs, clusters of CSUs are 
being set up to provide commissioning support. Both organisations will then be 
performance managed by the Local Area Teams (LATs). From April 2013, the 
commissioning budget for secondary care and community services in England 
will be managed by 212 CCGs. Like their predecessors, CCGs will take on the 
commissioning responsibility for the health services of patients registered with 
their constituent practices within a defined geography.  But unlike PCTs, CCGs 
have been given a reduced management allowance and instead of having 
internal commissioning expertise, are expected to source them from their local 
CSU. The DH has described CSUs as an interim measure to support the 
transition of PCTs to CCGs. Altogether, 27 LATs are being established as sub-
regional outposts of the four NHSCB regional offices to manage clusters of 
CCGs and to take the lead role in service reconfigurations, a responsibility 
currently held by SHAs. LATs are also to be responsible for commissioning 
primary care and a number of them will also take the lead roles for 
commissioning specialised services. Finally, the commissioning of public health 
services will be undertaken by local councils.  
The new Act has created not only new layers of bureaucracy but a larger 
number of new organisations with which CCGs have to interface. This new 
situation is undoubtedly more complex than the structure it is replacing, with the 
risks compounded by the need to save £20 billion by 2015. It has been widely 
commented that the new commissioning structures will centralise power and 
authority in the NHSCB which has already issued several policies, guidance 
and toolkits on governance, constitution and remuneration that shadow CCGs 
have to implement before they can be authorised as CCGs.  They include 
requiring applicants for the top leadership roles in CCGs, CSUs and LATs to 
undergo a national diagnostic, assessment and developmental process 
organised by the NHSCB. While the NHSCB (2012) asserted that this was to 
quality assure the process and to give prospective candidates the opportunity to 
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access development support ahead of their organisations taking up their formal 
responsibilities in April 2013, it could be argued that the selection process itself 
was reinforcing the status quo.  
4.5 Implications for CCG AOs 
As one of the goals of the restructure is to improve the quality of decision 
making, it is unclear why CCGs should be better in this regards than PCTs. 
Admittedly it is early days, but there is no reason why the same lessons and 
insights gleaned from this research that apply to PCT CEOs would not apply to 
CCG Accountable Officers (AOs). The situations that will be faced by the new 
AOs in decision making are likely to be at least equivalent to that experienced 
by PCT CEOs due to the CCGs’ position as the local health authority. In terms 
of contextual intelligence, CCGs will still have to implement national and 
regional policies while responding to the health priorities in their constituency. 
They will also have to achieve the performance expectations set out in those 
policies as well as meet existing national standards and regulations. The cap 
placed by DH on management costs has resulted in CCGs having a simpler 
organisational internal structure compared to PCTs. The CCGs will therefore 
have to work with and achieve through CSUs, making the decision making 
processes potentially more complex. For the AO, it could also mean a virtual 
TMT that straddles two organisations. As with PCTs, the local external contexts 
will continue to provide CCGs with additional boundaries for prioritisation, as 
stakeholders, in particular, the other significant organisations including the 
LATs, are likely to want to have a say on decision making and implementation 
at the local level and will have to be managed accordingly. All of these changes 
increase the complexity of the new situation, suggesting there is at least the 
likelihood that there will still be the range of explicit and implicit rules and 
structures that influence AO decision making behaviours.  
The situation clearly demonstrate that the context facing the new AO has 
sufficient equivalence to the PCT CEO role and that the new NHS context 
shares the critical features of its predecessor that prompted the “coping” 
behaviours to warrant examining what could be learned by the application of it 
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to the AO role. If anything, the new structure is more complex, has more layers, 
more relationships are involved, policy contexts are more complicated and still 
emerging – all contributing to a more complex decision making context. What 
this means for the AO role is that the role of contextual intelligence in decision 
making becomes even more critical. As the AO steers her CCG through the 
complexity of the new system, she has to balance central demands with local 
sensitivity, aligning top down policies and local strategies while taking into 
account both the organisational internal and local external contexts, engaging 
and managing key stakeholders, notably from other significant organisations, in 
delivering the expected performance, ensuring that decision making processes 
are robust and inclusive, and working with her TMT to implement the agreed 
decisions. To help her navigation, the AO has to be aware of how the relevant 
structures and rules work in practice. If we were to use Model 3 to analyse the 
decision making pathway from the perspective of the CCG AO in place of the 
PCT CEO, then it is apparent that each of the elements in the model is relevant 
to the new CCGs, except that the decision making context itself is more 
complex as well as unclear.  While “performance expectations”, “organisational 
internal context” and “external local context” will remain critical contextual 
factors, the main differences in the model are 
a) More complex and tenuous decision making processes arising from the 
additional layers of the hierarchy and the need to involve many more 
organisations, not least all of the constituent GP practices in each CCG.  
b) More complex and challenging stakeholder management as a CCG will 
have to relate to a much larger number of “other significant 
organisations” including the newly created CSUs, LATs and NHSCB 
(replacing SHAs), Health and Wellbeing Boards, the Local Education and 
Training Board (LETB), Public Health England and Health Watch.  
c) Instead of every member of the Top Management Team (TMT) being 
located within the CCG, the TMT will have to form virtual teams with CSU 
staff who will be acting as CCG agents. They will also have to be much 
more involved in the decision making process 
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d) Responsibility for implementation of commissioning intentions will sit with 
another body, the CSU, thus interrupting the seemingly important 
process of decision-making adjustment  
e) An increase in the complexity of the structures and rules due to the 
compounded effects of the additional layers and players in the NHS 
organisational structure, with areas that are implicit and not transparent 
causing confusion and delay in decision making.  
There will still be a focal point for national, regional and local policy decision 
making which needs to be taken at the CCG level. The job descriptions and 
person specifications for CCG AOs have similar requirements as those for PCT 
CEOs, despite the job title and pay reflecting the lower status of CCGs in the 
new organisational hierarchy, which may make it more difficult for AOs to 
navigate the new system. It is inevitable that in any transition period, there will 
be more complexity and more uncertainly, as structures are still emerging and 
the rules are still changing. The situation replicates and exaggerates the 
complexity issues as the entire system becomes unstable due to changes in 
leadership and personnel, new ways of working, new individual identities and 
roles, and loss of previous relationships and organisational memory.  These 
complexity issues could give rise to adverse decision making behaviours such 
as delays in taking decisions, delays in taking actions, more (rather than less) 
central control, drop in performance due a lack of focus, and staff 
disengagement and poor morale leading to underperformance. In placing the 
AO within the CCG and giving them the same critical responsibility as the CEO 
had in the PCT, we can make tentative predictions on the situations that could 
arise and their coping behaviour. Reflecting on how PCT CEOs deal with 
complexity, we can expect bounded rationality as the AOs simplify and prioritise 
competing contextual intelligence; get political, and delay making decisions. 
Sometimes it is about being seen to make decisions (than about the decision 
itself). They are also likely to continually negotiate and to focus their attention 
on meeting national performance targets, managing upwards to the LATs and 
NHSCB, and outwards with CSUs, GPs and other stakeholders, building a 
strong TMT and seeking out and responding to the contextual intelligence on 
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structures and rules as they evolve. While the model is evolving, predictions can 
only be tentative, but this is the coping behaviour that could ensure the AO is 
able to maintain the momentum of progress to date and not let them unravel. As 
such “coping” behaviours are likely to impact adversely on decision quality, 
timeliness and implementation, what needs to be avoided is a one size fits all 
approach form the NHSCB and further centralization of power and decision 
making. Instead, what is needed at the CCG level is to anticipate decision 
making issues and to take pre-emptive actions in the form of better 
understanding of the structures and rules underpinning the contextual factors in 
order to enhance decision effectiveness. 
The implications for the new commissioning structure are the need to create as 
much clarity as possible about each of the elements in Model 3, and in 
particular about the rules and structures. While some of these will remain the 
same as before the reforms were implemented, others will be different. In the 
short term, everybody will have to learn afresh about the new implicit features 
such as where the power bases are located.  Longer term, the AOs’ context will 
change, making it more imperative for the players to understand the nuances of 
the underlying factors. Given the imperative of delivering the challenging 
national health agenda and policy for improving clinical leadership and 
engagement of stakeholders at the grass root level, the development of CCG 
AOs would importantly include learning about the underpinning rules and 
structures in the NHS, both to improve their personal effectiveness, and the 
performance of their CCGs. It is clear that, despite the rhetoric of “Liberating the 
NHS” (DH, 2010), this analysis finds that the factors which comprise critical 
contextual intelligence that heavily influences key decision makers are still 
present. In addition, the system is more complex. It is likely therefore that the 
new organisational arrangements could well serve to increase the difficulty of 
appropriate decision making, making it more important than ever that the new 
CCG leaders understand and develop their contextual intelligence in decision 
making.  
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5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND AREAS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
5.1 Study limitations 
 The systematic review of published evidence on the whole reported positive 
findings, based on quantitative methods or structured interviews, which could 
have missed out on thick descriptions of theories in use. he peer status of the 
interviewer in Project 2’s structured interviews despite risk avoidance measures  
may have constrained participant openness and honesty. .  
Project 3 used diary analysis and an interpretive analysis of interview transcripts 
relating to an away day event. As the accounts are retrospective, they 
depended on good participant recall and could suffer from the same constraints 
as Project 2.  
In participant observation there is always a concern in field work that the 
researcher “goes native”. To minimise any potential bias, I was conscious of my 
own frame of reference throughout, and intentionally took a dispassionate view 
of events as a researcher (Gill and Johnson, 2002).  
5.2 Areas for further research  
This research study prompts several potential areas for potentially productive 
research.  
a) The research concluded with a derived model of the informal / formal, 
explicit/implicit structure and rules that govern CEO decision-making 
behaviour. The next step in developing this model would be to explore it 
with members of the study population to clarify and elaborate 
understanding of the mechanisms in practice.  
b) This study focussed on PCT CEOs whose function defined a specific 
arena of strategic decisions.  Using similar methodology, with another 
population of NHS CEOs leading different types of NHS organisations, 
for example NHS Trusts or NHS Foundation Trusts, would potentially be 
both theoretically valuable as well as of increasing practical importance 
and relevance as in contrast to PCTs who were commissioners of health 
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services, NHS Trusts are providers, so are likely to have a different 
conception of the operating context. And it is where the balance of top 
down and local considerations is explicitly undergoing change. An 
appreciation of different relevant factors, the rules and structures and the 
extent to which Foundation Trust CEOs (and their staff) recognise these 
in practice may be critical to success.   
c) The 2012 Health Act is introducing new NHS organisations to replace 
PCTs and SHAs. While it would be interesting to study how they work 
and how contextual intelligence might apply at this stage I can only 
speculate on the implications for AOs and CCGs as it is still very early 
days in the formation of the NHSCB, CCGs, CSS and LATs for them to 
be the focus of study. What is clear is that the NHS landscape has 
become more crowded with new players and new rules being introduced, 
which make the role of contextual intelligence in decision makers more 
relevant than ever. It would be worthwhile in due course (say, two years), 
to explore how the model applies in the context of the new NHS senior 
leadership decision-making roles. 
d) As Project 2 demonstrates NHS sector specific contextual intelligence 
factors and Project 3 some institutional specific contextual factors, the 
insights and methods can be applied to derive a contextual intelligence 
model for CEOs of other public or not for profit organisations. Equally as 
sector contexts appear to be important, CEOs from different industry 
sectors could provide a more informative basis on which to define sector 
specific contextual intelligence requirements.  
e) Specific findings emerging from this study which warrant further 
investigations includes 
 The salience of the CEO advisor as a commonly cited factor in CEO 
decision-making raises a number of questions about their strategic 
role, In an increasingly complex decision-making environment, it 
would be useful to understand how context affects the use of formal 
versus informal advisory systems and how advisors are selected and 
used 
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 Explore the productivity of engaging patients and service users in 
strategic planning. In this study patients and service users featured 
low down in factors taken account of by PCT CEOs decision-making 
both in theory and in practice. Not only is this surprising against the 
policy backdrop of patient–led NHS in place at the time of this 
research but if these decision-making behaviours are sustained by 
the factors identified here then they pose a challenge for the strategic 
direction of a patient centred NHS and the principle of “no decision 
about me without me” promoted by the Secretary of State in the 
“Equity and Excellence” White Paper (Lansley, 2010). A potential 
research question to be addressed in the future is the impact of 
involving patients in the strategic decision making process and 
whether they lead to a change in CEO decision making behaviour.  
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6 PERSONAL REFLECTIONS 
The executive doctorate has been an eye opening experience for me into the 
world of research and academia. From a research skills point of view, I have 
learnt about research methods and how to conduct primary research. My 
conceptual thinking skills have also developed which have improved my ability 
to communicate clearly, succinctly and precisely, orally and in writing. It has 
been a very long journey that has been attenuated by changes in employment 
and roles at work, during which time I have also developed as an executive and 
been appointed as a CEO. The 2012 Health and Social Care Act is 
implementing further changes to the NHS landscape, making the contribution of 
contextual intelligence to CEO competency development more important than 
ever.  
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Appendix A 
Chronology of DBA journey as a result of work 
pressures and demands 
 
Year Job situation DBA process 
2004-05 SHA Director of Performance  Project 1 scoping study  
2005-06 SHA executive restructure led 
to role change  
Project 1 systematic review  
 
Delay due to learning new job 
2006-07 SHA reconfigurations led to 
redundancy  
Project 1 completed  
 
Delay due to job insecurity 
2007-08 Interim and then substantive 
CEO of a failed PCT 
Project 2 started  
 
Suspension (8 months) June – 
Jan due to work pressures 
2008-09 CEO of PCT in turnaround Project 2 and Project 3 data 
collection  
 
Suspension (6 months) Jan 
09-July 10 due to work 
pressures 
2009-10  CEO of PCT in recovery Project 2 completed  
 
2010-11 PCT reconfigurations led to 
redundancy  
Project 3 completed 
 
Suspension (6 months) June- 
Nov due to job insecurity  
2011-12 CEO of NHS Trust  Linking Document completed 
 
DBA submission (extension of 
thesis handing in date) 
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7 INTRODUCTION 
Project 1 is the initial project of three designed to address the overarching 
question of how contextual intelligence influences Primary Care Trust (PCT) 
CEO strategic decision making in the English National Health Service (NHS). 
The question arose following widespread concerns expressed by senior leaders 
in both the NHS and Department of Health (DH) about the high turnover of 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the service.  
At the time of study, I was working as Director of Performance at a Strategic 
Health Authority (SHA), the intermediate tier between the DH and PCTs and 
NHS Trusts, and was responsible for managing the performance of 18 NHS 
organisations within the SHA area. I had read In Their Time – the greatest 
business leaders of the twentieth century by Mayo and Nohria (2005) who use 
the term contextual intelligence to describe executives who took account of 
macro level contextual factors in strategic decision making. I was interested in 
exploring the concept’s applicability to CEOs operating in the NHS for reasons 
of CEO performance development, not least because I also aspired to forge a 
career leading NHS organisations. 
The rest of this report goes on to, one, explain why contextual intelligence is 
worthy of research and what are its features; two, describe what is involved in a 
systematic literature review and how the process was carried out in this 
research; three, present the results in a systematic way that enables the 
findings to be synthesised; four, discuss the findings to build theories and, 
finally, allow conclusions to be drawn. On the basis of the evidence, a literature 
based model of contextual intelligence is proposed. 
7.1 Context matters for organisational performance  
Today’s organisational leaders have to deal with increasing complexity in a 
dynamic environment where success is dependent on how they adapt to 
continually changing contexts. As managers carry out their role, the one thing of 
which they can be sure is that things will change. The “nothing endures but 
change” wisdom from Heraclitus, a Greek philosopher from 535-475 BC, implies 
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that leaders need to understand, diagnose, and respond to their changing 
contexts to remain effective. This assertion challenges the conventional views 
of organisational leadership which have so far largely focused on personal 
qualities and what leaders do, over why they do what they do, or how they 
formulate strategic intent.  
Much of the research into leader behaviour and contexts has been in large US 
corporations. Miles et al., 1978; Porter, 1980 and 1985). A key study from 
Lieberson and O’Connor (1972) on organisational and environmental 
constraints and leader influence found non leadership factors to account for the 
vast majority of performance variations. Similar findings were reported by 
Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) when they looked at mayoral effects on city 
budgets. Samuelson, Galbraith and McGuire (1985) found changing CEOs did 
not significantly affect firm performance, although new CEOs tend to be more 
risk averse. In an extension of Leiberson and O’Connor’s work, Weiner and 
Mahoney (1981) modelled corporate performance as a function of 
environmental, organisational and leadership influences and concluded that 
situational factors affect organisational performance, and the independent 
impact of individual leadership on performance is not more than 15%.  
From these studies, it can be surmised that contextual factors have some 
impact on organisational performance, as, in each case, the vast majority of 
performance variation was accounted for by non-leadership factors.  
7.2 . Relationship between leader and context 
Evidence of senior leaders needing to understand and take into account context 
in strategic decision making to ensure organisational health and survival 
include, at the extreme, major world events such as the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan where not just lawyers and commentators but governments are 
scrutinising decisions made by presidents and prime ministers. In that sense, 
the normative organisations are no different. 
The perspective on leader-context relationship is rooted in the work of 
organisational contingency theory. The organisational contingency framework 
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(Burns & Stalker, 1994; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Miles, Snow, Meyer, & 
Coleman, 1978) was first introduced in the late 1950s and early 1960s in 
response to interests in the concept of the environment in organisational 
relations. Prior to this, a closed systems view of organisations was predominant, 
especially in classical management theory where organisations were treated as 
if their internal operations were the sole concerns of management. Once the 
idea that organisations are open to their environments was established by the 
systems theorists (Bertalanffy, 1972; Boulding, 1956)(Boulding, 1956), the 
concept further developed over the next few decades and now, the environment 
is assumed to be influential.  
The organisational contingency approach has two sub-schools – the 
deterministic and the strategic choice thinkers. Deterministic researchers were 
the early contingency researchers. Woodward (1965), Thompson (Thompson, 
1967b)(1967a) and Perrow (1967)  focused on technological determinism while 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) studied environmental determinism. By the 1970s, 
the later contingency researchers were proposing that it is managers who 
create and shape the environments to which their organisations adapt. The 
environmental strategic choice perspective holds that managers’ perceptions of 
their organisations’ environments are the basis for their decisions (Miles et al., 
1978). While some environmental factors will be included, perception theory 
states that others will be filtered out and ignored (Tyler and Steensma, 1998; 
Kassinis and Panayiotou, 2006). Hence exactly the same environment may be 
perceived differently by two managers depending on how they make sense of 
their contexts, which would then influence their decisions on everything from 
organisational design to developing their firm’s strategy and process. Managers 
thus enact, rather than react to, their environments. That is, they change them, 
rather than are changed by them (Weick, 1979). So, over a 40 year period, the 
preferred managerial model shifted from that of a reactive actor into a proactive 
sensemaker. 
With the strategic choice theory gathering momentum, Salancik and Pfeffer 
(1977) advise managers to pay more attention to identifying the critical 
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contingencies of their environments, which they see as determining most of the 
structure affecting organisational outcomes and problems. In order to manage 
the environment, managers should systematically construct an accurate 
contextual model that would also deal with the changing contingencies. It 
follows that organisational leaders need to be able to “diagnose” the 
organisational context in which they are working before they could decide on 
the “best fit” response. Miles et al. (1978) believe that such strategic decisions 
will be directed at maintaining the organisation’s alignment with its environment 
as well as managing its major internal interdependencies, arguing that 
organisational behaviour is only partially pre-ordained by environmental 
conditions and that the choices top managers make follow a general model of 
the adaptive process, which determine the strategic typology of their 
organisations.  
Accordingly, it is important to understand how organisational leaders such as 
CEOs make sense of the factors or variables that lend themselves to a 
contextual diagnosis, and use this knowledge to inform their strategic decision 
making. It is the ability to understand and diagnose one’s changing contexts 
and take appropriate strategic decisions that I am choosing to call “contextual 
intelligence”. 
7.3 Conceptualising contextual intelligence 
Context sets the milieu within which a CEO operates. According to Jenkins 
(1998), to be an effective operator requires having reasons and acting 
intentionally, which is the character of intelligence. Therefore a simple construct 
of contextual intelligence would imply being mindful of the different dimensions 
of context and deciding on appropriate actions.  
The processes comprising intelligence are guided by individual cognitive 
structures variously known as assumptions, mental models (Johnson-Laird, 
1983), schematas (Harris, 1994) and belief structures (Walsh, Henderson, & 
Deighton, 1988)  which facilitate and influence action by filtering incoming 
information as well as being the radar for sensing relevant information in the 
environment. It is recognised that their mental representations are subject to the 
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influence of collective mindsets such as industry recipes (Spender, 1989) and 
dominant logic, which have been defined as the “mindset or world view of the 
business and the administrative tools to accomplish goals and make decisions” 
which is stored as “a shared cognitive map (or set of schemas) among the 
dominant coalition” (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986).  
Attempts to understand how things happen have used cognitive mapping to 
provide the missing link between environmental conditions and strategic action 
(Huff, 1990; Jenkins, 1998; Stubbart, 1989)  but it is still unclear why some 
leaders choose to consider certain elements of context and not others in their 
decision making processes and what factors influence their strategic choices. 
To understand what may constitute contextual intelligence necessitates 
understanding the different types of context. 
That context is relevant to cognition has been proposed by Pettigrew (1990) 
and Suchman (1987).  Elsbach et al. (2005) use the term “situated cognition” to  
describe the interaction of cognitive schemas and contexts. According to 
Gronhaug and Falkenberg (1998), people come to understand their internal and 
external environment by making inferences about causes, as well as learning 
cause-effect (consequence) paths, with such paths becoming the knowledge 
structures that would facilitate future attributions. Weick (1995) calls this 
cognitive process sensemaking, which consists of a series of activities 
grounded in both cognition and context. More recently, Mayo and Nohria 
(2005), in a retrospective review, describe contextual intelligence as the key 
determinant of great business leaders and argue that, although CEOs often 
face the same contextual factors, it is their individual adaptive capacity that will 
be pivotal to their overall success.  
In order to understand what contextual intelligence is and how it could be 
developed, two questions need answering:  
 What are the features of contextual intelligence? 
 What are the mental processes of contextual intelligence? 
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7.4 Features of contextual intelligence 
Despite numerous studies on how leaders have coped with or taken advantage 
of the key contingencies facing their organisations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977a; 
Pettigrew, 1987; Mayo & Nohria, 2005; Pettigrew, 1987; Mayo & Nohria, 2005), 
the processes underlying how CEOs make sense of and respond to their 
environments are not well understood. Sternberg (1988) uses the term 
“contextual intelligence” to describe a set of three behavioural qualities:  one, 
the ability to adapt to one’s environment; two, instead of adapting, choosing to 
shape or modify the environment in order to increase the fit; and three, to select 
one’s environment by exercising choice in strategic decision making. 
While both researchers and practitioners have moved towards a more rounded 
approach in contextual analysis in terms of levels of analysis (ranging from 
intra-organisational level, through to sector, broad economic and political 
context levels) and degree of complexity (Pettigrew, Woodman, & Cameron, 
2001), the elements of contextual intelligence are not clear from the literature.  
Sternberg (2003) believes leaders need to be able to retrieve information that is 
relevant to leadership decisions and to analyse and evaluate different courses 
of action, so abilities to recall, recognize, analyse, evaluate and judge 
information are particularly important. For Mayo and Nohria (2005) the ability to 
identify, understand and adapt to different situational contexts, so called 
adaptive capacity, will be pivotal to a CEO’s overall success. So a construct of 
contextual intelligence needs to include elements of contextual variables that 
are both non-linear and multi-levelled and a sequence of information processing 
activities that makes up the sensemaking pathway. 
7.5 Process of contextual intelligence 
A contextual intelligence process would consist of sequences of events, actions, 
and activities unfolding over time to enable an individual to make sense of the 
changing contexts and to take strategic decisions. An example of such an 
approach is used by Mayo and Nohria (2005) in their retrospective study of 
1000 successful US business executives  selected on the basis of financial 
performance and/or they have led a business or service that changed the way 
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Americans lived, worked or interacted in the twentieth century. When they 
analysed the reasons for the CEOs’ success, six factors - government 
intervention, global events, demography, social mores, technology, and labour – 
were found to be especially influential. Mayo and Nohria used the term 
“contextual intelligence” to describe the manner in which the executives were 
sensitive to macro-level contextual factors in the creation, growth or 
transformation of their business. Their model of context-based leadership is 
shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9 Contextual model of leadership (Mayo and Nohria, 2005) 
 
Context-based leadership
Government 
Intervention
Labour Globalevents
Consumer
DemographyTechnology
Social
Mores
Evolving opportunity structure
(making sense of context)
Business
executive
Entrepreneur
•Creates new business
•Marshals resources
•Identifies new opportunities
Manager
•Expands existing businesses
•Aligns and optimises resources
•Harnesses growth potential
Leader
•Reinvigorates businesses
•Champions turnarounds
•Recognises latent potential
Contextual Landscape
 
 
In the model, contextual factors are set out in the top box titled “contextual 
landscape”. The consumer is placed at the centre as the authors believe that 
the consumer is often the focus of the effects of the other six contextual factors. 
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Government intervention in the forms of regulation and protection would 
influence the degree of autonomy that a CEO could exert. Globalisation could 
be either threats or opportunities and the ability of CEOs to adapt and optimize 
global events had significant consequences for their businesses’ sustainable 
performance.  Population demographic changes influenced both the marketing 
of products and services as well as the management of the workforce.  While 
consumers shaped and were shaped by the social mores of their time, due to 
their cyclical nature, Mayo and Nohria regard the interpretation of this 
contextual factor as requiring the greatest amount of adaptability and flexibility 
on the part of business executives. As increasingly sophisticated consumers 
became pivotal to the acceptance or rejection of new forms of technology, it 
often requires a CEO who can understand and then fulfil the potential of a 
specific technology. Finally, as the workforce experienced cycles of progress 
and redundancy tied to the country’s overall levels of economic prosperity, 
CEOs who invested in employee development were proactively managing this 
contextual factor as a source of human capital. 
The trapezium in the middle, labelled “evolving opportunity structure”, refers to 
the executive sensemaking process which leads subsequently to business 
strategy. Mayo and Nohria classify the business executives they studied into 
three archetypes (bottom three boxes): entrepreneur, manager and leader, 
based on their approaches to context. They emphasized that executives must 
be keenly attuned to the macro context of the times to be successful, and that 
contextual intelligence plays a critical role in building and shaping lasting 
business success. 
From their analysis, Mayo and Nohria (2005) draw the following conclusions:  
1. Context matters, and in contrast to the “great man” theory, long term 
success is derived not from the sheer force of an individual’s personality and 
character but is related to sensitivity to context. 
2. Leaders need to consider the temporal context in terms of life-cycle stage of 
the company or industry and choose approaches that are most aligned with 
their strengths and capabilities.  
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3. To be successful in the long term, the leader must possess the flexibility and 
courage to change direction when the environment changes, which requires 
both an awareness of the changing landscape and the ability to adapt with it. 
4. Success in one time and in one place does not necessarily translate to 
success in another time and in another context. When recruiting CEOs, 
boards are advised to focus on the individual’s unique ability to identify, 
understand and adapt to different situational contexts. 
5. Individuals considering career choices should align their personal strengths 
and preferences with the life-cycle stage and context of their potential 
employer.  
6. Enhancing contextual intelligence means becoming a “first rate noticer”: 
Mayo and Nohria advise individuals to not only develop an awareness of 
context but also possess the ability and desire to act on that awareness. 
Mayo and Nohria’s (2005) model provides a useful starting point for analysing 
contextual intelligence and its impact for a number of reasons. First, it connects 
contextual intelligence with organisational and personal success, thereby linking 
CEO sensemaking of context and organisational outcomes. Second, the model 
uses the contextual intelligence concept to link context and firm performance. 
Mayo and Nohria were able to show that the business strategy of successful 
firms matches the prevailing contextual landscape. Third, the model identifies 
and explains the macro-economic dimensions of context, namely government 
interventions, labour, technology, social mores, population demography and 
global events, and their impacts on business strategy. It also links contextual 
factors to each other and to a focal point - the consumer – thereby presenting 
different perspectives on the competitive landscapes. Fourth, it offers a 
systematic way of describing the macro-economic context. And fifth, it usefully 
conceives of an iterative, evolving and dynamic sensemaking and decision 
making process.  
Nevertheless, the model has a number of limitations. One, the contextual 
landscape of six macro dimensions does not cover the full range of contextual 
features. The model neither took into consideration intra-organisational factors, 
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nor, for that matter, the local environmental context. Two, the model does not 
adequately address or expand the contextual intelligence process beyond 
summarising it as the “evolving opportunity structure”. Three, Mayo and Nohria 
had neither measured nor evaluated the CEOs’ contextual intelligence as 
defined by their own model. Four, the model assigned the 1000 business 
leaders into one of three types based on how their actions were perceived and 
interpreted by the authors.  While a typology could be useful, the case definition 
for each type was unclear. Five, it was Mayo and Nohria’s own interpretation 
that the business leaders had intentionally taken advantage of contextual 
opportunities without considering that successes could be down to luck or 
chance. Six, as the data were based on available secondary source information 
about their subjects as well as general knowledge about the historical context, it 
was difficult to correlate particular CEO decisions to specific organisational 
outcomes to demonstrate how contextual intelligence affected organisational 
performance. And finally, the focus on success stories further limits the model’s 
explanatory value.  
Despite the criticisms, Mayo and Nohria’s thesis is still a valuable contribution to 
contingency theory of leadership as it diverts attention from general leader 
qualities or behaviours to the interactions between environmental factors and 
conditions under which the leader operates. Unlike previous contingency 
theories which focus on more immediate conditions such as the nature of the 
task or characteristics of the followers, the emphasis here is on the constraints 
and opportunities faced by the organisational leader, the importance of 
contextual intelligence and adaptive capacity. It highlights the importance of 
leader sensitivity to context and their ability to adapt strategically.  
Nevertheless, the model has a number of limitations. One, the contextual 
landscape of six macro dimensions does not cover the full range of contextual 
features. The model neither took into consideration intra-organisational factors, 
nor, for that matter, the local environmental context. Two, the model does not 
adequately address or expand the contextual intelligence process beyond 
summarising it as the “evolving opportunity structure”. Three, Mayo and Nohria 
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had neither measured nor evaluated the CEOs’ contextual intelligence as 
defined by their own model. Four, the model assigned the 1000 business 
leaders into one of three types based on how their actions were perceived and 
interpreted by the authors.  While a typology could be useful, the case definition 
for each type was unclear. Five, it was Mayo and Nohria’s own interpretation 
that the business leaders had intentionally taken advantage of contextual 
opportunities without considering that successes could be down to luck or 
chance. Six, as the data were based on available secondary source information 
about their subjects as well as general knowledge about the historical context, it 
was difficult to correlate particular CEO decisions to specific organisational 
outcomes to demonstrate how contextual intelligence affected organisational 
performance. And finally, the focus on success stories further limits the model’s 
explanatory value.  
Despite the criticisms, Mayo and Nohria’s thesis is still a valuable contribution to 
contingency theory of leadership as it diverts attention from general leader 
qualities or behaviours to the interactions between environmental factors and 
conditions under which the leader operates. Unlike previous contingency 
theories which focus on more immediate conditions such as the nature of the 
task or characteristics of the followers, the emphasis here is on the constraints 
and opportunities faced by the organisational leader, the importance of 
contextual intelligence and adaptive capacity. It highlights the importance of 
leader sensitivity to context and their ability to adapt strategically.  
7.6 Purpose of the systematic review 
What is missing from the knowledge so far is an understanding of the 
components of the relationship between context and the organisational leader. 
The systematic review set out to examine the different ways CEOs conceive of 
their contexts and how this sensemaking process influences how they make 
decisions.  By deconstructing contextual intelligence, the systematic review is 
designed to lay bare prior concepts, including how they are defined, observed 
and analysed, and critically examine the underlying theoretical models. It is 
unclear what role context plays in influencing CEO strategic decision making, 
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and whether a CEO’s contextual intelligence impacts on organisational 
performance.  
As an executive whose daily activities involve monitoring the performance of 
NHS organisations and supporting CEOs and their top management teams to 
improve performance, my personal observations of NHS CEOs are that they 
differ in their consideration of contexts in strategic decision making and actions. 
The systematic review will therefore concentrate in part on establishing whether 
any such models have been used or written about before and, if so, what 
models have been used and how useful they have proved to be. It aims to 
clarify each of the important concepts associated with contextual intelligence, 
their sub-components, structure, how they relate to each other and any specific 
evidence in the NHS context.  
Based on the above aims, the systematic review will explore the following 
questions: 
a) What are the key dimensions or aspects of context that a CEO needs 
to consider?  
b) What are the key dimensions or aspects of context in relation to a CEO 
of an NHS trust? 
c) What is the process of executive sensemaking and how can it be 
captured?  
d) What is the relationship between context, sensemaking and decision 
making?  
e) What is the research evidence that contextual intelligence impacts on 
organisational performance? 
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8 METHODOLOGY 
8.1 Overview 
This chapter sets out the systematic review protocol used for the review. A 
systematic review aims to produce a comprehensive and replicable analysis 
and synthesis of the available evidence, to enable summary conclusions to be 
drawn and gaps identified for future research. 
8.2 Conducting a systematic search 
8.2.1 The review panel 
A review panel was formed to advise the review process at each stage of its 
development. Members of the panel are set out in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 Membership of systematic review panel 
Person Title/Organisation Role in the review 
Dr Catherine Bailey Director, Cranfield General 
Management Programmes 
Supervisor 
Prof. Kim James Director, DBA programme, 
Cranfield SOM 
Review panel chair 
Nina Bhatia Partner, McKinsey’s  Practitioner (external) 
Dr David Denyer Senior Research Fellow, 
Cranfield SOM 
Advisor of systematic 
review method  
Heather Woodfield Information Specialist, 
Cranfield Library 
Advisor for literature 
search process 
 
I also took advice from two external academics: Professor Andrew Pettigrew, 
Dean and Head of Management School of University of Bath and an expert on 
contextual analysis; and Professor Anne Huff, Visiting Professor at Cranfield 
University and the Institute for Information, Organisation  Management, 
Technische Universitat Munchen.  
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8.2.2 Search strategy 
8.2.2.1 Mapping the fields 
To develop the contextual intelligence construct requires an understanding of 
the key concepts underlying context and sensemaking as well as knowledge of 
the connection between these concepts and organisational outcomes 
(performance). A systematic review verifies the existence of a potential gap in 
the management literature identified during the scoping study and specifies the 
depth to which I would go. As the research focus is on how CEOs make sense 
of their context and if and how that affects how they make strategic decisions, 
the systematic review will cover what is published in the scholarly literature 
about the concepts and sub-components of context, sensemaking, managerial 
cognition, action and organisational outcomes. It will also include any relevant 
evidence about the NHS context from published reports and practitioner 
literature.  
The scoping study identified the following search fields (see Figure 10). 
Intelligence was located at the intersection of context and managerial cognition 
as the aim was to gather evidence concerning primarily CEOs that approaches 
intelligence as per its original Latin verb intelligere which means to “pick out” or 
discern, and is also the medieval term for understanding, rather than as a purely 
cognitive function.  Similarly, sensemaking is located at the intersection of 
cognition and organisational performance, as Mayo and Nohria regard the 
making sense of context by the senior leader as a contributor to organisational 
performance. In the case of the NHS at the intersection of context and 
organisational performance, I was looking for NHS specific evidence where 
there is a relationship between context and organisational performance. Where 
all of the search fields overlap, they contribute to make up the contextual 
intelligence construct. 
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Figure 10 Mapping the fields 
 
Context Managerial 
Cognition
Contextual 
Intelligence
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Organizational 
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8.2.2.2 Key words and search strings 
The aim is to generate as comprehensive a list as possible of primary studies, 
both published and unpublished, which may be suitable for answering the 
questions posed in paragraph 1.6. As the development of a search strategy is 
an iterative process, one attempt will rarely produce the final strategy. The initial 
searches conducted for the scoping study helped to identify the literature gap 
and provided key words for the search strings. As part of the systematic review 
process, I carried out numerous searches, discussed the results of the searches 
with my supervisor and other academic advisors on the panel, as well as 
consulted experts in the field to ensure that all relevant search items are 
covered. The keywords and their variants capturing essential concepts with 
which to conduct the review are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 Keywords and phrases used in systematic review 
Chief executive 
officers (chief execute* 
or CEO*) or executive* 
Managerial cognition (or 
percep* or belief* or 
knowledge* or recogni* 
or insigh*) 
 
Mental or cognitive 
representation (mental 
represen* or model* or 
schem* or frame or 
recipe* or mindset*) 
Strategic capabilities 
or management 
 
Context (context* or 
environmen* or 
situation) 
Decision making 
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Intelligence or 
information processing 
Environmental scanning Strategic choice 
Organisation (organis* 
or firm) 
Performance (perform* 
or effective* or failure) 
Sensemaking 
Performance 
 
Managerial behaviour or 
behav* or act* 
 
National Health Service 
or NHS 
 
The following search strings were used in the systematic review (Table 3): 
Table 3 Search strings used in systematic review 
string Key words 
S1 Chief executive* (or CEO*) OR executive* AND Managerial 
cognition (or percep* or belief* or knowledge* or recogni* or 
insight) OR Mental representation (mental represen* or model* or 
schem* or frame or recipe* or mindset*) 
S2 Chief executive* (or CEO*) OR executive* AND Sensemaking 
S3 Chief executive* (or CEO*) AND Context (context* or environmen* 
or situation) AND Intelligence  
S4 Chief executive* (or CEO*) AND Intelligence  
S5 Chief executive* ( or CEO*) AND Context (context* or environmen* 
or situation) AND information processing 
S6 Chief executive* (or CEO*) OR executive* AND Decision making 
S7 Chief executive* (or CEO*) OR executive* AND Strategic choice 
S8 Chief executive* (or CEO*) OR executive* AND Behaviour (behav* 
or act* ) AND performance 
S9 Managerial cognition (or percep* or belief* or knowledge* or 
recogni* or insigh*) AND Organisation (organis* or firm) AND 
Performance (perform* or effective* or failure) 
S10 Context (context* or environmen* or situation) AND Environmental 
scanning 
S11 Managerial cognition (or percep* or belief* or knowledge* or 
recogni* or insigh*) AND Performance (perform* or effective* or 
failure) 
S12 Strategic capabilities or management AND Decision making OR 
Strategic choice 
S13 Strategic decision making AND performance (perform* or effective* 
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or failure) AND CEO* 
S14 Information processing AND performance (perform* or effective* or 
failure) 
S15 Sensemaking 
S16 Environmental scanning AND Performance (perform* or effective* 
or failure) 
S17 Mental representation (mental represen* or model* or schem* or 
frame or recipe* or mindset*) AND CEO* 
S18 Chief executive* (or CEO*) AND National Health Service or NHS 
 
In addition to key words, I also searched key authors, to ensure that important 
publications were not overlooked. Secondary references cited in primary papers 
were also searched. 
8.2.2.3 Databases 
To achieve the aims of the review, I had to balance sensitivity (ability to identify 
relevant articles) against specificity (ability to exclude irrelevant articles). Two 
electronic databases were used as the main search engines, namely, Abi 
Proquest and EBSCO (see Table 4 and Table 5), although, because there was 
significant overlap in the journals between the two databases, Proquest was 
used as the principal search engine with backup from EBSCO. This strategy 
proved to be helpful, especially when following up secondary references or 
searching for older papers, as Proquest tends to hold more recent literature. 
The search for most of the older (pre mid-1980s) literature took place using 
EBSCO, which holds more full text documents. The search process was 
iterative, based on subject, title and abstract of scholarly journals and dates. 
Table 4 Systematic review using search strings with Proquest search engine 
Search strings Database Timeframe Number of 
hits 
Number 
relevant 
S1 Abi-Proquest All dates 142 21 
S2 Abi-Proquest All dates 5 1 
S3 Abi-Proquest All dates 150 10 
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Table 4 summarises the number of journal articles identified from using 
Proquest as a search engine. The most productive strings were S1 (CEO or 
executive cognition), S3 (CEO, context and intelligence), S6 (executive decision 
making), S15 (sensemaking) and S17 (CEO mental representations). This 
reveals that research in these areas had largely focused on cognitive processes 
and intelligence as a psychological function.  
Similar patterns were found with EBSCO, as shown in Table 5, with search 
strings S1 (CEO or executive cognition) and S15 (sensemaking) being most 
productive, followed by S6 (executive decision making) and S17 (CEO mental 
representations). Of significance with both search engines were the low returns 
for search strings S2 (CEO intelligence), S12 (strategic capabilities and decision 
making) and S18 (CEOs operating in the NHS) showing gaps in evidence. The 
search string S15 (sensemaking) drew many papers that were theoretical and 
non specific to context. 
S4 Abi-Proquest All dates 30 2 
S5 Abi-Proquest All dates 21 6 
S6 Abi-Proquest All dates 99 15 
S7 Abi-Proquest All dates 21 6 
S8 Abi-Proquest All dates 16 6 
S9 Abi-Proquest All dates 4 2 
S10 Abi-Proquest All dates 18 4 
S11 Abi-Proquest All dates 15 6 
S12 Abi-Proquest All dates 6 1 
S13 Abi-Proquest All dates 24 4 
S14 Abi-Proquest All dates 53 5 
S15 Abi-Proquest All dates 165 33 
S16 Abi-Proquest All dates 52 8 
S17 Abi-Proquest All dates 156 20 
S18 Abi-Proquest All dates 44 4 
Total   1021 154 
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Table 5 Systematic review using search strings with EBSCO search engine 
 
8.3 Inclusion and exclusion criteria and appraisal 
8.3.1 Selection criteria 
By setting selection criteria, it helps to identify articles that would answer the 
review questions. It enables both inclusion and exclusion criteria to follow 
logically from the questions and to be defined in terms of the study population, 
the topic under study, and the study designs of interest. In order to be selected, 
a study should fulfil all of the inclusion criteria and none of the exclusion criteria. 
Search strings Database Timeframe Number of 
hits 
Number 
relevant 
S1 EBSCO All dates 222 35 
S2 EBSCO All dates 32 6 
S3 EBSCO All dates 150 10 
S4 EBSCO All dates 23 2 
S5 EBSCO All dates 13 6 
S6 EBSCO All dates 82 15 
S7 EBSCO All dates 16 6 
S8 EBSCO All dates 16 6 
S9 EBSCO All dates 4 2 
S10 EBSCO All dates 18 4 
S11 EBSCO All dates 8 2 
S12 EBSCO All dates 1 1 
S13 EBSCO All dates 122 4 
S14 EBSCO All dates 38 5 
S15 EBSCO All dates 194 28 
S16 EBSCO All dates 25 8 
S17 EBSCO All dates 99 13 
S18 EBSCO All dates 25 2 
Total   1088 155 
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The selection criteria were piloted on a subset of primary studies. There were 
three stages to the selection procedure: 
 Criteria were applied to the citations generated to decide whether to 
obtain full copies of those potentially relevant  
 Full copies were obtained 
 The inclusion/exclusion criteria were applied and decisions made 
about inclusion of each study 
The subject areas were delimited by using broad selection criteria initially, 
starting with titles and abstracts of papers retrieved from searches. The criteria 
include: 
 country (UK, US, Europe, Australia), year of publication (after 1970)  
 CEOs as the study population   
 focus (CEO, performance, cognitive processes, intelligence) 
General selection criteria:  
Criteria used when reviewing titles and abstracts 
 Only primary and review studies published in scholarly journals 
 Studies focusing on CEOs, but will include the top management 
team 
 Prioritise studies on health care and public sector organisations but 
will include other sectors due to limited literature in this field from 
scoping study 
 Only empirical papers published in last 30 years will be included in 
review 
 Studies conducted in UK, US, Europe, Australia 
Selection criteria for full text papers: 
Conceptual / theoretical papers must contain: 
 Discussion of the theories or conceptual frameworks used to 
guide the development of a new approach for understanding 
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CEO cognition and performance. They should not be mere 
discussions of managerial competencies or leadership theories 
but contain the dynamics of interactions between CEOs, context, 
the intervening processes such as perception/ conception of job, 
managerial cognition, human information processing and decision 
making 
 Explicit consideration of a theory, model or conceptual framework 
to support this 
 Construction of a framework or model for linking different 
concepts e.g. contextual intelligence and sensemaking 
 A theoretical conceptual review of ideas about earlier work e.g. 
different approaches, qualitative or quantitative 
 A purpose /goal (which may be identifying a gap/demonstrating a 
new application of existing ideas in a new field, “why you are 
doing what you are doing” 
Empirical papers must contain: 
 Experiments or cases or interventions designed to enhance 
understanding of the impact of different cognitive models and 
processes on CEO performance, the link between sensemaking, 
performance and context, and relationship between information 
processing, context and managerial cognitive models 
 Factors impacting on the performance of the CEO, relationship 
between sensemaking, outcomes and context, reviews of above 
 Factors behind the success of CEOs, implications for selection, 
training and development, the barriers or reasons for failure or 
success 
Methodological papers must meet the following criteria: 
 Clear and consistent in their initial assumptions, field of study, 
sample and also in their limitations 
 Can be conceptual or empirical or independent paper 
 Research design is sound and concepts are well grounded from 
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theories 
 The results obtained should make sense with respect to 
assumptions and conceptual backgrounds; if not, then explanation 
of deviance 
 Review of methodologies earlier adopted in address same question 
8.3.2 Quality appraisal 
Quality appraisal of primary studies was used at various stages in the review 
process, from study selection to generation of recommendations for practice 
and research. The approach used was based on the following four quality 
constructs: methodological quality, evidence of avoidance of systematic error or 
bias, evidence of internal and external validity. 
The appraisal criteria based on a framework by Popay et al. (1998) was also 
used as a checklist: 
a) A primary marker: is the research aiming to explore the subjective 
meanings that people give to particular experiences of interventions? 
b) Context sensitive: has the research been designed in such a way as 
to enable it to be sensitive and flexible to changes occurring during 
the study? 
c) Sampling strategy: has the study sample been selected in a 
purposeful way shaped by theory and/or attention to the diverse 
contexts and meanings that the study is aiming to explore? 
d) Data quality: are different sources of knowledge /understanding 
about the issues that are being explored compared? 
e) Theoretical adequacy: do the researchers make explicit the process 
by which they move from data to interpretation? 
f) Generalisability: if claims were made to generalisability do these 
follow logically and/or theoretically from the data? 
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8.4 Data analysis 
The standard Cranfield- designed data extraction form in the Procite database 
was used to extract data, which helps to accurately extract relevant information 
and results from the selected studies, and minimise the biases of human error. 
As there was no specific hierarchy of qualitative evidence, I was conscious of 
the need to be consistent in my rating, to ensure that the findings reflect 
whether or not a standard had been reached. 
8.5 Amendments to final review methods 
The review departed from the protocol for a number of reasons: 
a) Some of the key words and search strings were not sufficiently refined, 
resulting in a very large number of items. In this case, I added other key 
words to the search strings, reduced the date-range and limited the 
search to scholarly journals. 
b) Some of the key words and search strings were too narrow, picking up 
few citations. In this case, I expanded the case definitions, for example 
accepting research that involved managers other than CEOs. 
c) As it became obvious there were a number of key authors and 
researchers, additional searches were performed by authors.  
d) A number of key textbooks helped to provide an overview of the research 
construct and cross-referenced other key authors. 
e) As Proquest and EBSCO identified few relevant studies on the NHS, 
advice was sought from the NHS CEO, as well as a number of leading 
researchers on leadership in the NHS. 
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9 FINDINGS 
9.1 Results from review process 
The literature was reviewed using a numerical approach to quality assessment, 
as shown in Table 6.  A summary of the selected papers that passed the quality 
review is listed in Appendix B. Every paper that scored 2 or higher in at least 
two of the four elements was accepted. This may appear to be a low threshold 
but was necessary due to the paucity of literature in the subject areas. A full 
tabulation of all of the included studies is set out in Appendix B. 
Table 6 A numerical approaches to quality assessment (adapted from Denyer, 
2006) 
Elements to 
consider 
Level 
0 – 
absence 
1 – low 2 – 
medium 
3 – high Not 
applicabl
e 
Contribution The article 
does not 
provide 
enough 
information 
to assess 
this criteria 
 
The paper 
adds little to 
the body of 
knowledge 
in this area 
Contributio
n to 
knowledge 
is trivial in 
importance 
and 
significanc
e 
Significant 
addition to 
current 
knowledge
; fill an 
important 
theory gap 
This 
element 
is not 
applicabl
e to this 
paper 
Theory The article 
does not 
approve 
enough 
information 
to assess 
this criteria 
Literature 
review is 
inadequate; 
failure to 
motivate 
study with 
practical 
implications; 
no 
underlying 
story 
Theoretical 
base is 
acceptable
; having 
practical 
rationales 
for study in 
some 
extent 
Excellent 
review of 
prior 
literature; 
strong 
theoretical 
basis; 
study has 
important 
implication
s for 
practitioner
s 
 
This 
element 
is not 
applicabl
e to this 
paper 
Method The article 
does not 
The idea of 
study is 
Justified 
research 
Research 
design 
This 
element 
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provide 
enough 
information 
to assess 
this criteria 
poorly 
executed; 
inappropriat
e 
quantitative 
methods; 
failure to 
justify 
proxies for 
variables 
design; 
acceptable 
proxies for 
variables; 
the idea of 
study is 
not fully 
executed 
adequately 
examining 
the 
theoretical 
argument; 
proxies are 
adequately 
defined 
 
is not 
applicabl
e to this 
paper 
Data 
analysis 
The article 
does not 
provide 
enough 
information 
to assess 
this criteria 
Data 
sample 
insufficiency
; weak 
connection 
between 
statistical 
results and 
economic 
story; 
inconclusive 
statistics 
Appropriat
e data 
sample; 
statistical 
results 
relate to 
study 
aims; 
adequate 
statistics 
but 
inadequate 
explanatio
n 
Adequate 
data 
sample; 
statistical 
results 
support 
theoretical 
arguments; 
well 
explained 
statistics; 
include 
limitation 
analysis 
 
This 
element 
is not 
applicabl
e to this 
paper 
 
9.2 Descriptive analysis 
This section provides an overview of the emerging study characteristics.  
9.2.1 Citation information 
A full list of citations appears in the Bibliography.   
9.2.2 Tabulation of data 
Table 7 lists the top 10 journals which together accounted for 111 out of the 
total 143 papers. The top six journals that contributed more than 10 articles 
each to the systematic review are the Strategic Management Journal (23), 
Administrative Science Quarterly (18), Journal of Management Studies (17), 
Academy of Management Review (15), Academy of Management Journal and 
Organisation Science.  
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Table 7 Top 10 journals contributing to the review 
Rank Journal Field A List 
citations 
1 Strategic Management 
Journal 
Strategic management 23 
2 Administrative Science 
Quarterly 
Administration 
 
18 
3 Journal of Management 
Studies 
Organisation theory and 
behaviour 
17 
4 Academy of Management 
Review 
New theory of 
management and 
organisations 
15 
5 Academy of Management 
Journal 
Management theory and 
practice 
11 
6 Organisation Science Operational research 
and management 
11 
7 Organisation Studies Organisation behaviour 7 
8= California Management 
Review 
Management practice 3 
8= Management Science Management  3 
8= Human Relations 
 
Social science 3 
 
An analysis of the papers reviewed according to year of publication is shown in 
Table 8. The subject areas reviewed are relatively new, with the earliest studies 
reported from mid 1970s onwards and the trend staying relatively low and 
stable until the mid 80s, since when there has been fluctuating but still low 
activity until more recently, with steady growth in interest in the fields of 
managerial cognition and sensemaking.  
Table 8 Papers reviewed according to year of publication 
Year No of publications Year No of publications 
2006 5 1987 4 
2005 11 1986 3 
2004 4 1985 3 
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2003 8 1984 7 
2002 7 1983 2 
2001 6 1982 3 
2000 5 1981 3 
1999 2 1980 3 
1998 2 1979 1 
1997 7 1978 1 
1996 1 1977 3 
1995 6 1976 2 
1994 7 1975 0 
1993 5 1974 0 
1992 7 1973 0 
1991 5 1972 3 
1990 3 1971 1 
1989 6 1970 0 
1988 7   
 
The papers were analysed according to the country setting or location (Table 9). 
The US dominates research in this area, followed a long way back by the UK.  
Table 9 Country analysis of papers reviewed 
Country No. of papers (A list) % sample 
UK 18 12.6 
North America 
USA 
Canada 
 
115 
2 
 
80.4 
1.4 
Europe 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
France 
Hungary 
 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3.5 
Asia 
Malaysia 
 
1 
 
0.7 
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Other 
Australia 
 
2 
 
1.4 
Total 143 100 
 
When the studies were analysed by industry (Table 10), the most common 
industries were manufacturing, service (notably healthcare) and institutions 
(notably universities). Healthcare organisations and universities together 
accounted for one third of all studies. This is unsurprising as the NHS was a 
search word and as hospitals and universities provide relatively easily 
accessible study populations. 
Table 10 Industry analysis of papers reviewed 
Industry No of papers 
 
% sample 
Primary 
Energy (utilities) 
Forestry 
3 
2 
1 
4.8 
Manufacturing and production 
Clothing 
Food 
Wineries 
Furniture 
General 
12 
2 
2 
1 
1 
6 
19.4 
Service 
Financial  
Insurance 
Restaurant 
Healthcare 
15 
2 
1 
1 
11 
24.5 
High technology 
Pharmaceutical 
Computer 
Unspecified 
7 
1 
2 
4 
11.7 
Institutions 
Religious order 
Fine arts museum 
12 
1 
1 
19.5 
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University 10 
Entertainment 
Orchestra 
3 
3 
4.8 
RD 1 1.7 
Transport 
Airlines 
Shipping 
3 
2 
1 
4.8 
Business 
Multinationals 
SMEs 
5 
2 
3 
8.1 
Not for profit 1 1.7 
Total 62 100 
 
All of the 143 review papers were categorised by subject area in Table 11. The 
majority of papers cover several subject areas. For example, a study examining 
managerial cognition and mental representations in decision making would be 
categorised under all three subject areas. In this case, the paper was included 
in more than one subject category. 
Table 11 Analysis by subject of all the papers reviewed 
Subject area 
 
No of papers % 
Managerial cognition 46 32.2 
Environmental scanning 13 9.1 
Information processing 51 35.7 
Decision making 30 21.2 
Organisational behaviour 8 5.7 
Performance 14 9.8 
Contextual factors 137 95.8 
 
The literature on managerial cognition focused mainly on mental 
representations (15 papers) and sensemaking (11 papers), with the rest 
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covering managerial beliefs and knowledge and strategic issue interpretation. 
Where studies referred to specific settings, they were categorised according to 
their specific context. If the study covered more than one contextual category, 
the study was included in all the relevant contextual categories. Within 
contextual factors, there were seven contextual categories and 38 sub-
categories, as summarised in Table 12. 
Table 12 Contextual analysis of papers reviewed (A list) 
Context No of papers % of sample 
Environmental dynamism 
Stable 
High velocity 
Turbulent/unstable 
Uncertain 
Hyper competitive 
 
11 
1 
3 
2 
4 
1 
6.5 
Information management 
Search 
Interpretation 
Processing 
Transmission (sensegiving) 
 
17 
7 
3 
5 
2 
10.0 
Financial  
Corporate (Profit making) 
Not for profit 
Public sector 
 
26 
21 
2 
3 
15.3 
Decision making processes 
Speed of decision making 
Flexibility/preferences/choice 
Time/Urgency  
Human information processing 
capacity 
Complexity of problems 
Cognitive perspective 
Perceived degree of discretion 
 
29 
3 
6 
3 
11 
 
1 
4 
1 
17.1 
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Organisation 
Autogenic crisis 
Relationship 
Learning 
Acquisition and divestment 
Size 
Structure 
Complex adaptive system 
Adaptation, change 
Culture, values 
Top management team 
Strategy 
Operations 
Staff 
 
29 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
6 
1 
5 
1 
17.1 
Temporal 
Time 
History 
 
4 
2 
2 
2.2 
Managerial characteristics 
Identity 
Experience 
Significant events 
Relationships 
 
8 
2 
4 
1 
1 
4.7 
Total 124 100 
 
9.3 Narrative summary 
The systematic review identified seven subject areas. Of these, environmental 
scanning, information processing and decision making relate to contextual 
factors of the environment, information and decision making processes and are 
therefore discussed within those contextual factors. Although performance was 
a key word in the search strings, on detailed review and analysis, the results did 
not identify performance as a contextual factor. The remainder of the subject 
areas are discussed below.  
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9.3.1 Contextual factors 
Contextual factors can be categorised by whether they are internal or external 
to the organisation. 
External contextual factors 
9.3.1.1 Environmental dynamism 
Eleven papers focused on the dynamism of the external environment. The 
industry (or sector) environment was found to have a major influence on 
executive strategic scanning behaviour and objectives (Hough & White, 2004). 
There was a direct relationship between the state of environmental dynamism 
and  speed of strategic decision making (Baum & Wally, 2003) and CEO 
scanning emphasis (Garg et al., 2003; Hough & White, 2004). In times of high 
sector uncertainty, CEOs of high performing firms were likely to scan more 
broadly and more frequently as well as reporting greater use of personal 
information sources compared to their counterparts in low performing firms 
(Daft, Sormunen, & Parks, 1988). There was also a relationship between CEO 
scanning emphases, environmental dynamism and firm performance, such as 
prioritising innovation-related internal functions when the external environment 
was dynamic and increasing broad scanning of the external environment and 
efficiency-related internal functions when the external environment was stable 
(Garg, Walters, & Priem, 2003). Nevertheless, how CEOs perceive and interpret 
environmental change might be affected by organisational and resource 
dependence factors (Milliken, 1990). 
Other environmental contexts identified in the review include turbulent or 
unpredictable (Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992; Nastanski, 2004; Wang & Chan, 
1995) and high velocity environments (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Oliver & Roos, 2005; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 
1988; Oliver & Roos, 2005). Johnson and Hoopes (2003) found that in hyper 
competitive environments, managerial beliefs tend to converge, and the pattern 
of strategies that emerges is consistent with those predicted by economic 
theory. Beekun and Ginn (1993) found turbulent environments to result in 
different inter-organisational coupling strategies. In total, five environmental 
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contextual types were identified in varying degrees of dynamism: stable, 
uncertain, turbulent or unpredictable, high velocity and hyper-competitive.  
9.3.1.2 Finance 
Of the 26 papers that made specific reference to finance, three were about non-
profit organisations (Tucker, Cullen, Sinclair, & Wakeland, 2005; Rhodes & 
Keogan, 2005; Krug & Weinberg, 2004; Rhodes & Keogan, 2005; Krug & 
Weinberg, 2004), three were about publicly (state) funded organisations 
(Blackler & Kennedy, 2004; Learmonth, 2005; Alimo-Metcalfe & Lawler, 2001) 
and the rest were about the corporate (private) sector. Whether an organisation 
was a private, non-profit or public sector organisation was itself an important 
contextual factor for the following reasons.  
9.3.1.2.1 Public sector organisations 
Public sector organisations often face difficulties attracting appropriately skilled 
staff and having to work with resource limitations and an unstable environment 
(Tucker et al., 2005) impacting on their strategy formulation (Rhodes & Keogan, 
2005) and strategic decision making (Krug & Weinberg, 2004).  
Leaders of public sector organisations, on the other hand, have to deal with 
direct political interference and hence function in a highly politicised arena 
(Blackler & Kennedy, 2004). They have to manage discursive changes 
(Learmonth, 2005) and in the context of the NHS, lead a professional 
bureaucracy (Alimo-Metcalfe & Lawler, 2001). According to Ring and Perry 
(1985), the contextual factors particular to the public sector mainly concern: 
a) ambiguity of policy directives 
b) relative openness of decision making 
c) the greater number of influencing interest groups 
d) artificiality of time constraints and 
e) relative instability of policy coalitions 
Euske (2003) identified additional contextual factors for the public sector: 
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a) The public sector’s goal of providing high quality efficient public services 
meant that its approach to relationship or partnership was one of 
collaboration instead of (the private sectors’) competition. 
b) As funding was dependent on government allocation rather than earned 
from fees and charges, the scope for income generation was limited and 
relatively inflexible. The incentives of working in the public sector 
included job security, power, and recognition compared to financial 
rewards in the private sector.  
c) In contrast to private sector’s shareholders, the nature of stakeholders 
in public sector organisations meant that the latter were much more open 
to the external environment and therefore subjected to greater scrutiny. 
Public organisations have to deal with public expectations and direct 
political interference hence function in a highly politicised arena. 
d) The influence of stakeholders in public sector organisations meant that  
goals in public sector were often shifting, complex and conflicting, 
compared to the clear goal of maximising shareholder value in the 
private sector where authority is vested in organisational leaders. 
e) Performance expectations were vague and in constant flux rather than 
being clear and fixed (as in maximising shareholder values). 
9.3.1.2.2 NHS context 
According to Goodwin (2006), the impact of these constraints means local 
senior NHS leaders have to consider the following contextual factors: 
a) Government setting the national operating context restricts local 
flexibility and discretion 
b) the ethos and history of local services 
c) availability of resources 
d) power of the professions (clinicians) 
e) expectations of local players and  
f) interference from the management tier above through performance 
management and regulations 
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Goodwin’s study of NHS CEOs found that those who were able to overcome 
their constraints with resultant organisational and personal success did so by 
tackling significant local challenges in an inclusive way. They developed 
positive and influential interpersonal relationships with key players who saw 
themselves as local leaders with their own networks of influential relationships. 
He concluded that to be successful NHS CEOs would need to devote greater 
energy to managing the interface between the organisation and the political 
process. In other words, NHS organisations and their leaders need to make 
sense of their contexts and transact with those environmental elements in order 
to survive. As all NHS Trusts have local catchment areas, the local health 
economy is especially important. In addition to the macro contextual factors 
identified by Mayo and Nohria (2005), and internal operational contextual 
factors, 10 NHS-specific contextual factors relevant to a Trust CEO derived 
from the search is shown in Table 13.  
Table 13 Contextual factors in NHS specific contexts 
Government (interference) 
Policy 
Performance management (strong 
central controls) 
Relationships 
Inter-personal 
Inter-organisational 
Media 
Regulators (scrutiny) 
National – Healthcare Commission 
Local –Strategic Health Authority, 
Overview and Scrutiny Committees 
Ethos (industry culture) 
Public service values 
Collaboration  
History of local services 
Professional bureaucracy 
Openness of decision making 
Stakeholders (expectations) 
Politicians 
pressure groups 
Trade unions 
Interest groups 
Clinicians 
Patients 
Public 
Other significant  organisations   
Other NHS Trusts  
Independent sector providers 
Primary care providers (GPs) 
Voluntary sector 
Other public organisations, e.g. 
councils 
Resources Goals 
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Financial 
People 
Complex, shifting, unclear 
Contingent upon stakeholders 
Time 
Artificial time constraints 
Performance expectations 
Vague and in constant flux 
 
9.3.1.3 Decision making processes 
In total, 29 papers referred to the context of strategic decision making 
processes. The sub-factors included the speed of decision making (Eisenhardt, 
1992; Baum & Wally, 2003), time available for decision making processes 
(Dutton & Duncan, 1987), human information processing capacity (Schwenk, 
1988), complexity of problems (Schwenk, 1995), choice or preferences of 
decision makers (Corner, Kinicki, & Keats, 1994; Hambrick & Snow, 1977; 
Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005a), perceived degree of discretion 
(Carpenter & Golden, 1997) and individual CEO perceptions (Kassinis  
Panayiotou, 2006). A number of papers made reference to the cognitive 
perspective on strategic decision making (Schwenk, 1984; Schwenk, 1988; 
Schwenk, 1995). Pettigrew (Mintzberg, Waters, Pettigrew, & Butler, 1990) 
recommends understanding decision making as a continuous process in 
context. 
While proper processes were clearly important in strategic decision making, 
Mintzberg et al. (1976) argued that such processes were characterised by 
novelty, complexity and open-endedness, and despite variations in decision 
type, they all had a basic structure. To support the case for contextual factors to 
be considered as part of strategic decision making, Mintzberg et al. (1976) 
developed a contextual framework that complemented Hambrick and Snow’s 
(1977) strategic decision making model.  
Accordingly, decision making processes are identified as a separate contextual 
factor as there are aspects of the process that could impact on the eventual 
outcome. The quality of strategic decisions would be affected by contextual 
sub-factors including the operation of decision making process itself, 
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information processing capacity of organisational leaders, and individuals’ 
preferences.  
Organisational internal factors 
Differentiation of context into that which is internal and external to the 
organisation had been alluded to earlier (Walters, Jiang, & Klein, 2003; Walters 
& Priem, 1999; Kumar, Subramanian, & Strandholm, 2001; Weiner & Mahoney, 
1981) although missing from Mayo and Nohria’s model. Of the 28 papers that 
studied the organisational context, finance was a relevant factor in both internal 
and external factors. The rest of the internal elements of context were:  
9.3.1.4 Information management 
Studies that looked at roles played by information as a contextual factor were 
focused on how information was searched, gathered, processed and conveyed 
by the top management team. Firms’ information search strategies appear to be 
influenced by the CEO’s cognitive schemas (Lant  Hewlin,(Lant & Hewlin, 2002) 
(2002), the corporate strategy of the firm (Walters  Priem, 1999; Garg et al., 
2003) and the performance level of the CEO (Auster & Choo, 1994; Yunggar, 
2005; Garg et al., 2003; Walters & Priem, 1999; Kumar et al., 2001; Analoui & 
Karami, 2002). Walters and Priem (1999) found that CEOs changed their 
patterns of information search if their firm's strategy changed, and CEOs of the 
highest performing firms conducted external and internal scanning to match 
their business-level strategy. While environmental information can be acquired 
from multiple, complementary sources (Auster & Choo, 1994) there was a 
tendency to seek, in a crisis, fewer sources of information and to restrict new 
information to that which the organisation already possessed (Staw, 
Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Lant and Hewlin (Lant & Hewlin, 2002) 
recommend that cognitive schemas and team decision making structure be 
used to focus the CEO’s attention on different types of information for different 
categories of decision.  
The ways in which information is transmitted also have an impact on recipients 
(O'Reilly & Roberts, 1974) due to attribute framing influencing the content of 
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people's thoughts (Kuvaas & Selart, 2004). In the workplace, how information is 
communicated to employees, a process Weick (1995) describes as 
sensegiving, affects their interpretation at the organisation level, with 
implications for information management strategies to help employees better 
understand strategic actions, organisational change and learning (Thomas & 
McDaniel, 1990; Thomas, McDaniel, & Anderson, 1991; Thomas et al., 1991). 
Dutton (1993) advises that in order to not miss potentially significant events, 
developments and trends, design and process interventions may be necessary 
to engage active strategic issue diagnosis. As the process of information 
management impacts on strategic decision making, the search, gathering, 
processing and transmission of information are important considerations when 
analysing the contextual landscape. 
9.3.1.5 Organisational strategy 
Organisational strategy accounted for a significant part of the variance in CEOs’ 
interpretations of strategic events (Thomas et al., 1991); how they acquire 
information (Walters & Priem, 1999) and make strategic decision (Duhaime & 
Schwenk, 1985) and is a positive predictor of firm performance (Hitt & Ireland, 
1985). 
9.3.1.6 Size 
Depending on industry, being of a certain size may be a positive predictor of 
company performance (Hitt & Ireland, 1985). 
9.3.1.7 Structure 
Structure influenced CEO’s interpretations of strategic events (Thomas et al., 
1991) and employees’ interpretive schemes (Bartunek, 1984) but did not affect 
firm performance (Hitt & Ireland, 1985). 
9.3.1.8 Systems 
The review identified a number of new frameworks for describing systems, such 
as: complex adaptive systems and dominant logic (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995), 
executive support systems and top management perception of strategic 
information processing (Wang & Chan, 1995), personal value systems and 
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decision making styles of public managers (Connor & Becker, 2003) and taking 
a systems approach to making effective strategic decisions (Tucker et al., 
2005).  
9.3.1.9 Relationships 
Relationships relate to the interactive character of the organisation (Hellgren & 
Lowstedt, 1998). 
9.3.1.10 Staff 
Connor and Becker (2003) found that public sector managers' personal values 
were related to their decision making styles. When there is organisational 
restructuring or change, leaders can facilitate change by: managing the 
changing interpretive schemes among its members (Bartunek, 1984), adopting 
specific behaviours and taking specific actions to facilitate innovation and 
adaptation (Yukl & Lepsinger, 2006), taking advantage of the momentum in 
organisational adaptation (Miller & Friesen, 1980), using autogenic crisis to 
initiate strategic "pre-adaptations" to future crises, thereby using latent threat to 
generate organisational flexibility, learning, renewal and, possibly, longer life. 
(Barnett & Pratt, 2000) Goodwin highlights the power of the professions. 
9.3.1.11 Culture 
Culture influences individual sensemaking (Harris, 1994), affects how 
intelligence is understood (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2006) and undermines 
performance when it entraps decision makers in unfortunate courses of action 
from which they cannot disengage (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003). 
9.3.1.12 Organisational learning 
Organisational learning which involves critical reflection and social structuring 
contributing to meaning making (Schwandt, 2005), acknowledging that a firm's 
predominant managerial mental model has a significant impact on its learning 
capability (Harrison & Boyle, 2006)(Clapham & Schwenk, 1991), tendency to 
make external attributions for poor performance outcomes (Lant et al., 1992), 
and developing enough consensus for organized action to result, through 
framing and labelling of communications (Fiol, 1994). 
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9.3.1.13 Top Management Team  
Top management team (TMT) characteristics, which include:  
a) duration of tenure (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990) with long-tenured 
teams following more persistent strategies as well as strategies that 
conformed to central tendencies of the industry, and exhibiting 
performance that adhered to industry averages 
b) level of discretion, with the strongest results occurring in contexts that 
allowed TMT high discretion (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990) 
c) mental models of TMT members that recognized opportunities 
(Kaplan, Murray, & Henderson, 2003)  
d) politics within TMT found to be associated with poor firm performance 
(Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988) 
e) having a powerful, decisive chief executive and a powerful TMT who 
can make major decisions carefully but quickly, and who seek risk 
and innovation but execute a safe, incremental implementation. 
(Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988) 
f) members' perceptions of identity and image, especially desired future 
image (key to the sensemaking process) serving as important links 
between the organisation's internal context and the team members' 
issue interpretations (Gioia & Thomas, 1996)  
g) TMT heterogeneity increases the likelihood of strategic change (Lant 
et al., 1992). 
9.3.1.14 Operational efficiency 
In order to overcome poor efficiency, managers need to monitor closely group 
membership as well as the interaction between resource utilization within a 
given group (Short, Palmer, & Ketchen, 2002). When financial performance is 
unsatisfactory, attention should be focused on better capitalizing on extant 
resources as well as developing new resources (Short & Palmer, 2003). 
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Comparing efficiency-related internal functions against external players 
produced higher  performance (Garg et al., 2003) which in times of resource 
scarcity, increased efficiency and control may be functional (Staw et al., 1981); 
(Harrison & Boyle, 2006; Gioia & Manz, 1985). 
Managerial characteristics 
The final group of contextual factors is managerial characteristics. Empirical 
research demonstrates strong associations between the characteristics of 
managers, in terms of tenure, age, formal education, and functional experience 
(Montserrat Entrialgo, 2002), international experience (Collinson & Houlden, 
2005) and network relationships (Collinson & Houlden, 2005) and performance 
(Jenkins & Johnson, 1997).  
Gavetti and Levinthal (2001) believe that an actor’s mental models of the world 
came from experiential wisdom that had accumulated as a result of positive and 
negative reinforcement of prior choices, and cognition itself may change as a 
result of prior experiences. Similar findings were reported by Hambrick et al. 
(2005a) who found that executives who were intensely prepared – by virtue of 
their prior experiences, training, and readiness for difficult conditions – were 
less likely to feel under pressure compared with colleagues who are less well 
prepared. This is an important consideration when executives may react to 
objectively stressful situations with denial (Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 
2005b) or, as Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) found, be intolerant of ambiguity. 
Furthermore, Daniels et al. (2002) propose that CEOs’ beliefs or mental models 
were shaped by the different events earlier in their careers, a point iterated by 
Porac et al.’s 1989 study of the Scottish knitwear industry which revealed that 
the cognitive foundation of mental models came partly from how organisations 
managed issues such as recruitment and career paths. When the CEOs were 
middle managers they dealt with operational issues and had similar day-to-day 
experiences across the same industry. They were likely to have belonged to 
social networks comprising other senior managers within the industry. Such 
events and processes influenced how managers were socialised into the 
 107 
professional culture of the industry, which therefore influenced their mental 
model development. 
9.3.2 Managerial cognition 
Altogether, 46 papers referred to cognition in a major way. Cognitive processes 
and structures help individuals make sense of the available information from 
their environment which facilitates and influences action. The papers have been 
grouped under six concepts: 
a) Managerial beliefs that allow managers to define competitive boundaries, 
make sense of interactions within these boundaries (Porac, Thomas, & 
Baden-Fuller, 1989; Johnson & Hoopes, 2003), to support innovation and 
change (Yukl & Lepsinger, 2006; Greenwood & Hinings, 1988) and to 
conduct strategic issue diagnosis (Dutton et al., 1983)  
b) Framing to influence the content of people's thought and subsequent 
decision-making (Kuvaas & Selart, 2004), scanning habits and inter-
organisational relationships (Bluedorn, Johnson, Cartwright, & Barringer, 
1994). A type of framing is using labels to convey pictures of reality (Fiol, 
1994) 
c) Commitment in decision contributors were encouraged through  
promotion of specific cognitive heuristics and biases (Schwenk, 1986) as 
well as issue interpretation (Ginsberg & Venkatraman, 1995). There was 
a tendency for people, after a setback, to escalate their commitment of 
resources to the same course of action to recoup the losses  
d) Managerial judgement reflecting perceptions of causal relationships 
influences both organisational alignment and firm performance (Priem, 
1994) 
e) The single largest subgroup, consisting of 15 papers, identified mental 
representations, also known as cognitive structures such as schematas 
(Harris, 1994), scripts (Gioia & Poole, 1984), and mental models 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983), as central to understanding cognition and 
information processing. These knowledge structures act as frames of 
reference (Bartunek, Gordon, & Weathersby, 1983) in the processing of 
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information for making decisions (Walsh, 1995; Swan, 1995), creating 
meaning necessary for action (Schwandt, 2005), influencing choice 
(Gibbons & O'Brien, 2001) and managerial perception (Benson, Saraph, 
& Schroeder, 1991). Cognitive structures used by managers to filter and 
make sense of information are influenced by dominant logic (Bettis & 
Prahalad, 1995), collective beliefs (Walsh et al., 1988), industry mindsets 
(Phillips, 1994) or recipes (Spender, 1989) as well as being linked to 
bandwagon behaviours (Fiol & O'Connor, 2003) 
f) The mental frames not only operated as the basis for evaluating choice 
alternatives, but more importantly, determined the space of alternatives 
that were considered in a given decision problem, what Gavatti and 
Levinthal (2001) called the cognitive space of the actor. The size and 
shape of this space had been shown to be a critical determinant of 
managerial choice and action (Huff, 1990; Fiol & Huff, 1992; Walsh, 
1995). According to Simon (1991) a firm’s choice of strategy was often a 
by-product of actors’ representation of their problem space. Dutton and 
Jackson (1987) believed that decision makers’ intelligence and 
motivation systematically affect how issues are processed and the types 
of organisational action taken 
g) These mental frames can be modified through learning (Bartunek et al, 
1983; Barnett and Pratt, 2000; Broussine, 2000) 
h) In 11 papers, sensemaking was a dominant feature and will be discussed 
below. The effects of sensemaking on organisational outcomes could be 
seen in the results of various interventions on the mental models of 
managers and the decisions and actions they took (Porac & Thomas, 
1994; Johnson, Daniels, & Asch, 1998; Daniels, Johnson, & de 
Chernatony, 1994).    
9.3.2.1 Sensemaking 
Emanating from the fields of psychology and organisation studies, sensemaking 
sought to reveal how individuals construct meaning, interpret their world and 
function within it (Gioia & Sims, 1986; Weick, 1995).  Sensemaking drew on the 
development and use of cognitive structures in which individuals accumulated 
 109 
and extrapolated understandings and assumptions about the environment, roles 
and events that shaped their lives (Louis, 1980). These structures acted as 
filters through which actors gleaned salient cues from the ‘noise’ that constantly 
surrounded them and also provided a mechanism to explain and to account for 
actions ‘post hoc’ (Lant & Hewlin, 2002). Elements of the sensemaking process 
included the concepts of problem sensing (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982) which 
comprises noticing, interpreting and incorporating stimuli, mindfulness which 
describes purposeful noticing (Seiling & Hinrichs, 2005), scanning (Thomas, 
Clark, & Gioia, 1993), information processing (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990; 
Priem & Harrison, 1994) and decision making (Child, 1997). 
Weick (1979; 1995)’s seven properties of sensemaking which incorporate action 
and context, have remained the fundamental construct of sensemaking, despite 
criticism from Gioia and Mehra (1996) that sensemaking as construed by Weick 
was a purely conscious control process and things only make sense if they 
fitted into prior structures of understanding. They believe that such knowledge 
structures can be modified and adjusted via assimilation of subtle cues over 
time and argue for automatic unconscious cognitive process to be included in 
sensemaking formulation. Gioia and Mehra (1996) also contend that 
prospective sensemaking provides an impetus for action and suggest 
expanding the sensemaking domain to include both retrospective and 
prospective elements. Weick et al. (2005) updated his1995 seminal text which 
recognises that the central features of sensemaking needed to be “more future 
oriented, more action oriented, more macro, more closely tied to organising, 
meshed more boldly with identity, more visible, more behaviourally defined, less 
sedentary and backward looking, more infused with emotion and with issues of 
sensegiving and persuasion” (p409). In summary, sensemaking utilises 
cognitive structures that are constantly renewed by new experiences, has both 
prospective as well as retrospective elements, is both conscious and 
unconscious, and is linked to action. 
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9.3.3 Information processing 
There were 11 references about mental processes involved in individual 
decision making. They are discussed here rather than under managerial 
cognition as they relate to the cognitive aspects of decision making. Corner et 
al. (1994) proposed a process model of individual level information processing 
which recognizes that people process information in six stages: attention, 
encoding, storage/retrieval, decision, action and outcomes. The stages as 
defined by Corner are explained below with additional evidence from the 
search: 
a) Selective attention is the focus of consciousness and acts as an 
information ‘filter’ (Hambrick & Mason, 1984)(Kiesler & Sproull, 1982) 
b) Encoding, also known as interpreting or understanding, gives meaning to 
the information. Encoding determines what information is retrievable from 
memory for decision making and is the critical ‘point of entry’ for cognitive 
biases (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Schwenk, 1984)(Jackson & Dutton, 
1988). For example, the way an issue is labelled or framed would 
mobilise action in a particular direction (Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan, 
1983) 
c) Storage is the preservation of interpreted information. A strategic 
decision opportunity triggers a search of memory for information 
(Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976)  
d) Strategic decisions are based on information retrieved from storage 
(Mintzberg et al., 1976; Nutt, 1984), as well as information emerging from 
previous process stages, a view consistent with Mintzberg’s (1979) 
notion of strategic decisions as emergent phenomenon 
e) Action is the enactment of a strategic decision within the individual’s 
sphere of responsibility. Effective action often depends on an ability to 
implement decisions based on scanning strategies and subsequent 
interpretation of strategic information (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977b). 
Outcomes are the result of a decision enactment. 
While the Corner et al. (1994) decision making process model was dependent 
on the information processing capacity of individuals, it was also subject to 
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distortions and deceptions that can arise from the cognitive biases of human 
nature (Lavallo and Sibony, 2006). The biases that distorted the way people 
collected and processed information could arise from interactions in 
organisational settings where judgement might be coloured by self interests 
(Roxburgh, 2003).  Lavallo and Sibony (2006) believe that two cognitive 
distortions, namely optimism, which is a judgement based on the likelihood of a 
given outcome, and loss aversion, which is about the human tendency to 
experience loss more acutely than gain, were most likely to lead decision 
makers astray; the former generating unrealistic forecasts as well as 
underestimating risks, and the latter leading to inaction and under commitment.  
Deceptions could happen as a result of a conflict of interest that arises between 
an “agent” (in this case the CEO) and the “principal” (the corporation) on whose 
behalf the agent acts (Jensen and Meckling, 2001). An example could be a 
CEO proposing an investment that is being reviewed and evaluated by an 
executive committee. Agency problems occurred when the agent’s incentives 
were not perfectly aligned with the principal’s interest (Fama, 1980). Lavallo and 
Sibony (2006) identified three contexts that create agency problems between 
individuals and organisations: misalignment of time horizons, differing risk 
profiles, and asymmetry of information.  
In summary, the systematic review has identified 12 contextual factors within 
the organisation, and 15 contextual factors external to the organisation that 
have not been considered in Mayo and Nohria’s contextual intelligence 
framework. It also identified 10 new contextual factors specific to the NHS. 
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10 DISCUSSION 
10.1 Types of contextual factors 
Mayo and Nohria (2005) highlighted a connection between context, 
sensemaking and organisational performance and asserted that behind every 
successful organisation was a CEO who had regard for macro level contextual 
factors. The systematic review found evidence in support of Mayo and Nohria’s 
contextual landscape (Albright, 2004; Daft et al., 1988; Pettigrew, 1987; Analoui 
& Karami, 2002; Hitt & Ireland, 1985) but also identified nine new contextual 
factors. 
10.1.1 The environmental  
It was surprising that across the studies, environmental contexts were defined in 
a rather narrow way, with references limited to describing the macro-economic 
states of the industry or sector in which the business operates.  In total, five 
environmental contexts along a continuum of dynamism (defined as rate of 
change) were identified, with labels such as stable, uncertain, turbulent or 
unpredictable, high velocity and hyper-competitive describing the perceived 
speed of change in the sector. While conceptual names might be self 
explanatory, they were unhelpful when it came to specificity and generalization 
of the findings. As none of the studies had critically defined what constituted 
those conceptual labels, it was unclear if the attributions to environmental 
factors were valid, both in terms of internal validity as well as construct validity.  
The lack of case definition extended to the assessment of CEO environmental 
scanning behaviour which also appears to be focused at the industry level. As 
managerial beliefs tend to converge especially in hyper competitive 
environments, there is a real risk that the myopia would eventually 
disadvantage an entire industry (as in the case of the Scottish knitwear industry) 
as a result of the information seeking behaviour of organisations being biased 
towards confirmation. This group think on an industry scale runs the risk of 
ignoring changes in global and micro-environmental or local factors, because 
the “big picture” was framed by organisational leaders’ conception of their 
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operating environment, which influenced their approach to business 
intelligence. 
As this review is concerned with identifying the key dimensions or aspects of 
context for CEO strategic decision making, a final but significant criticism of the 
literature is the absence of research evidence on local environmental factors. 
The range of factors that could fall within the definition of “local” would differ 
depending on product or place. For example, local factors within the NHS would 
include significant buildings, the population within a catchment area, 
infrastructure including roads and transport, local health community 
stakeholders and geography. None of the studies had examined the 
environment from these perspectives. This is not to say that the factors were 
not taken into account by CEOs, but it was unclear if these and other possible 
contributory factors could have and should have been considered as being part 
of the “environment” and therefore be included in the scanning frames of CEOs. 
As such, any link between environmental dynamism, CEO scanning behaviours 
and organisational performance may not be straightforward despite it being 
intuitive to relate broad frequent scanning by CEOs in periods of high 
environmental dynamism with positive outcomes. 
10.1.2 Information management 
Information management involves collecting and making sense of data, then 
codifying them to produce knowledge and intelligence to inform corporate 
strategy. It was interesting to find the dominance of environmental scanning 
literature in the field to the detriment of almost all other aspects of information 
management. While much strategic effort was expended on gathering 
information from the external environment, no firm studied seemed to have 
taken a systematic approach to data management, and none that had a 
comprehensive strategy for dealing with the information pathway as a whole. 
This is of concern especially as the literature review showed that firms’ 
information search strategies were influenced by CEO cognitive 
schemas(2002), corporate strategy and the performance level of the CEO - 
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factors that are susceptible to cognitive bias, bandwagon effect or individual 
variations. 
To avoid missing potentially significant events, the literature concluded that 
organisations should consider setting up process interventions for information 
management that takes account of cognitive schemas, internal and external 
environments, crisis situations as well as data quality issues in terms of 
timeliness, accuracy, reliability and completeness. Every firm will benefit from 
having a corporate information management strategy that ensures the integrity 
of data. By taking a systematic approach to information management, CEOs 
and their organisations will be able to facilitate active strategic issue diagnosis 
(Dutton, 1993) and help employees to better understand strategic actions and 
organisational change, as well as promote organisational learning.  
10.1.3 Finances 
Most of the references to finances were related to how the enterprise was 
financed. Whether an organisation operates in the private, public or not-for-
profit sector is relevant in a contextual analysis as each, by their nature, has 
constraints and flexibilities that impact on the CEO’s role and scope. It may be 
de rigueur to maximise shareholder value in the private sector but the concepts 
of profit and shareholders sit uneasily in the public and not-for-profit sectors for 
obvious reasons.   
10.1.4 Sector/pubic sector/NHS 
In the case of the NHS which is publicly funded from taxation, the UK 
government, through the DH, defines the roles and responsibilities of CEOs of 
local health care organisations by determining national policies, structures and 
organisational accountabilities. The key responsibility of a CEO in the NHS 
therefore is to translate national operating frameworks and policies into local 
implementation plans, which may sound straightforward but is rarely so, as 
Goodwin (2006) alluded to, due to the presence of local or organisational 
contextual factors. Having to operate within a national framework also 
constrains what CEOs can do, since budgets, rules and even prices are set 
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nationally. Being a free public service also has meant demand would always 
exceed affordability. As a consequence, strategic change in public services 
such as the NHS is often complicated and difficult to implement.  
The NHS structure consists of a central core, the DH, an intermediate tier of 
regional offices called Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs), and some 400 local 
NHS organisations called NHS Trusts. Being free at the point of delivery meant 
the NHS has a number of unique contextual factors that do not apply to private 
firms, or even to other local public services. They include the ethos and history 
of local NHS services, expectations of local players and stakeholders, and 
emotional attachment of local communities to buildings and places used for 
care. Provision of care has to address issues of ethics, equity and equality. At 
the same time, NHS Trusts have to meet top down performance requirements 
and deliver complex goals that may be contingent upon stakeholder support 
within artificial time scales. The CEOs have to balance all these requirements 
while complying with regulations and dealing with interference from the 
management tier above (Goodwin, 2006).  
NHS Trusts interface with the public by providing healthcare services to local 
communities. Like other nationally organized public services, local Trusts have 
to align the interests of the DH with those of local stakeholders and players. So 
NHS CEOs need to have good contextual intelligence when engaging with local 
politicians, stakeholders and pressure groups, especially if their beliefs and 
expectations were at odds with the government. The strong central controls 
exerted on NHS bodies create two potential adverse consequences of operating 
in politically driven environments. The first is a tendency towards centralisation 
including strong central controls inside organisations. The second is a fear of 
failure leading to inaction, as it is often safer not to act than act and be proven 
wrong. It is not surprising that Goodwin (2006) advised NHS CEOs to devote 
greater energy to managing the interface between the organisation and the 
political process. In other words, NHS leaders need to make sense of their 
contexts and transact with these environmental elements in order to survive. 
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10.1.5 The organisation 
The organisation itself could be regarded as a contextual landscape and a 
fitness assessment of the internal organisational environment should form part 
of any contextual analysis. The systematic review identified 11 organisational 
contextual sub-factors: strategy, size, structure, systems, relationships, staff, 
adaptation and change, culture, organisational learning, top management team 
characteristics and operational efficiency. Some concepts overlapped, for 
example, adaptation and change could be categorised under culture, 
organisational learning or operational efficiency, depending on the changes 
involved; for this reason, they would not be appropriate as a standalone 
contextual factor. There were contextual factors which were enriched by the 
review, for example, temporal factors involving organisational history or 
memory, and communication which fall under information management and that 
in itself cuts across all the sub-factors.  
It was notable that while all of the contextual factors had impacted on 
organisational performance in one way or another, there were no existing 
frameworks that had examined those factors systematically and in an inclusive 
manner. Off-the-shelf tools such as the 7 S framework (Waterman, Peters, & 
Phillips, 1988) cover some factors and may be useful for conducting quick but 
superficial organisational analysis. That may be sufficient for single loop 
learning but to achieve double loop learning (Bartunek et al., 1983) 
organisations need to be able to question their underlying assumptions and 
values and implement systems that can monitor and correct behaviours as well 
as determine what appropriate behaviours are. The 11 organisational contextual 
sub-factors provide an additional checklist for CEOs when conducting a 
contextual analysis of the internal organisation. 
10.1.6 Decision making process 
Decision making processes have been treated as a contextual factor on their 
own rather than being included under the context of organisational systems. 
This is because strategic decisions have to deal with many competing interests 
including those of parties outside the organisation. What, when, where and how 
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decisions are taken, and by whom, both influence and are influenced by 
decision making processes. In most cases, managing the strategic decision 
making process is part of the CEO’s decision making context, and in order to 
manage the process, he or she would have to take account of relevant 
contextual factors. In large complex organisations like NHS Trusts, the real 
strategic decision making often takes place in forum or committees, so part of 
the CEO’s responsibility will be to improve their organisation’s decision making 
ability.  By identifying the prevalent biases and dealing with the human factors 
of strategic decision making as well as shaping decision making processes 
should enable the CEO to create a productive decision making culture that 
would result in smarter strategic decisions. 
 It is not surprising that many of the factors identified above were consistent with 
Simon’s (1957) bounded rationality model of decision making. The 
boundedness is particularly relevant for CEOs in the NHS who work in a highly 
politicised machine bureaucracy. Unclear goals that shift over time lead to 
people often searching for information and alternatives in a haphazard manner 
as well as opportunistically. Analysis of alternatives may be limited and 
decisions often reflect the use of standard operating procedures (routines) 
rather than systematic analysis, which reinforces the status quo. On the basis of 
evidence, the literature review identified three potential biases for CEOs when 
taking strategic decisions (Simon, 1997):  
a) Existing strategy affects fields of vision; the strategic decision process 
satisfices instead of optimises, with strategic decision makers rarely 
engaged in comprehensive search, and discover their goals in the 
process of searching 
b) Selective perception may limit options, as decisions follow the basic 
phases of problem identification, development and selection but as they 
cycle through the various stages, frequently repeating and following 
different paths in fits and starts 
c) Current performance also affects strategic decisions as the complexity of 
the problem and the conflict among decision makers often affects the 
shape of the decision path 
 119 
Figure 11 Sensemaking model of CEOs 
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As mental models get exposed to new experiences and information, they 
change to incorporate the new insights, with new cognitive structures behaving 
like a wider and more flexible lens aperture (Figure 11). In an iterative 
sensemaking process, as individuals accumulate and extrapolate 
understandings and assumptions about the environment from experience or 
study, they revise their mental models to take account of more of the context, 
including accounting for actions post-hoc. This contextual rationality enables 
CEOs to be better informed as well as better prepared for taking strategic 
decisions. The principle is similar to the double loop learning model (Argyris and 
Shon, 1974) by which sustainable learning takes place after new (improved) 
cognitive maps were formed.  
A managerial cognition model starts with systematic scanning of contextual 
factors followed by a sensemaking process before culminating in decision 
making as a precursor to action. The three steps are sequential, but actual time 
spent on each step could vary from seconds to days; sometimes all three could 
happen in quick succession as in an emergency, at other times it could be 
indefinite. The concept of contextual intelligence is based on developing a 
cognitive model of context that supports the CEO’s sensemaking ability to 
improve strategic issue diagnosis.  As the managerial cognition model is based 
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on skills that are developable, organisations can develop this competence in 
executives by providing a combination of contextual knowledge and experiential 
opportunities. A diagram of the managerial cognition model based on evidence 
from Corner et al. (1994), Weick (1995) and Gioia and Mehra (1996) is shown in 
Figure 12. 
Figure 12 Managerial cognition model 
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10.1.7 Temporal 
Time as a process or amount of time allowed and history are important 
contexts. This argues for the role of time to be explicitly incorporated into 
organisational decision making process. 
10.2 Modelling contextual factors 
One of the main challenges in performing a contextual analysis is determining a 
reasonable organisational boundary. Because few organisations are closed 
systems, the decision about which environmental actors to include or to leave 
out can be arbitrary. Managers are often selective about where to draw their 
boundaries and therefore what they take into account. This poses two risks. 
One, they are prone to disregard information that appears outside the periphery 
of their construction of the context. Some of this information can be highly 
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valuable. Two, what they look out for and make sense of, will be influenced by 
their mental models. As dependence on mental models could constrain the 
quality of a contextual analysis, I have built a model of contextual factors that 
extended Mayo and Nohria’s model, based on findings from the systematic 
review. The model has three concentric circles, radiating out from the CEO in 
the centre. In order to show all of the labels of contextual factors, they have 
been presented in two separate diagrams. The first shows the contextual 
factors operating inside of the organisational boundary (Figure 13). The second 
shows the contextual details of the two outer circles (Figure 14), each 
representing the local environmental and macro contexts respectively. 
Figure 13 Internal organisation contextual factors 
 
CEO  
ORGANISATION  
budget 
strategy 
organisational  
learning 
top management  
team  
relationships 
structure 
culture 
Information  
management 
operations 
staff 
systems 
size 
 
 122 
 
Figure 14 The (external) local and macro contextual factors 
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10.3 Process of contextual intelligence 
As individuals cannot imagine all possibilities, they adopt mental models that 
not only operate as the basis for the evaluation of choice alternatives, but more 
importantly, determine the cognitive space allowed for alternatives to be 
considered in any given decision problem. Just as the CEOs’ beliefs or mental 
models were shaped by the different experiences and events earlier in their 
careers, it is proposed that contextual intelligence could be developed by 
expanding an actor’s cognitive space, which could be achieved by altering 
individuals’ mental models through training and development, broadening their 
work or life experiences and helping them to develop new insights through 
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raised level of self awareness. It is possible that terms such as “narrow-
minded”, “tunnel vision” or parochial had arisen from a recognition that mental 
frames define the cognitive space used by decision makers and that they are 
developed through certain kinds of experience. 
From the evidence gathered so far, the emerging model and process of 
contextual intelligence for CEOs appear to follow the pathway shown in Figure 
15. (For details of elements within the concentric circles, please refer to Figure 
13 and Figure 14) Mayo and Nohria (2005) described executive sense making 
as an “evolving opportunity structure” and attributed sensemaking to helping 
CEOs work out what their context was telling them, and what they needed to do 
to make the most of their environment. Building on Mayo and Nohria’s 
contextual model of leadership, the literature based model of contextual 
intelligence shows that, for a CEO, there are internal and external 
organisational contextual factors that are likely to affect his/her personal 
success, and therefore, the success of his/her organisation. For CEOs of public 
sector organisations, the local context plays a particularly important role. In 
addition, the personal contextual factors of the CEO may themselves be 
markers or predictors of likelihood of success, due to their influence on mental 
model and cognitive space developments. The sensemaking concept has been 
deconstructed to its elements of noticing/scanning, filtering, interpreting 
information and decision making.  
As a result of conducting the systematic review, an operational definition of 
contextual intelligence has been developed to describe the construct. CEOs 
who are contextually intelligent could be expected to define their strategic 
decision making context at three levels, namely the internal organisation, the 
local environment, and the macro economy, and at their sub-levels; 
demonstrate “ contextual intelligence” by systematically taking account of all 
relevant contextual factors in strategic decision making; demonstrate good 
information processing and sensemaking capabilities; have self awareness 
about their personal context; and able to make strategic decisions in a variety of 
different contexts.   
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Figure 15 Outline of the contextual intelligence process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The personal qualities of CEOs as possible contributors to contextual 
intelligence development were an interesting finding. However it is unclear how 
they impact on strategic decision making. Based on the contextual factors 
identified in the CEOs’ operating environment, a literature based model of 
contextual intelligence is produced in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16 Literature based model of CEO contextual intelligence 
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11 CONCLUSION 
The theory of contextual intelligence was first mooted by Sternberg (1988) as 
an executive capability, and Mayo and Nohria (2005) used the term in their 
historical review to describe business leaders who acted strategically in respond 
to prevailing macro level contextual factors. Surprisingly, there appears to have 
been no empirical research into the concept, despite a growing number of 
studies linking contextual factors to senior leader performance. The systematic 
literature review has drawn the following conclusions in response to the 
questions set out in paragraph 7.6. 
First, a CEO needs to consider a number of key dimensions of contexts in 
strategic decision making. The dimensions of context for a CEO are his 
personal context, factors in the internal organisation, factors in the local 
economy, and macro-level factors at the national, or in some cases, global 
levels. Second, while the literature based model is expected to be generic for all 
CEOs, there are aspects of the NHS context that are relevant to a CEO 
operating in the NHS. These CEOs face particular constraints due to national 
policies, shifting goals, funding availability, power of the professions, 
stakeholder expectations including political interference. The results show 10 
contextual factors that are particularly relevant to the NHS context. Third, by 
exploring the underlying concepts and theories of contextual intelligence, the 
literature review enabled the process of executive sensemaking to be captured. 
Fourth, the review enabled the formulation of the relationship between context, 
sensemaking and decision making, as shown in Figure 12. Fifth, as a result of a 
lack of empirical evidence, the impact of contextual intelligence on CEO and 
organisational performance cannot be confirmed.  
The systematic review has resulted in the development of a literature based 
model of contextual intelligence which shows that CEOs need to consider 
different contextual factors when taking different types of strategic decisions. 
With public sector leaders such as CEOs of NHS Trusts, their main focus had 
been the local context, as most aspects of strategic decision making were about 
managing inter-personal and inter-organisational relationships and meeting the 
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competing expectations of different stakeholders. The literature based model 
revised and extended Mayo and Nohria’s (2005) dimensions of context and 
deconstructed their “sense making” box to take account of prospective 
sensemaking. In a cycle of frequent renewals, contextual intelligence appears to 
guide managers in how they interpret the world and act on the information 
presented to them, enabling the actors to gain new insights that lead to further 
development of contextual intelligence.  
The next step in the process of addressing the overarching research question of 
“ how contextual intelligence influences PCT CEO strategic decision making in 
the English NHS” is to explore the derived contextual intelligence model in an 
empirical investigation. 
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Appendix B 
Table summarising all of the included studies (119 studies) 
Author Data used in 
study 
Date Place of 
study 
Summary of empirical 
findings 
Adner  Helfat Review of 
annual reports 
of 30 
companies in 
the petroleum 
industry 
2003 USA Use ANOVA to examine 
the effect of differences 
in managerial decisions 
on corporate 
performance. Found 
dynamic managerial 
capabilities in the form 
of human capital, social 
capital and managerial 
cognition to be linked to 
managerial decisions, 
and therefore firm 
performance.  
Albright n/a 2004 USA A theoretical piece on 
environmental scanning 
Alimo-Metcalfe  
Lawler 
Postal survey 
of 44 private 
and public 
sector 
organisations 
– 30 
questionnaires
 
2000 UK When asked to identify 
factors influencing their 
organisations’ 
approaches to 
leadership 
development, market 
place and shareholder 
value were rated over 
people issues. 
Analoui  
Karami 
Postal survey 
of CEOs of 
SMEs in the 
electrical and 
electronics 
industry – 132 
question-
naires 
1999 UK Direct correlation 
between increased 
environmental 
scanning, CEO strategic 
awareness and 
performance of SMEs 
(using non parametric 
correlation matrix, p< 
0.01) 
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Barnett  Pratt n/a 2000 USA Theorising a new 
conceptual model of 
organisational change 
“autogenic crises”, used 
by top managers to 
prepare their 
organisations for future 
crises 
 
Bartunek Case study of 
a restructuring 
decision in a 
Religious 
Order  
1979 USA The process of change 
in interpretive schemas 
(“mindsets”) is in 
reciprocal relationships 
with changes in 
structure. This 
relationship is not direct 
but is mediated by the 
actions of members and 
their emotional 
reactions to change. 
How the environment is 
interpreted by members 
also affects the type of 
change that takes place 
 
Bartunek, 
Gordon  
Weathersby 
n/a 1983 USA A theoretical paper 
exploring Weick’s notion 
of complicated 
understanding and 
linking it to other 
concepts including 
cognition and adult 
development 
Baum  Wally Postal survey 
of CEOs of 
industrial 
companies - 
318 
questionnaires
2003 USA Fast decision making is 
linked to improved firm 
performance but may 
produce bad decisions 
and bad performance if 
comprehensive 
information gathering is 
sacrificed to gain speed.
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Beekun  Ginn Postal survey 
of hospital 
CEOs - 58 
questionnaires
1993 USA Use a Likert-scale to 
examine the 
relationship between 
CEO self assessments 
and Likert scale 
responses for two 5-
year periods (1976 -
1980 and 1981-1985). 
Multiplexity was 
measured using 
network analysis. Found 
inter-organisational 
coupling patterns varied 
within two domains as a 
function of increasing 
environmental 
turbulence and strategy 
type  
 
Bettis  
Prahalad 
 
n/a 1995 USA Theory development of 
the Dominant Logic 
Blackler Face to face 
Interviews 
with 25 NHS 
CEOs  
2006 UK Found the study of 
leadership in the public 
sector cannot be  
separated from the 
broader study of state 
institutions and that 
NHS CEOs have limited 
bureaucratic discretion 
 
Blackler  
Kennedy 
Face to face 
and telephone 
Interviews 
with 32 CEOs 
in NHS  
 
2004 UK Recognition by CEOs 
that their job was to 
deal with the everyday 
dilemmas and problems 
(rather than wishing 
them away) and this 
situation is not unique to 
the NHS 
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BluedornJohn
son, 
Cartwright,  
Barringer 
Literature 
review 
1994 USA Review of literature on 
strategic management 
and organisational 
context lead to six 
subsets: strategic 
leadership and upper 
echelons; scanning; 
inter-organisational 
relationships; 
institutional theory; 
organisational 
alignment; strategic 
control 
 
Bourgeois  
Eisenhardt 
Case studies 
of strategic 
decision 
making in 4 
computer 
firms 
  
1988 USA Used hypothesis 
testing. In high velocity 
environments, 
successful firms were 
able to make major 
decisions carefully but 
quickly; and have a 
powerful, decisive CEO 
and powerful TMT 
Broussine Focus groups 
and one ot 
one telephone 
interviews - 36 
CEOs of local 
councils 
2000 UK Five capacities were 
identified as central to a 
CEO’s role: work with 
political dimensions; 
lead, change and 
develop the 
organisation; self 
awareness; develop 
external relationships; 
and focus on strategic 
and long term issues 
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Butler in 
mintzberg, 
Waters, 
Pettigrew  
Butler 
Transcript of 
an exchange 
of view  
 
1990 USA Capturing Mintzberg 
and Waters’ argument : 
in an organisation, the 
locus of decision 
making can be diffuse; 
exogenous events can 
trigger decisions; 
decisions are made 
within a context and 
help to influence the 
context for future 
decisions 
 
Carpenter  
Golden 
Management 
simulation 
based in food 
product 
industry – 20 
managers and 
78 MBA 
students 
1997 USA Measured three 
constructs- perceived 
managerial discretion, 
locus of control and 
perceived power – 
using statistical tests. 
Found individual 
differences, such as 
locus of control, 
influence the degree of 
discretion which 
predicts managerial 
power  
Child n/a 1997 UK Theory about strategic 
choice in organisational 
action. 
 
Clapham  
Schwenk 
Content 
analysis of 
letter to 
shareholders 
in annual 
reports of 20 
utility co’s 
 
1991 USA Correlation tests on 
relationship between 
attributions and 
performance. 
Executives tended to 
take credit for good 
outcomes but to blame 
the environment for 
poor outcomes which 
may reflect cognitive 
bias. Found negative 
correlation between 
defensiveness and 
future earnings growth 
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Collinson  
Houden 
Postal survey 
of SMEs – 30 
questionnaires
2005 UK Analysis of mental 
maps, correlation tests 
and use of Likert scales 
to identify factors 
influencing top 
managers’ perceptions 
of spatial environment 
and patterns of 
internalisation.Internatio
nal experience and 
network relationships 
strongly influence 
managerial cognition 
and thereby 
internationalization 
decision-making. 
 
Connor  
Becker 
Survey of 
state 
managers 
attending their 
AGM – 161 
questionnaires
 
2003 USA Using the Rokeach 
Value Survey and Rowe 
decision style inventory, 
found personal values 
to affect decision 
making styles of public 
managers 
Corner, Kinicki  
Keats 
Literature 
review 
1994 NZ A conceptual model of 
strategic decision 
making that integrates 
organisational and 
individual level 
information processing 
perspectives 
 
 135 
Daft, 
Sormunen  
Parks 
Interviews 
with CEOs of 
SME 
manufacturing 
firms – 50  
respondents 
 
1988 USA Tests for correlation 
between strategic 
uncertainty and CEO 
scanning behaviour. 
Found greater 
frequency of scanning 
and greater use of 
personal information 
sources when sector 
uncertainty was high; 
CEOs in high 
performing companies 
scanned more 
frequently and more 
broadly 
Daniels, 
Johnson  
Chernatony 
Semi-
structured 
interviews of 
middle and 
senior 
managers in 
medium sized 
financial 
service firms – 
32 participants
 
2002 UK Use cognitive mapping 
methods to explore 
management cognition 
of competition. 
Institutional influences 
lead to convergence of 
mental models within 
middle managers 
across the industry. 
Task environment 
creates cognitive 
differences across 
organisations, 
especially amongst 
senior managers 
Denison, 
Dutton, Khan  
Hart 
Postal survey 
of CEOs in 
manufacturing  
technology 
firms – 320 
questionnaires
 
1996 USA Use factor analysis, 
correlation matrix and 
descriptive statistics to 
test hypotheses. 
Organisational context 
contributes to 
interpretation of 
strategic issues, 
significantly predicting 
the perception of threat 
and opportunity 
 136 
Duhaime   
Schwenk 
Selective 
citations of 
examples  
1985 USA Theorising four types of 
cognitive biases coming 
into play during decision 
making processes 
leading to corporate 
acquisitions or 
divestment decisions 
Dutton n/a 1993 USA Theorising that strategic 
issue diagnosis for 
decision makers being 
affected by the 
organisational 
conditions, decision 
makers connections to 
a strategic issue, and 
characteristics of the 
issue – put decision 
makers on automatic in 
their interpretation of 
strategic issues 
Dutton  
Duncan 
n/a 1987 USA Theorising that due to 
limited information 
processing capacity, an 
organisation’s strategic 
planning process affects 
the set of strategic 
issues that capture 
decision makers’ 
attention 
Dutton  
Duncan 
n/a 1987 USA Conceptualising the 
process of strategic 
issue diagnosis creating 
momentum for change 
by linking to two 
contextual variables: the 
organisation’s belief 
structure and its 
resources 
Dutton, Fahey  
Narayan 
n/a 
 
1983 USA Theorising a framework 
for strategic issue 
diagnosis in the process 
of strategic decision 
making  
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Dutton  
Jackson 
n/a 1987 USA A conceptual paper 
linking managerial 
cognition, strategic 
decision making and 
organisational action 
Dutton, Walton  
Abrahamson 
Interview 
strategic 
decision 
makers at the 
Port Authority 
-29 
participants 
1989 USA Use Repertory Grid to 
identify the “meaning 
space” for strategic 
issues. Showed how 
framing of issues affects 
perception due to 
managerial cognition 
Eisenhardt Exemplar 
cases from 
computer 
industry 
1992 USA Fast decision makers 
look at real time 
information, focusing on 
the present; examine 
multiple simultaneous 
alternatives; seek 
expert advice; use 
conflict to reach a 
consensus; and 
integrate focal decision 
with other key decisions 
to achieve alignment 
with overall strategic 
direction 
Eisenhardt  
Bourgeois 
Interviews 
with CEOs 
and TMTs, 
questionnaire, 
and 
secondary 
source data – 
8 firms in IT 
industry  
1988 USA Multiple case design. 
Results a) political 
behaviours arise from 
power centralisation 
and b) politics are not 
issue based but are 
organised into stable 
coalitions based on 
demographic 
characteristics such as 
age and office location, 
c) politics within TMT  
are associated with 
poor firm performance 
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Elsbach, Barr  
Hargadon  
Literature 
review  
2005 USA Proposed a framework 
whereby specific 
cognitive schemas and 
specific contexts 
interact during 
sensemaking resulting 
in momentary 
perceptions called 
situated cognition 
Euske Literature 
review 
2003 USA Comparing the public, 
private and charity 
sector for differences 
and similarities in 
sectors 
Fama n/a 1980 USA Using economics theory 
to deal with managerial 
incentive problems 
(“agency problems”) as 
a result of managers 
facing both the 
discipline and 
opportunities provided 
by markets for their 
services 
Fiol Case study of 
a large 
financial 
institution 
1995 USA Successful corporate 
innovation requires  
decision makers to 
develop a collective 
understanding by using 
communication frames 
to communicate the 
new reality 
Fiol  Huff Literature 
review 
1992 USA Theorising a framework 
for classifying cognitive 
maps  
Fiol  O’Connor Literature 
review 
2003 USA Interactions between 
mindfulness and the 
decision making context 
impact on managers’ 
ability to challenge 
bandwagon behaviours, 
hence affect decision 
outcomes 
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Garg, Walters  
Priem 
Postal survey 
of CEOs of 
manufacturing 
firms – 105 
questionnaires
 
2003 USA Use descriptive analysis 
and correlation to test 
hypotheses. 
Recommend future 
scanning studies to 
include both internal 
and external 
environments of the firm 
when evaluating CEO 
scanning behaviour 
Gavetti  
Leninthal 
Computer 
simulations  
2000 USA Use Kauffman’s NK 
landscape to model the 
degree to which 
alternative actions 
correlate with one 
another. Cognitive 
representation shown to 
be a powerful guide to 
search efforts. 
Changing actors’ 
cognitive maps may be 
an act of adaptation but 
is offset by loss of tacit 
knowledge linked to 
prior recognition 
Gavetti  
Leninthal 
n/a 2001 USA Theorising that the 
nature of the cognitive 
task and process of 
revision of beliefs likely 
to differ by level within a 
hierarchy 
Gibbons  
O’Brien 
Postal survey 
of CEOs of 
firms chosen 
randomly from  
directory – 92 
questionnaires
 
2001 Ireland Use factor analysis. 
Found negative link 
between socialisation 
(operationalised as 
exposure to variety of 
work experiences) and 
CEO commitment to 
status quo 
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Ginsberg  
Venkatraman 
Postal survey 
of tax return 
preparation 
firms – 430 
questionnaires
1995 USA Structural equation 
analysis support taking 
a managerial cognition 
approach to 3 
dimension of issue 
interpretation – urgency, 
understandability and 
manageability - as they 
enhance adaptive 
competencies 
Gioia  Manz Literature 
review 
1985 USA Using scripts as a 
model for vicarious 
learning to link cognition 
and behaviour 
 
Gioia  Mehra Book review 1996 USA A critique of Weick’s 
seminal text “sense 
making in 
organisations” 
 
Gioia  Poole n/a 1984 USA A conceptual framework 
on use of scripts in 
organisational 
behaviour, drawn from 
theory and research 
from other disciplines as 
well as the script notion 
 
Gioia  Thomas Field notes, 
tapes and 
transcripts of 
interviews and 
meetings, 
action notes of 
task force and 
reflective  
recordings - 
an 
observational 
study in a 
university  
 
1994 USA Ethnographic analysis 
identified the main 
dimensions of 
sensemaking in a 
strategic change 
situation to be the 
guiding symbols  and 
metaphors used, as the 
directionality if the the 
dominant change 
processes 
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Gioia  Thomas Case study - 
30 in-depth 
interviews with 
TMT, internal 
documents. 
Findings then 
used to survey  
311 
executives 
from 
academia 
1996 USA Categorical analysis 
and Gestalt analyses. 
Found when facing 
strategic change, TMT 
members’ perceptions 
of identity and image, 
especially desired future 
image, are key to the 
sensemaking process 
and serve as important 
links in members’ issue 
interpretations 
Greenwood  
Hinings 
n/a 1988 USA Theorising how 
organisational change 
and stability can be 
understood through the 
concepts of design 
types and tracks which 
are given meaning and 
coherence by 
underlying interpretive 
schemes 
Gupta  
Govindarajan 
Interview data 
from 16 senior 
managers and 
survey of 
general 
managers of 
SBUs from 8 
Fortune 100 
diversified 
firms – 58 
questionnaires
1984 USA Regression analysis 
suggests matching 
managerial 
characteristics with SBU 
strategy would increase 
likelihood of effective 
strategy implementation 
Hambrick Postal survey 
of CEOs and 
TMTs from 8 
colleges, 6 
hospitals and 
6 insurance 
firms; 
Interview two 
executives 
from each 
industry 
1981 USA Frequency method was 
used to measure 
scanning variables 
against hierarchical 
levels and industry type. 
Results suggest no 
close or consistent 
relationship between 
scanning behaviour and 
either hierarchical levels 
or functional areas  
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Hambrick  
Mason 
Literature 
review 
1984 USA The Upper Echelons 
theory states that 
organisational 
outcomes – strategic 
choices and 
performance levels – 
are partially predicted 
by managerial 
background 
characteristics 
Hambrick  
Snow 
Literature 
review 
1977 USA Theorising a contextual 
model of strategic 
decision making in 
organisations 
Hambrick  
Finklestein  
Mooney 
Literature 
review 
2005 USA Theorising a concept 
known as “executive job 
demands” to explain 
strategic decisions and 
leader behaviours 
Harris Literature 
review 
1994 USA Theorising individual 
sensemaking in 
organisation being 
based on mental 
dialogues between 
themselves and other 
contextually –relevant 
others as guided by 
their schemas for others
Harrison  
Boyle 
Historical case 
study footwear 
industry 
2005 UK Business failure 
resulting from firm’s 
predominant mental 
model impacting on its 
learning capability 
Hitt  Ireland Postal survey 
of top CEOs 
from all 
industries – 65 
questionnaires
1991 USA Use inter-correlation 
matrices to measure 
executives’ strategic 
decision making 
processes. Industry and 
executive 
characteristics are 
significant moderators 
(p<0.01) supporting the 
strategic choice 
perspective rational 
analytical approach 
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Hough  White Behavioural 
simulation  - 
172 managers 
from a 
Fortune 100 
diversified 
technology 
firm; MBTI  
1994 USA Results indicate level of 
environmental 
dynamism combined 
with manager’s 
functional position 
explains scanning 
behaviour 
Jackson  
Dutton 
Study 1 – 
administered 
questionnaire 
– 78 
managers 
attending 
development 
programme 
Study 2 – 
reaction to 
posted 
stimulus 
material  - 83 
MBA alumni  
1988 USA Use statistical test. 
Study 1 identified the 
issue characteristics 
that managers 
associate with the 
concept of threat and 
opportunity 
Study 2  suggests 
presence of a threat 
bias leads managers to 
be more sensitive to 
issues associated with 
threats than to those 
associated with 
opportunities 
Jenkins  
Johnson 
Face to face 
interviews with 
owner 
manager of 
retail stores 
using 
laddering – 30 
respondents 
1997 UK Causal maps elicited 
from discourses were 
compared to establish 
whether individual 
cognition is linked to 
business performance. 
No difference was found 
but subsequent 
inductive analysis 
identified a focus on 
relationships between 
specific concepts in the 
maps of high 
performers suggesting 
exploring the 
relationship between 
cognition and 
performance 
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Johnson  
Hoopes 
Simulation 
game applying 
different 
parameters of 
sunk costs of 
changing 
strategy and 
observable 
competitor 
numbers 
2003 USA Modelling the dynamics 
of cognition and intra-
industry structure shows 
a relationship between 
managerial cognition, 
the underlying nature of 
the industry (sunk 
costs) and evolution of 
industry structure 
 
Kaplan  
Murray 
23 year data - 
company 
annual reports 
patents filed, 
number of 
scientific 
publications - 
15 largest 
drug 
companies 
2003 UK and 
USA 
Found recognition to be 
an important predictor 
of action, suggesting 
that cognition at the 
most senior level can 
help shape firms’ 
response to 
discontinuities 
Kiesler  
Sproull 
Literature 
review 
1982 USA Conceptualizing 
managerial problem 
sensing, a necessary 
precondition for 
managerial activity 
directed toward 
organisational 
adaptation 
Kumar, 
Subramanian 
Strandholm 
Postal survey 
of CEOs in 
healthcare – 
59 
questionnaires
 
2001 USA Statistical tests confirm  
significant moderating 
role of environmental 
scanning activities in 
competitive strategy 
and firm performance 
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Kuvaas Postal survey 
of TMTs in 
newspaper 
industry – 162 
questionnaires
 
2002 Norway Use statistical tests. 
Results support 
behavioural decision 
making and social 
cognition perspective 
but question the 
organisational 
information processing 
prediction that assume 
active information 
processing equates to 
environmental vigilance 
Lant  Hewlin Decision 
forms, 
information 
generated by 
the Markstrat 
simulation 
strategy 
game, 
questionnaire 
– 87 
participants 
consisting of 
executives on 
development 
programmes 
and MBA 
students 
2002 USA Results point to 
cognitive schemas and 
team decision making 
structures focusing 
decision maker 
attention on different 
types of information for 
different categories of 
decisions 
Lant, Milliken  
Batra 
Content 
analysis of 
annual reports 
from firms in 
furniture and 
computer 
industries – 40 
firms each 
 
1992 USA Descriptive statistic 
results indicate that 
poor past performance, 
environmental 
awareness, TMT 
heterogeneity and CEO 
turnover increase the 
likelihood of strategic 
re-orientation 
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Learmonth Interviews 
with 16 CEOs 
in the NHS 
2005 UK Discourse analysis of 
distinguishing between 
words - management, 
administration and 
leadership – what the 
might represent and 
how they affect actions 
in the way they are 
used 
Louis Literature 
review 
1980 USA Theorising key features 
of newcomers’ entry 
experiences and 
describing the 
sensemaking processes 
by which individuals 
coped with their entry 
experiences 
Miller  Friesen Published 
data – 26 
firms, postal 
survey of 
TMT– 10 
questionnaires
 
1980 USA Use statistical tests to 
analyze structural and 
strategy making 
variables over time. 
Found organizations to 
resist changing direction 
in strategy and 
structure. 
Milliken Postal survey 
of CEOs of 
liberal art 
colleges – 211 
questionnaires
1990 USA Use statistical tests and 
correlation. Results 
indicated perceived 
organizational and 
resource dependence 
characteristics 
significantly affected 
how CEOs interpreted 
environmental change 
Mintzberg Literature 
review 
1979 Canada Describes a pathway of 
strategy development 
Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani 
Theoret 
Field study of 
25 strategic 
decision 
process; and 
literature 
review 
1976 Canada Describes patterns of a 
basic structure 
underlying all 
apparently 
“unstructured” 
processes 
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Mintzberg, 
Waters, 
Pettigrew  
Butler 
Transcript of 
an exchange 
of views 
1990 Canada Key points to note in 
contextual analysis: 
interconnected levels of 
analysis; 
interconnectedness of 
past, present and 
future; importance of 
contexts and action; 
nature of causation 
about change 
Monserrat Postal survey 
of CEOs of 
SME from 
diversified 
industries – 
233 
questionnaires
 
2002 Spain 
 
Use Likert scale to 
measure how managers 
make decisions and T-
test to measure 
demographics. Found 
co-alignment between 
managerial 
characteristics and firm 
strategy contribute to 
organisational success  
Nastanski A Delphi 
process using 
multiple 
surveys in 
computer 
industry -20 
questionnaires
2004 USA Repeated round from 
Delphi. 
Active scanning is 
important to 
organisations operating 
in turbulent environment 
where future states are 
unpredictable 
Nutt 78 case 
studies 
1984 USA Profiling decision-
making processes 
uncovered variety of 
approaches and 
managers do not 
always use methods 
prescribed for good 
decision making. Most 
decision processes 
found to be solution 
centred, limit the 
number of alternatives 
considered and 
perpetuate the use of 
questionable tactics. 
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O’Reilly  
Roberts 
Laboratory 
experiments 
1974 USA Processes of selective 
filtration which occur in 
organisational 
hierarchies indicate 
senders acted to filter 
different types of 
information depending 
on direction information 
was to be sent, and the 
senders’ trust in the 
receiver 
Oliver  Roos Case studies 
– a firm each 
from toy and 
high tech 
industries 
2005 USA/ 
Netherlan
ds 
Profiling decision-
making processes 
uncovered variety of 
approaches and 
managers do not 
always use methods 
prescribed for good 
decision making. Most 
decision processes 
found to be solution 
centred, limit the 
number of alternatives 
considered and 
perpetuate the use of 
questionable tactics. 
Pettigrew Single case 
study 
1987 UK Real strategic change 
requires crisis 
conditions, and by 
implications, senior 
executives pushing 
change in pre-crisis 
circumstances do not 
have sufficient leverage 
to break through the 
pattern of  inertia in their 
organisation 
Pettigrew in 
Mintzberg, 
Waters, 
Pettigrew  
Butler 
Transcript of 
an exchange 
of views 
 
1990 UK Decision making need 
to be understood as a 
continuous process in 
context.  
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Pettigrew, 
Woodman  
Cameron 
 
Literature 
review 
2001 USA Theorising future 
research studying 
organisational change 
and development 
should include time and 
history and to portray 
changes as continuous 
processes  
Pfeffer  
Salacik 
Postal survey 
of CEOs of 
hospitals – 57 
questionnaires
 
1977 USA Descriptive statistics 
and correlations were 
presented. 
Organisational 
contextual factors found 
to be related to 
characteristics of CEOs 
and CEO succession 
Phillips ethnographic 
interviews of 
cross section 
of staff from 
12 (total) fine 
art museums 
and 
Californian 
wineries – 96 
informants  
 
1994 USA Content analysis. 
Findings support 
existence of industry 
mindsets and 
recommend broadening 
research on industry 
based cognitive 
construct to include a 
wider range of cultural 
elements and wider set 
of industry participants 
Porac  
Thomas 
2 case studies 
of retail firms 
 
1994 USA How managerial 
cognitive structures 
using categorization 
help managers make 
sense of perceived 
competitive boundaries 
Porac, 
Thomas  
Baden Fuller 
 
Interviews 
with top 
managers 
from 6 
Scottish 
knitwear firms. 
Secondary 
industry data 
1989 UK Qualitative analysis. 
Found industry structure 
both determines and is 
determined by 
managerial perceptions 
of the environment 
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Prahalad  
Bettis 
 
Literature 
review 
1986 USA Theorising the concept 
of dominant logic to 
explain the connection 
between diversity and 
performance 
Priem Field study 
and survey of 
CEOs from 
manufacturing 
firms – 33 
questionnaires
 
1994 USA Descriptive statistics 
and correlations were 
presented. Executive 
judgements influence 
both organisational 
alignment and firm 
performance, 
supporting the strategic 
choice perspective 
Priem  
Harrison 
Literature 
review 
1994 USA Proposals for 
techniques for eliciting 
and analysing the 
strategic judgements of 
strategy makers 
Rhodes  
Keogan 
Interviews of 
CEOs from 
non profit 
housing 
associations – 
25 participants
 
2005 Ireland Qualitative analysis. 
Research suggest non 
profit strategy is 
affected by three 
external contexts: high 
regulation; impact of 
growth, and high HR 
visibility 
Ring  Perry Literature 
review 
1985 USA Theorising implications 
of public vs private 
organisations on 
organisational 
behaviour and strategic 
choices  
Samuelson, 
Galbraith  
McGuire 
 
Historical 
published data
1985 USA Statistical analysis. Top 
management 
performance has 
insignificant  impact on 
organisational 
performance although 
new CEOs tend to be 
more risk adverse 
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Schwandt Literature 
review 
2005 USA Theorising the 
conceptual orientations 
of sensemaking to adult 
learning  and implication 
for conceptualisation of 
managerial work and 
development of 
managers 
Schwenk Literature 
review 
 
1984 USA Theorising possible 
cognitive simplification 
processes in strategic 
decision making 
Schwenk Literature 
review 
1986 USA Applying decision 
behavioural theory to 
model the process by 
which executives 
encourage commitment, 
by promoting specific 
cognitive heuristics and 
biases 
Schwenk Literature 
review 
1988 USA Proposes an integrative 
model of cognition in 
strategic decision 
making 
Schwenk Literature 
review 
1995 USA Modelling three different 
perspectives – 
cognitive, organisational 
and political – of 
strategic decision 
making to explain why 
organisations are resist 
strategic change 
Seiling  
Hinrichs 
n/a 2005 USA Theorising mindfulness 
and constructive 
accountability as critical 
elements of effective 
sensemaking 
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Short  Palmer CEO annual 
shareholder 
letters in 
restaurant 
industry  
2002 USA Content analysis. CEOs 
use a wide variety of 
primarily internal 
referents to assess 
performance but those 
who integrate external 
referents tend to form 
larger and higher 
performing organisation 
Short, Palmer  
Ketchen 
Published 
performance 
data on 85 
hospitals 
 
2003 USA Depending on what 
aspect of performance 
needing improvement, 
managers should focus 
their attention on either 
organisational 
resources or strategic 
group membership 
Staw Literature 
review 
1981 USA Theorising the concept 
of escalation of 
commitment and 
recommended a range 
of preventive actions 
Staw, 
Sanderlands  
Dutton 
Literature 
review 
1981 USA Multi-level analysis 
show a restriction in 
information processing 
and constriction of 
control when under 
threat – so called “threat 
rigidity effect” 
Sternberg Literature 
review 
2003 USA Conceptualizing the 
WICS –wisdom, 
creativity and 
intelligence – approach 
to leadership using 
stories  
Sternberg  
Crigorenko 
Literature 
reiew 
2006 USA Conceptualizing cultural 
intelligence and the 
importance of 
understanding 
intelligence in its 
cultural context 
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Swan Literature 
review 
1995 UK describes the nature 
and importance of 
knowledge bases and 
cognitions for decisions 
about technological 
innovation  
Stubbart Literature 
review 
 
1989 USA Call for more explicit 
cognitive emphasis in 
strategic management 
research 
Thomas  
McDaniel 
Postal survey 
of hospital 
CEOs – 151 
questionnaires
Archival data 
from trade 
publications 
 
1990 USA Multivariate analysis 
and interpretations. 
Strategy and 
information processing 
structures of TMT affect 
how CEOs in different 
organisations interpret 
the same situation. If 
CEOs want this to 
change, they should 
manage their TMT’s 
capacity to gather, 
process and convey 
information 
Thomas, 
McDaniel  
Anderson 
Postal survey 
of hospital 
CEOs – 162 
questionnaires
1991 USA Multivariate analysis. 
CEOs’ interpretation of 
strategic issues, extent 
of whether a given 
strategic issue is 
perceived as 
controllable, is related 
to the existing hospital 
strategy and information 
processing structure 
Thomas, Clark  
Gioia 
Postal survey 
of hospital 
CEOs – 156 
questionnaires
1993 USA Path analyses based on 
case scenario method. 
Develop a model of 
strategic sensemaking 
and organisational 
performance that links 
scanning, interpretation, 
action and outcomes 
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Tucker, 
Cullen, 
Sinclair  
Wakeland 
Single case 
study of a 
non-profit and 
simulation 
2005 USA Encourage non-profit 
leaders to use system 
dynamics modelling as 
decision making tools 
for options appraisal for 
strategic decisions 
Tyler  
Steensma 
Postal surveys 
of CEOs of 
technology 
firms – 101 
questionnaires
 
1998 USA Descriptive analysis and 
correlations. Top 
executives with a 
technical education or 
experience favour 
opportunities for 
potential technological 
alliances 
Walsh Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
1995 USA Identification of  
research implications to 
gain a better 
understanding of 
knowledge structure 
representation, 
development and use in 
organisations 
Walters  Priem Survey and 
computerised 
judgement 
task data -
CEOs of 
manufacturing 
firms – 42 
questionnaires 
and data set 
1999 USA Descriptive analysis. 
CEO of highest 
performing firms 
matched certain 
aspects of external and 
internal scanning to 
business strategy 
Walters, Jiang  
Klein 
Postal survey 
of CEOs of 
small 
manufacturing 
firms - 116 
questionnaires
2002 USA Descriptive statistics. 
Internal information is 
just as important in 
analysis of new 
situations as is the 
external information 
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Wang  Chan Literature 
review 
1995 UK Propose that top 
management perception 
of strategic information 
processing in a 
turbulent environment is 
influenced by 4 
contextual attributes – 
rewards and incentives, 
culture, structure of 
strategic planning 
process, and executive 
support systems 
Weiner  
Mahoney 
Secondary 
source data 
(Compustat) 
for 193 firms 
in 
manufacturing 
1981 USA Content analysis and 
descriptive statistics. A 
model of corporate 
performance as a 
function of 
environmental, 
organisational and 
leadership influences 
showing top leadership 
position of an 
organisation to be 
unimportant 
Yukl  
Lepsinger 
n/a 2006 USA Organisational leaders 
should consider 
efficiency, adaptation 
and human resources 
as determinants of 
improvements in 
organisational 
effectiveness 
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12 INTRODUCTION 
12.1 Statement of the issue 
Recent studies of successful organisational leaders have reported the need for 
senior leaders to understand and take account of context when making strategic 
decisions (Thomas, 1988; Sternberg, 1988; Mayo and Nohria, 2005). A 
systematic review of the literature conducted in Project 1 has resulted in a 
literature based contextual intelligence model for chief executive officer (CEO) 
strategic decision making. What is unknown is that model, based on evidence 
from the corporate world, applies to CEOs working in the English National 
Health Service (NHS). The project will test the applicability of the literature 
based model by exploring the range of contextual factors Primary Care Trust 
(PCT) CEOs take into account when making substantive and organisationally 
significant decisions across different decision making contexts. The aims of 
Project 2 are two folds: one, to contribute to the understanding about the 
contextual intelligence concept in PCT CEO strategic decision making and two, 
to compare the contextual factors CEOs said they took into account against 
evidence from the literature.  
12.2 Background 
Researchers of leadership and performance have long argued that contextual 
factors matter in relation to organisational performance (Lieberson  O’Connor, 
1972; Salancik  Pfeffer, 1977; Samuelson et al., 1985; Weiner  Mahoney, 1981), 
supported by studies showing how leaders have coped with or taken advantage 
of the key contingencies facing their organisations (Pettigrew 1987; Mayo  
Nohria, 2005). Yet the processes underlying how CEOs make sense of and 
respond to their environment are not well understood. Sternberg (1988) uses 
the term “contextual intelligence” to describe a leader who “learns and 
remembers and gains information from past mistakes and successes; has the 
ability to understand and interpret his environment, knows what’s going on in 
the world” (p.244). Mayo and Nohria (2005) extended the concept with a 
leadership model of contextual intelligence based on an analysis of historical 
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data linking CEOs’ sensitivity to macro-economic contextual factors and 
business success. 
In order to understand what may constitutes contextual intelligence, it is 
necessary to, first, describe what the CEOs conceive of as their contexts, and 
second, to provide a plausible explanation as to how this conception influences 
strategic decision making. Drawing upon the systematic review findings, a 
conceptual model of CEO contextual intelligence was constructed as shown in 
Figure 17.  
Figure 17 Literature based model of CEO contextual intelligence 
 
 
This literature based model of contextual intelligence attempts to represent a 
CEO’s contextual world in a series of hemispheres radiating outwards from the 
CEO in the middle and internal organisation to the external local and macro 
environments. Each hemisphere contains contextual factors that apply to that 
part of the CEO’s social world. The ability to make sense of context and to apply 
this knowledge to strategic decisions is what constitutes contextual intelligence. 
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The literature based model of contextual factors has yet to be tested for its 
validity in practice as it was derived from studies in a broad range of 
management environments. Furthermore, with almost all of the published 
evidence coming from the corporate sector, its application to the public sector 
and in particular the NHS is unclear. A research study into how aspects of 
contextual factors influence strategic decision making occurs in the NHS would 
be helpful not only in identifying actions that could lead to better strategic 
decision making by senior leaders in the NHS but would also offer an 
opportunity to compare strategic decision making practices in the NHS with 
those in the corporate sector. Evidence about how CEOs in the NHS make 
strategic decisions would therefore contribute to leadership and decision-
making theories by developing a practical understanding of strategic decision 
making practices in an organisationally critical role.  
12.3  Statement of scope and aims 
The research sets out to answer the following question:   
What aspects of contextual intelligence are most important for PCT CEOs 
in the NHS? 
In order to address this question, further eight sub questions were identified: 
1. How do CEOs define their decision making context? 
2. Is there a hierarchy among contextual factors? Do certain contextual 
factors have greater influence than others? 
3. How do the contextual factors identified by the CEOs match the 
contextual intelligence model developed on the basis of the 
systematic review? 
4. Are there common patterns of contextual factors and influence 
across CEOs? 
5. Do the CEOs take different things into account when taking different 
kinds of strategic decisions? 
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6. If they do, is it possible to explain how the common approaches 
came about? 
7. What are the differences between what CEOs say they do (theory) 
and what they actually do (practice)? (This tells us the extent to 
which CEOs enact their intentions.) 
8. What other factors play a part in CEO decision making process? 
In order to address these questions, the research was divided into two parts, 
Project 2 and Project 3. The first part, Project 2, is the subject of this report and 
is based on the first round interviews with CEOs about their decision making 
practices with respect to different kinds of strategic decisions. The aims of 
Project 2 are to address questions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (theories of action). The 
second part is reported in Project 3 and is based on the findings from a second 
round of interviews with CEOs based on their diary activities at a later point. 
The aims of Project 3 are to address questions 5 (theories in use), 6, 7 and 8 as 
well as issues that arise in Project 2.  
12.4 Research strategy 
The research strategy used in Project 2 is abduction. An abductive strategy was 
chosen because it enables theory to be generated from the accounts given by 
the CEOs of their social world. In Project 2, such accounts contain the concepts 
and meanings used by the CEOs to structure their contexts and therefore to 
direct their decisional behaviour. By moving from first order constructs (actors’ 
descriptions and accounts) to second order constructs (researcher’s 
interpretations) the approach allows the researcher to discover and describe the 
key concepts making up the CEOs’ decision making context from an “insider” 
view, thereby retaining the integrity of the phenomena. 
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13 METHODOLOGY 
13.1 Research methods 
The research is carried out in two parts, the first part in Project 2 and the 
second part in Project 3. It adopted a multi-method approach with a number of 
key features: 
a) Project 2 used qualitative, semi-structured interviews to elicit CEOs’ 
understanding of what they perceived as their decision making contexts. 
Diary based interviews were conducted in Project 3 to gather data on 
CEOs’ lived experience. 
b) The research design was both prospective (Project 2) and retrospective 
(Project 3). Two interviews conducted two months apart in a public 
decision-making timeframe enable data to be collected from participants in 
a “before and after” way, to enable the testing of theory (Project 2) versus. 
practice (Project 3). A gap of two months between interviews was chosen 
as an appropriate time frame as it was deemed to be sufficient for strategic 
decisions to have progressed and to show which contextual factors have 
influenced that progress. As the CEOs were asked to keep a diary in the 
interim period, a longer time frame would run the risk of non-compliance. 
c) In Project 2, the CEOs were presented with four strategic decision 
contexts, in order to identify differences in the contextual factors that have 
significant influence on CEOs when dealing with different kinds of strategic 
decisions.  
d) One of the four strategic decision making contexts was a major policy edict 
from the Strategic Health Authority (SHA). As a common decision 
instigator, it would involve all CEOs making comparable decisions in 
parallel, thereby identifying any individual differences. 
e)  All of the CEOs kept a diary to provide an additional source of 
 confirmatory evidence of decision making activity for Project 3.  
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Project 2 is a report about the first round of semi-structured interviews. 
13.2 Data sources, types and forms 
Data sources used in Project 2 are as follows: 
a) Study population: As the main research question is about what aspects 
of contextual intelligence influence CEO strategic decision making in the 
NHS, all CEOs of PCTs operating in an SHA region were invited to take 
part. Only permanent appointments were invited to participate to avoid 
the risk of having different approaches to strategic decision making being 
affected by the interim status of the incumbent.  
b) Semi-structured interviews: An interview protocol (Appendix C) 
provided a standard and semi structured approach to collect qualitative 
data on the theory and intentions of how the CEOs conceived of their 
strategic decision making context. 
13.3 Criteria for choosing appropriate strategic decision 
An early pilot of the interview protocol with two NHS CEOs revealed that some 
organisationally critical decisions do not necessarily involve CEOs. For 
example, neither of the two CEOs interviewed knew what their organisations 
were doing on the “18 weeks referral to treatment” target which was a top 
national priority, as they had delegated that responsibility to their Director of 
Operations. The pilot findings suggest that NHS CEOs may delegate some 
strategic decision making to their teams, especially those with a large element 
of implementation. I therefore decided that the choices of strategic decision 
context would focus on policy or strategic plans that the CEO would be held 
accountable for by their boards. I was aware from my own experience that, in 
practice, the terms strategies, policies and plans were used interchangeably in 
the NHS. These policies, strategies or plans would have to be designated as 
the responsibility of the CEO for which they would be answerable to their 
boards. It must also allow for individual differences in action. 
Around the time of study design, the SHA launched a major regional health 
strategy (hereafter to be referred to as RHS) so it made sense for the strategy 
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to be a focal policy to test CEO strategic decision making approach. The RHS 
was published in July 2007 by the SHA and proposed two key changes:  
a) centralisation of emergency services in fewer hospitals where evidence 
supports the case for critical mass (activity volume and availability of 
expert staff). This would see PCTs commissioning new services in fewer 
(mainly teaching) hospitals, with minimal impact on local hospital services 
due to the small number of patients affected by the change. 
b) shifting services out of hospitals into a new type of community health 
centre called polyclinics that would provide outpatient and simple 
diagnostics in addition to routine primary care and community services. 
This localisation strategy would have a major impact on PCTs as each 
would have to develop local plans to reconfigure the provisions of health 
services in its area as well as invest in new facilities. Local hospitals could 
lose business as activity moves out of hospitals and GP practices would 
have to work in a federated model. 
The potential gainers of the RHS would be large teaching hospitals while district 
general hospitals could lose up to 25% of their activities. The SHA had set a 
timetable for public consultation (a statutory requirement for major service 
changes) to be led jointly by all PCTs in the region. Each PCT was responsible 
for consulting their local population and every PCT Board was required to 
consider the responses received in a public board meeting to be held in an 
agreed week in May 2008. 
13.4 Data collection process and methods 
Twenty four of the 31 PCT CEOs in the region took part in the study. Seven 
CEOs were excluded due to vacancy (2), interim appointments (3), imminent 
departure (1) and me, the researcher. The CEOs were recruited through a face 
to face meeting or telephone call followed by a personal email from me 
(Appendix C) explaining the research context and commitments required (two 
face to face interviews, each lasting up to 90 minutes to be conducted in their 
offices or an alternative preferred location; and keeping an electronic diary for 
two months), and assuring them of confidentiality. Attached to the email was a 
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participation information sheet (Appendix D) and the research ethics approval 
form (Appendix F). Once email confirmations were received from the CEOs, 
their offices were contacted and interview dates arranged. 
The interviews adopted a semi-structured approach following an interview 
protocol (Appendix E). I conducted all the interviews personally. With four 
exceptions, all interviews took place in individual CEO’s offices. Each interview 
took up to 1.5 hours and was recorded. The interviews focused on the 
contextual factors the CEOs would take account of when responding to national 
policies, a major regional strategy (RHS) and local strategic plans. All CEOs 
were asked four standard questions: 
1. What factors would they take into account generally when taking  generic 
strategic decisions? 
2. What factors would they take into account when responding to national 
policies? 
3. What factors would they take into account in relation to implementing the 
RHS proposals for service centralisation? 
4. What factors would they take into account in responding to the RHS 
polyclinic strategy in their local area? 
13.5 Ethical issues 
There was a risk that despite the straightforward nature of the interview 
questions, some respondents could find the experience uncomfortable. In 
accordance with good practice in social research, participants were provided 
with an information sheet (Appendix D) about the nature of the project, what 
was expected of them, how the research procedures may affect them and how 
anonymity would be assured. It also reassured them that the information 
provided would be treated in confidence and that they had the right to withdraw 
from the process at any stage. The study satisfied the ethical standards laid 
down by Cranfield University Research Ethics Committee (Appendix G). 
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13.6 Data reduction process 
The data reduction process involved a detailed line by line examination of the 
raw transcripts, a process known as microanalysis, using NVivo 8, a computer 
software package developed by QSR International for qualitative data analysis.  
In total, 23 of the 24 transcripts were analysed in this way. One recording was 
of poor quality and although hand written notes were taken during the interview, 
the decision was taken to exclude the transcript to ensure consistency with the 
rest of the data sources. With microanalysis, the data were mined, and relevant 
texts in the form of single words, phrases, sentences or paragraphs highlighted 
and “tagged”. The tagging process enabled me to label or name the text in the 
form of a code, hence the use of the term “coding”. By categorising the data, 
coding facilitated data management and conceptualisation as the process linked 
data to concepts and back to supporting data (Richards and Moore, 2007).  
Overall, the open coding process identified well over 200 codes or “concepts”, 
each represented by a tree node. As the number of nodes grew, it created 
multiple levels or generations (it reached five levels at one point) from the top 
level parent nodes. By then, the data had become too unwieldy to handle and 
time was wasted scrolling up and down coding trees to look for the tree node 
that fitted the description. It soon became evident that several codes were really 
sub-categories, duplications or even overlaps, by the ways they were relating to 
each other. To organise the concepts into more manageable and sensible 
groupings, I created a priori codes based on contextual factors from the 
literature based model and where applicable, parent tree nodes would be coded 
to these. This reductionist process led progressively to parent tree nodes coding 
the top level contextual factors and generational child nodes providing details of 
the phenomena such as when, where, why, who, how and with what 
consequences, thus giving each concept further clarification and specification.  
13.7 Data analysis 
Data analysis was carried out in three stages: 
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The first stage involved a systematic analysis of 23 of the interview transcripts 
(case files) with a view to testing the construct validity of the literature based 
contextual intelligence model. The aims were to examine the extent the 
theoretical framework applies to PCT CEOs and to identify any new contextual 
factor that had been missed in the systematic review. As I systematically went 
through the transcripts, relevant texts were coded based on my interpretation of 
the data and the emergent concept or phenomenon. Each code was assigned a 
tree node, with nodes progressively forming a hierarchy or “generations” under 
a top level parent node. Texts that did not show obvious connections to existing 
tree nodes were coded as free nodes.  
For this stage, each transcript was analysed as a single response rather than as 
distinct responses to four separate questions. Whilst such an approach enabled 
the theoretical model to be tested, it would miss any potential differences in 
contextual factors associated with different kinds of strategic decision. With 
each of the four questions presenting a different strategic decision context, 
analysing the responses by question could help to clarify if CEOs took different 
contextual factors into account when dealing with different decision making 
contexts. This was the focus of the next stage of analysis. 
The second stage of data analysis involved re-categorising the coded data from 
12 case files by question. Only 12 files were coded this way as saturation was 
reached. Four coding systems, or trees, were set up in NVivo to represent the 
four decision making scenarios of generic strategic decision, national policy, 
regional strategy (centralisation), and local plans (polyclinic). Each tree had its 
own set of a priori codes (in the form of child nodes) based on the literature 
based model. Previously coded texts were retrieved and re-categorised 
according to the responses to questions. That is the main difference between 
stages 1 and 2; data analysis in stage 2 was scenario or context-based, while 
stage 1 was conceptually based.  
The third and final stage in data analysis repeated the coding process used in 
Stage 2 to the CEO responses to Q1 (“what factors do you take into account 
when taking generic strategic decisions?”) from the remaining 11 transcripts. By 
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taking a common approach to data analysis for the same question, a link was 
made between steps 1 and 2, enabling all 23 responses to Q1 to be analysed in 
a standard way. 
13.8 Expected outcomes and benefits 
The expected outcomes from adopting this analytical approach are as follow: 
a) The first step of analysis involved systematic coding of 23 case files, 
treating each case file as a single response. The aim was to achieve a 
rapid assessment of the applicability of the literature based contextual 
intelligence model to PCT CEOs at a high level   
b) The second stage of analysis was carried out on only 12 case files as 
saturation was achieved. This stage would show if PCT CEOs took 
different things into account when making different kinds of strategic 
decisions   
c) The third stage of analysis extended stage 2 to the remaining 11 case files 
but only for responses to the Q1 which examined contextual factors in 
generic strategic decision making.  This is to check for internal consistency 
between stages 1 and 2 
d) If there were common patterns of contextual factors and influence across 
CEOs when taking strategic decisions, that might suggest  the presence of 
an NHS mindset or mental model  
Potential findings from data analysis should provide a clearer understanding of 
the common contextual factors PCT CEOs take into account and an elucidation 
and development of the proposed Contextual Intelligence model. 
 
 

 171 
14 FINDINGS 
14.1 Testing the literature based contextual intelligence model 
The coding process enabled underpinning concepts to be identified, with the 
sub-factors explaining the make-up of each contextual factor. The findings are 
reported below, starting with the contextual factors closest to the CEO as 
represented in Figure 16. 
14.1.1 Top Management Team 
The contextual factor, Top Management Team (TMT), was referred to variously 
as the senior management team, top team, executive team or management 
team. For consistency, the term TMT was used throughout the research for any 
reference to individual directors or TMT. In total, 10 out of the 23 transcripts 
(10/23, 43%) referred to TMT, usually as sources of expertise, skills or 
managerial capacity, as shown in Table 14. While the focus on tasks and 
accountability was to be expected, some CEOs used their TMT or individual 
directors as sounding boards. 
Table 14 Top Management Team (TMT) factors considered by PCT CEOs in 
strategic decision making 
Functional expertise 
 Individuals skills 
 Deputising for CEO 
Tasks 
Accountability 
Sounding board 
 testing ideas 
 brainstorming 
  
Examples of quotes referring to TMT members are shown below 
Functional expertise 
We’ve got a strong public health director ….. and public health embedded in the 
values of the organisation. My directors, depending on whether the decision is 
in their domain, I would always take their advice.  
CE Is 
 172 
I have got a very reliable deputy chief executive in the Director of Finance and 
Information and for some issues, it is really helpful to be able to sort of have an 
informal word with him. He will always challenge me and offer a different 
perspective and that is really helpful in the early stages. 
 CE Br 
Testing ideas and brainstorming 
With the chief operating officer from our provider side, we sat there and we sort 
of said, there will be x and there will be y …... So we did brainstorming I 
suppose. 
CEO Is 
I do work very much with a team ….. who I trust, so their views would be 
fundamental. 
CEO Ha 
I would expect, in making those decisions therefore to have tested ….. with 
management team colleagues as to what their priorities are, and therefore what 
the context is for their decisions.  
CEO Cr 
14.1.2 Organisational internal factors 
The results for the rest of organisational internal factors are set out in Table 15 
and Figure 18. They show PCT CEOs identifying with a majority of the literature 
based contextual factors, albeit to different degrees.  
Every CEO talked about organisational strategy, indicating this to be a critical 
factor in strategic decision making. In second place was structure, which was 
mentioned by 20 CEOs (20/23, 87%). The remaining factors, in order of citation 
frequency, were information, finance, operations and staff. A few factors, 
namely size, systems and relationships, were not mentioned by anyone. The 
next section will examine the contextual factors and their sub-factors (sub-
categories) in detail. 
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Table 15 Organisational internal factors considered in CEO strategic decision 
making 
Contextual factors Number of CEOs (%) 
Strategy 
Structure 
Information 
Finance 
Operations 
Staff 
Culture 
Relationships 
Systems 
Size 
23 (100) 
20 (87) 
16 (70) 
12 (52) 
12 (52) 
11 (48) 
5 (22) 
0 
0 
0 
 
Figure 18 Organisational internal factors considered in CEO strategic decision 
making 
 
 To understand the reasons for variations in frequency distribution of contextual 
factors, the coding trees of sub-categories were examined with a view to 
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identifying the explanatory factors underpinning each organisational internal 
factor (see Table 16 below.). The following notes were made with respect to 
contextual factors (which are represented by the parent tree node).  
Table 16 Coding tree of organisational internal factors involved in PCT CEO 
strategic decision making 
Strategy 
Coherence with national/regional policy 
Synergy 
Flexibility 
Strategic fit 
Development process  
Timetable 
Openness 
Risk assessment 
Impact analysis 
Strategy vs operations 
Mapping risks 
Assessing future needs 
Negotiability 
Must do’s 
Compromises  
Fudges 
Presentation 
Communication 
Local meaning 
Use of language 
Vsioning 
Frequency 
 
Structure 
Engagement framework 
Group composition  
Expert inputs 
Formal arrangements 
Conflict of interest 
Organisation 
Leadership 
Individual capability 
Formal groupings 
Governance 
Information  
Hard (quantitative) evidence 
Published evidence 
Best practice standards 
Existing data  
Audit reports 
Qualitative insights 
Expert views 
Consultation feedback  
Lessons from elsewhere  
Soft intelligence 
Talking to people 
Seeking patient views 
Modelling assumptions 
Observations 
 
Finance 
Affordability 
Financial modelling 
Value for money 
Risks 
 
Operations 
Mobilisation 
Performance 
Pilots 
Scale 
 
Staff 
Engagement 
Trade union 
Professional groups 
Terms and conditions 
 
Culture 
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Board 
Chairman 
NEDs 
PEC Chair 
Medical Director 
CEO 
Programme  
Programme boards 
Programme management 
 
 
Values 
Climate 
Learning 
 
 
14.1.2.1 Strategy  
Organisational strategy was a critical factor guiding CEO decision making. 
Faced with top down policy requirements, the CEOs’ first reactions were to seek 
strategic fit between policy and existing organisational strategy. If this were 
difficult, they would try to negotiate with the SHA or DH for local flexibilities. The 
CEOs described how they would operationalise the policies by establishing a 
process to engage stakeholders. A timetable will be set and the process might 
include a risk assessment with an impact analysis of trading off long versus 
short term needs, mapping risks and assessing future needs. The CEOs were 
in agreement about what counted as “must dos” or central diktats and if 
necessary they would try to present or “fudge” their local positions in legitimate 
ways to improve compliance. They would translate top down policies into 
meaningful and achievable local plans, which they do by using language that 
local stakeholders understood and communicating frequently. 
14.1.2.2 Structure 
The PCT CEOs appeared to take a broad view of structure, citing structural 
forms relating to engagement, organisation, governance, performance and 
programme management. They liked operating in a formal structure that 
involved the right people such as subject matter experts, and managed the 
conflicting interests of stakeholders. For this reason, programme management 
and decision making fora were popular. The CEOs would pay attention to 
leadership and individual capability at every level, from groups to organisations. 
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Having an effective governance structure was a high priority, and CEOs valued 
having a strong board with strong leadership with the ability to demonstrate 
accountability and legitimacy in strategic decision making. 
14.1.2.3 Information 
Three out of four CEOs said they would ask for evidence to inform their 
strategic decisions, with preferred information sources being formal publications 
ranging from DH reports, peer-reviewed journals to public audit reports. A few 
would also obtain advice and knowledge about best practices from subject 
matter experts, as well as source soft intelligence from talking to stakeholders, 
opinion formers, and other significant organisations such as the SHA or other 
PCTs. On occasions the PCTs may have to formally seek feedback from the 
public through formal consultations. Modelling was sometimes used to 
challenge prevailing assumptions and practices. The CEOs did not appear to 
use information systematically. 
14.1.2.4 Finance 
Half of the CEOs mentioned money issues, mainly to do with affordability and 
whether plans were value for money. There was little evidence of strategic 
financial acumen beyond financial modelling to mitigate risks. 
14.1.2.5 Operations 
The one in two CEOs who raised this was concerned about balancing 
implementation with maintaining performance, and said they would pilot 
changes before expanding on a larger scale. 
14.1.2.6 Staff  
Issues were about engaging with staff; dealing with a unionised multi 
professional workforce in the NHS and instilling a learning culture in the 
organisation. 
14.1.2.7 Culture  
Issues were about values, climate and culture within the PCTs. 
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In summary, all PCT CEOs espoused a determination to achieve alignment 
between organisational strategy and top down goals. They indicated they would 
try to influence their internal organisation to act in ways that would be 
advantageous for the PCT and its local population. There was a strong 
preference for formal structures and published quantitative evidence. As leaders 
of statutory organisations, the CEOs demonstrated that they had good 
knowledge of governance and accountability and would want to establish 
appropriate structures and communicating frequently with stakeholders. Just 
over half of all CEOs expressed concerns about finances and operations, which 
may reflect the financial situation of their PCTs at the time of interview. One in 
two CEOs cited staff engagement, including the building of a strong culture as 
part of policy implementation. Unsurprisingly, there was no mention of 
relationships, systems and size, which could be explained by CEOs being 
outward facing in relationship terms and are likely to delegate concerns about 
internal systems to the TMT. As there was no prescribed size for PCTs, which 
vary widely in the population covered, the size of the organisation was not a 
concern. 
14.1.3 Local (external) contextual factors 
Compared to internal organisational factors, PCT CEOs reportedly pay 
substantially more attention to local contextual factors external to their 
organisations, as shown in Table 17 and  
 
Figure 19. Of the first level factors, stakeholders topped the list, followed closely 
by goals and decision making process. The three contextual factors were cited 
by over 90% of CEOs, showing they may be critical contextual factors in PCT 
strategic decision making considerations. The next group of contextual factors 
cited by the majority of CEOs consists of, in descending frequency order, 
environmental dynamism, time, relationships, politicians and public 
engagement. The citation frequencies for this group indicate that such factors 
were likely to be important considerations depending on local circumstances. 
The final group of contextual factors is related to unique local contexts, as they 
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were cited by a minority of CEOs. (In both organisational internal and local 
contexts, no new contextual factor emerged from the analyses.) 
Table 17 Local (external) contextual factors considered in CEO strategic decision 
making 
Contextual factors Number of CEOs (%) 
Stakeholders 
Goals 
Decision making process 
Environmental Dynamism 
Time 
Relationships 
Politicians 
Public engagement 
Service users 
Other significant organisations 
Performance expectations 
Interest or pressure groups 
Industry culture  
Regulators 
Resources 
22 (96) 
21(91) 
21 (91) 
19 (83) 
18 (78) 
15 (65) 
15 (65) 
14 (61) 
11(48) 
10 (43) 
6 (26) 
6 (26) 
4 (17) 
2 (9) 
0 
 
 
Figure 19 Local contextual factors considered in CEO strategic decision making 
 179 
 
A coding tree containing details of categories and sub-categories of PCT CEOs’ 
local strategic decision making context is shown in Table 18.  
Table 18 Coding scheme showing the categories and sub-categories of local 
factors informing PCT CEOs strategic decision making  
Stakeholders 
Stakeholder management 
Identifying stakeholders (see list) 
Public 
Signifiant organisations 
NHS 
Non NHS 
key post holders 
Significant groups 
Significant individuals 
Service users 
Politicians 
Conducting stakeholder analysis 
Position 
Interest  
Issues  
Inner circle of influence 
Engaging stakeholders 
Taking soundings  
Opportunity to raise concerns 
Goals 
Origin or trigger 
 Top down requirement 
 Local strategy 
 Being opportunistic 
Appropriateness 
Right model of care 
Do-ability 
Timeframe 
Alignment with strategy 
Locally focussed 
Delivery 
Structure 
process 
 
Performance expectations** 
Clear specification 
Targets 
 Do minimum 
Monitoring mechanisms 
 180 
Building links  
Building support 
Managing stakeholders 
 Managing expectations 
 Managing relationships 
 Managing reputation 
 
List of stakeholders 
Statutory (other sig organisations*) 
Local council 
Local Strategic Partnerships  
Politicians* 
Mayor 
Council leader 
Ward councillors 
OSC Chair  
Executives 
CEO, DASS 
Social Services 
NHS Trusts 
Significant individuals 
Consultants  
CEO 
Medical Director 
Issues 
Shared goal 
Financial problem 
Staff buy-in 
Relationship 
Range of service 
Access 
Other PCTs 
Sector (sub-regional) 
Peers (other CEOs) 
SHA 
Formal approach to policy 
View of sign individuals 
Department of Health  
GPs 
Organisations 
LMC 
PBC  
Sanctions
Horison scanning 
 
Decision making processes 
Clarifying objectives 
Specifying outcomes 
Demonstrating the problem 
Published evidence  
Expert views 
Lessons from elsewhere 
Independent validation 
Developing a plan 
Mapping decision pathway 
Working backwards 
Having a Plan B 
Timetabling 
Evaluating options 
Developing business case  
Appraising options  
do-ability 
Track record 
 SWOT analysis 
Mitigating actions 
Programme management 
Negotiating outcomes 
Pragmatism 
Doing deals 
 Trading off 
 Compromising 
Engaging stakeholders 
Conveying local meaning 
Getting buy-ins 
Early warning 
Communication 
Relationships 
Legitimising decisions 
 Board  
 Governance 
  processes 
  composition (members) 
 Demonstrating accountability 
 Demonstrating compliance 
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PEC 
Individuals 
LMC Chair 
PBC Chair 
Key local GPs 
Issues 
Contractors 
Polyclinic anchor tenants 
business opportunities  
Closed shop   
 
Non statutory 
 
Clinical networks 
Clinical reference groups 
voluntary sector 
politicians – MPs 
Regulators* 
Monitor 
 
Relationships (types) 
Joint committees 
Strategic Partnerships 
Alliances 
Cooperative 
Collaborative 
Joint working 
Honest broker 
Trading 
Collective 
Contractual 
 
Public engagement* 
Plan 
Communication plan 
Story telling 
Methods 
Formal consultation 
Multimedia 
Field work 
Talking head/ champion 
Formal events 
 
Environmental dynamism 
Space 
Location 
Geography 
buildings  
of significance (usually 
hospitals) 
GP premises 
Infrastructure 
Road 
Access 
Distance 
Travel routes 
travel times 
Public transport 
Socio- demography 
 Population growth 
 Deprivation 
 Ethnicity 
culture 
Local economy 
 healthcare market 
 
Time (temporal) 
Past 
Legacy 
History 
Track record 
Measures 
Availability (hours/days) 
Timing  
Pace (speed) 
Momentum (rate) 
Period (duration or length) 
Future 
Time scale 
Timetable 
Evolution 
 
NHS (industry) culture  
Staff afraid of making mistakes 
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Hard to reach groups 
Funding 
 
Service users* 
Patients 
Patient views 
Patients Forum 
GP patient groups 
Local community 
 
Impression management
Too many players 
Top down imposition  
Market immaturity 
 
 
 
* stakeholder subgroups that are 
distinct conceptual groups  
 
 
The following section examines the major categories that define the external 
decision making context of PCT CEOs, starting with the most frequently cited 
concepts.  
14.1.3.1 Stakeholders 
The CEOs named several individual groups, while other times they may refer to 
stakeholders as a group. The list of stakeholders cited by CEOs vary from 
person to person but there are significant consistencies as to the most 
important, namely other significant organisations (and specific individuals within 
these organisations), the local council, both officers and councillors, and MPs. 
As PCTs are the local health authority, NHS Trusts, the SHA and GPs are 
significant players. The majority of PCT CEOs describe conducting stakeholder 
analysis to assess the positions of different stakeholders. They would use 
formal or informal stakeholder engagement processes to take soundings while 
giving stakeholders opportunities to raise concerns and to take part in decision 
making process and structures. Many use the term stakeholder management to 
dampen resistance and build support by managing expectations and positioning 
key stakeholders at key decision points in the decision making process.  
14.1.3.2 Public engagement 
The public interests in local NHS issues can be as service user, carer, 
community, taxpayer and citizen.  PCTs have a statutory duty to consult the 
public on material strategic change, so public engagement is a specific activity.  
 183 
14.1.3.3 Service users or patients 
The NHS equivalent of customers in business. The government is encouraging 
NHS organisations to be much more focused on patient needs and to consult 
patients in redesigning services. 
14.1.3.4 Goals  
Goals are long term strategic directions for both the PCT as well as local health 
economy. 
14.1.3.5 Performance expectation 
This an the umbrella term used for  coding references to measurable targets, 
standards or central requirements, as distinct from goals.  
14.1.3.6 Decision making process 
Decision making processes are used by CEOs to demonstrate governance and 
stakeholder engagement. They include actions and interactions, movements, 
sequence, and changes in response to changes in context or conditions. 
14.1.3.7 Environmental dynamism 
Environmental dynamism is an umbrella term used to cover references to 
issues in the local health economy. They included pace of change, spatial 
issues such as premises and infrastructure that need to be considered by the 
PCT in formulation of local strategies or plans. The main issues identified were 
space, in terms of location of properties and geography; buildings, especially 
hospitals of historical significance beloved of local communities and quality of 
GP premises; infrastructure mainly consisting of roads, with dimensions of ease 
of access, distance, travel routes and travel times; and public transport; and 
socio-demographic factors including community population profiles, and the 
local economy. 
14.1.3.8 Time 
Temporal factors including legacy, history, track record and memory would be 
influential. Also time measures such as availability, timing, pace, momentum 
 184 
and period; and looking into the future in terms of timescale, timetable and 
evolution. 
14.1.3.9 Relationships  
The CEOs used different terms to describe their working relationships with 
stakeholders and other parties. The dimensions ranged from contracts and 
formal committees at one end, to alliances and collaborative at the other, with 
semi-formal arrangements such as joint working and strategic partnerships 
sitting somewhere in between. 
14.1.3.10 NHS culture  
The CEOs used phrases such as “staff fear making mistakes” which could be 
interpreted as having a blame culture, and a prevalence of impression 
management with impression counting more than results, too many “players” 
resulting in inefficiencies and bureaucracy, top down imposition revealing a 
command and control structure with little flexibility and market immaturity due to 
a lack of choice and competition and monopoly providers. 
14.1.4 Macro level factors 
Macro level factors were notably absent. Other than the one CEO who said he 
did not understand the impact of the economy, there was no other reference to 
macro level factors. 
14.1.5 Summary 
The results show that the literature based contextual intelligence model has 
some relevance to PCT CEO decision making practice in that at least half of the 
literature based contextual factors both within the organisation as well as 
externally in the local health economy were flagged up by a majority of CEOs as 
important considerations. Of the most frequently cited contextual factors, 
strategy and structure topped the organisational internal list while stakeholders, 
and goals and decision making processes emerged as critical local factors. Of 
the never cited contextual factors, surprising differences were one, the 
insignificance of organisational size in the NHS; two, CEOs’ lack of attention to 
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internal systems and relationships and three, CEOs’ apparent limitation in 
seeking synergistic collaboration with non NHS resources. As a group, PCT 
CEOs appeared to take variable account of their context when taking strategic 
decisions. However, the findings did not adequately explain why the CEOs 
referenced certain contextual factors more than others. As the CEOs were 
asked four standard questions, each one presenting a different strategic 
decision context at the policy or strategy level, the next step is to analyse the 
CEOs’ responses to each question independently. 
14.2  Contextual factors in generic strategic decision making 
This section presents the analysis of responses to Question 1. All 23 responses 
to Q1 were coded using the interpretive approach and the results shown in 
Table 19 and Table 20.  
14.2.1 Top Management Team 
Only five (22%) CEOs mentioned TMT in their responses, which relate to team 
problem solving, testing ideas, or individual contributions. One CEO gave two 
reasons. It was noted that 18 (78%) CEOs did not mention TMT in relation to 
generic strategies. This may be because they were asked for “what” rather than 
“whose views” would be taken into account, although this had not stopped the 
majority of CEOs from naming other individuals. Considering that TMTs form 
part of the PCT strategic apex, the finding suggests that most CEOs do not 
consider their TMT members as significant contributors to strategic decisions. 
This inference is somewhat consistent with the results in Table 19, which show 
CEOs tending to regard their TMT as functional experts who get tasks done. 
Earlier findings showed CEOs using TMTs as sounding boards; here they were 
engaged in problem solving and testing ideas, supporting CEO sense making, 
with the TMT using their expertise to help their boss to notice, filter and interpret 
the many competing contextual factors that shaped the strategic decision 
making context. 
Table 19 Reasons for Top Management Team (TMT) influence on CEOs in 
strategic decision making 
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Reasons for TMT engagement  Number of CEOs 
Team problem solving 2 
Testing ideas 1 
Sharing responsibility 1 
Individual strengths or expertise 1 
 
14.2.2 Organisational internal factors 
The next set of results, summarised in Table 20 and presented as bar charts in 
Figure 20, shows the organisational internal factors CEOs said they took into 
account when taking generic strategic decisions.  
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Table 20 Organisational internal factors considered by CEOs in generic strategic 
decisions 
Factors No of CEOs 
(%) 
Factors No of CEOs 
(%) 
structure 16 (70) culture 5 (22) 
strategy 11 (48) operations 0 
information 10 (43) size 0 
staff 7 (30) relationship 0 
finance 7 (30) systems 0 
 
Figure 20 Organisational internal factors considered by CEOs in generic 
strategic decisions 
 
14.2.2.1 Structure 
The most commonly cited were structural factors, with 70% (16/23) of CEOs 
referring to engagement, organisation, programme management, decision 
making and governance structures. It appears that CEOs liked having a 
framework and to operate within a structure when taking strategic decisions to 
give order, transparency and probity to their decision making processes, as 
shown in quote below.  
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I start by designing a process that enables work to be constructed, and then 
position key stakeholders either in individual work streams or at decision 
making points, or formally through a board or an executive.  
If you take the sector work, we needed to find some way of bringing four acute 
trusts and five PCTs as boards together. What I designed there was a 
governance process, but quite consciously, I structured the work, organised it, 
put it on a critical path and all the usual stuff. You are doing big programme 
management, but then you draw up a list of actions – through that, developed a 
list of key stakeholders that needed to be engaged and then designed the 
processes for that engagement to occur.  
We then needed to define the work streams that had to be undertaken so public 
engagement, clinical advice, business modelling and out of hospital care 
programmes in our whole sector, which are detailed programs in their own right, 
can take place. We then needed to be accountable to an executive that report 
to myself as the Senior Responsible Owner of the whole programme. 
We can actually attempt to control some of the environment within which the 
work is going by engagement, but also that has a robustness of approach, so 
that when things go wrong and get rough, you have got the programme 
established in a way that it can go forward even if people are attacking it.  
And the more work I have done as a chief executive, the more I think, 
particularly with very large programmes, the need for quite rigid structures 
within which the project unfolds. It is of critical importance to be able to record 
progress in the multiple and complex relationships, but perhaps more 
importantly, to provide a framework within which continuous engagement can 
occur.  
CEO 3 
14.2.2.2 Organisational strategy  
Strategy was the next most popular, with 48% (11/23) of CEOs looking for 
strategic coherence or synergy with other local plans, especially where national 
and regional policies could be reframed to fit local contexts. Alignment between 
top down initiatives and local plans facilitate implementation and provide an 
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external stimulus to much needed change. Below is a quote from a CEO 
explaining why his PCT opened a new health centre in a particular location. 
We as a team within the PCT do our best to try to relate what we do 
strategically, and then what we do practically, to the notion of “health benefit” for 
the borough. It just so happened ...... that we’d already identified the fact that 
there had probably been more proactive development in the north half ….. than 
in the south, and so we were already ....... thinking about the need for 
development in X (place). It is not coincidence therefore that it happened in X 
and not somewhere else. I suppose it goes back to “going after the do-able” 
doesn’t it, that we sort of knew that would be well met.  
CEO 16 
14.2.2.3 Information management 
The information management factor was cited by 43% (10/23) of CEOs in the 
form of research data, expert knowledge, quantitative analyses including 
modelling and benchmarking, published evidence and intelligence as shown by 
examples of quotes below. Information management focused on finding 
quantitative evidence to support decision making in deductive rather than 
inductive ways. There was a strong preference for numerical data as well as 
volume of data although few CEOs practised evidence based decision-making.  
All the planning work was done on a huge amount of data and trajectories and 
when we brought in (consultants) they went through all the numbers and 
confirmed we had costed everything.  
CEO 23 
Depending on the decision, we totally have to have actual hard information. You 
look at the figures. In this particular example, you look at patient flows, you look 
at population forecast, you look at needs assessment. You also collect a fair 
amount of soft information along the way. 
CEO 8 
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14.2.2.4 Staff  
Employee related issues were cited by the 30% (7/23) of CEOs in relation to 
engagement or development events when taking strategic decisions as shown 
by quotes below. 
We did workshop sessions with senior managers. We did staff briefings so the 
whole organisation understood the absolute critical importance of delivering 
this. We were creating this impetus to change, to move it on. 
CEO 23 
We need to do more to engage the team below directors ..... because 
sometimes they can contribute, you know. If we don’t manage the information 
that comes from the thinking along the way, we miss some really good ideas. 
CEO 19 
14.2.2.5 Resources (finance) 
The next category, resources, was identified by seven CEOs (30%). They were 
all about financial issues in relation to alignment with PCT strategy, risk 
management, and affordability as shown by quotes below.  
We suffered dreadfully with the top slice, therefore I was quite influenced by 
that (experience). Whatever we do, it cannot risk us losing financial control, I 
couldn’t pump prime it, I couldn’t take risks - financial risks. We had to do it in a 
way that allowed us to keep that control. 
CEO 8 
Obviously we will be taking stock of affordability. 
CEO 16 
What we have had to struggle with is the desire to be focused on the here and 
now, around money versus the bigger strategic picture. We have found it 
difficult as many do in those circumstances to be playing both agendas. 
CEO 12 
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14.2.2.6 Culture 
Altogether, five out of 23 CEOs (22%) mentioned organisational culture issues, 
saying they wanted their organisation to be successful, to have the right values, 
valuing staff by providing a good work place, and becoming more financially 
aware. Examples of quotes from CEOs in relation to organisational culture are 
shown below. 
Looking forward and that is about saying how do we begin to build a culture of 
ambition in the organisation about what we can achieve. How do we improve 
health outcomes, how do we demonstrate to our public, to our stake holders, to 
the board, that the investment that we are making now are improving outcomes, 
and that is a very different challenge. 
CEO 10 
You do need to run things back past your own values. You need to have some 
value sets about decision making. Which obviously you have to be about, if you 
do make decisions, you try to do it in an honest, transparent way and you take 
into account public sector values. ….. The point is, you have to make sure is 
that decision making is done in terms of agreed values. In all organisations 
there are agreed values in the organisation, but you also have your own 
personal values as well. 
CEO 2 
In summary, the findings describe the internal PCT actions involved in strategic 
decision making. The responses of PCT CEOs show a common approach to 
taking strategic decisions generally. Their key actions would involve designing 
structures and decision making processes for governance, to organise work, to 
engage staff and stakeholders, to keep track on progress and ultimately to take 
the strategic decision. The CEOs will want to ensure decisions are coherent 
with the PCT strategy, are evidence based and affordable. 
14.2.3 Local contextual factors 
Table 21 and Figure 21 show the local factors CEOs said they took into account 
in generic strategic decision making. The local factors normally refer to 
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contextual factors in the local health economy. The health economy is normally 
defined as within the boundaries of the PCT catchment area but for supra PCT 
issues, the definition could extend to neighbouring PCT boundaries. They may 
therefore include regional factors but exclude national macro level factors. 
Compared to organisational internal factors, the vast majority of CEOs were 
likely to take external factors into account, as well as showing greater 
consistency in the factors that influenced their strategic decision making. 
Table 21  Local factors CEOs took into account when taking generic strategic 
decisions 
Factors No of CEOs 
(%) 
Factors No of CEOs 
(%) 
goals 21(91) public engagement 3(13) 
decision making 
processes 
21(91) performance 
expectations  
2(9) 
stakeholders 17(74) learning 2(9) 
environmental 
dynamism 
17(74) relationships 2(9) 
time 
other significant 
organisations 
14(61) 
12(19) 
regulator 0 
politicians 8 pressure groups 0 
service users 5 industry culture 0 
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Figure 21  Local factors CEOs took into account when taking generic strategic 
decisions 
 
14.2.3.1 Goals 
Of all of the local contextual factors, occupying joint top spots were goals and 
decision making process. They were mentioned by 21/23 (91%) of CEOs. It is 
no wonder that goals guide how PCT CEOs take strategic decisions. Examples 
of quotes from CEOs on how local goals influenced their decision making are 
shown below.  
We got some priorities within the PCT that have been agreed at board level. 
Therefore, whatever the situation that presents itself that you had to take a 
decision on, you try and work through - how am I going to engineer this, so that 
it gets the best possible win against those priorities. 
CEO 8 
Top down requirements 
In terms of a major change that would be imposed from above ....... I would 
want to have a discussion that says, what’s this policy about? What are the pros 
and cons? What are the opportunities and what are the strengths and what 
does it mean for us in that local situation, obviously. 
CEO 19 
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Achievability 
I would expect to be testing factually both what our starting point is and talking 
with colleagues their judgment about what’s reasonably achievable. 
CEO 6 
Triggers 
To some extent it depends on where the original trigger for the strategic change 
comes from. My response might be quite different to something that lands from 
the DH ...... or that I observe in the organisation ...... or that a local stakeholder 
or a member of the board raises with me or comes up in a group discussion 
within the organisation. 
CEO 10 
Opportunistic 
We have some quite powerful opportunities to bring those things together in 
joint commissioning arrangements ...... something the local authority would be 
willing to engage in.  
CEO 12 
Future impact 
Hearing Bill Moyes (chairman of the regulator Monitor)......we have to have a 
much more sophisticated commissioning capability to really manage the 
commercial market and to drive improvement in a number of ways that isn’t only 
through commercialisation. 
CEO 20 
Well, we were writing up our primary care strategy in draft before polyclinics, 
and we’ve got super health centres. So we launched our strategy ahead of 
(RHS) - there was, you know, a kind of eureka moment. I did think, oh fantastic, 
so I was a great supporter. But I kept thinking, wondering, whether he was 
going to water that down ......   
CEO 11 
It is not uncommon for CEOs to be faced with conflicting central demands and 
local goals. On these occasions, they said they would take into account a 
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number of factors: appropriateness of the new demands on local goals including 
do-ability within timeframes; importance of the trigger, taking into consideration 
synergy with local priorities and strategies; degree of local flexibility; being 
opportunistic and use national policies to push through local change, being 
anticipatory of future needs. In short, what is the problem the decision is trying 
to solve, and if the decision would support or compromise local or top down 
goals.  
14.2.3.2 Decision making process 
The same number (21/23) of CEOs talked about having decision making 
processes for taking key strategic decisions. As statutory organisations, PCTs 
must be able to demonstrate that due process had been followed. For reasons 
of corporate governance, transparency and sometimes mandatory 
arrangements, CEOs said they preferred to use formal decision making 
processes that usually follow a standard format with some common features 
(see Table 22 below).  
Table 22 Key steps in decision making processes used by PCT CEOs in strategic 
decisions making 
Features No of CEOs 
(%) 
Features No of CEOs 
(%) 
governance 
risk assessment 
20(87) 
20(87) 
stakeholder 
engagement 
16(70) 
clear process 
negotiation 
17(74) 
17(74) 
clear objectives 
structure 
10(43) 
10(43) 
 
From the interviews with PCT CEOs, a coding tree of the terms and phrases 
used most frequently to describe strategic decision making processes is shown 
in Table 23. 
. 
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Table 23 Coding tree showing key features of strategic decision making process 
(cited by number of CEOs) based on terms and phrases used 
Governance (20) 
Systems and process (20) 
Board (5) 
Risk assessment (20) 
Options appraisal (20) 
Do-ability (10) 
Threats (10) 
Opportunities (6) 
Expert views (4) 
Clear process (17) 
Decision pathway (16) 
Timeframe (4) 
Negotiation (17) 
Compromises (11) 
Competing views(10) 
Stakeholder engagement (16) 
Framework for engagement 
(14) 
Buy-ins (10) 
Champion (6) 
Communication (4) 
Clear objectives (10) 
Structure (10) 
Program management (5) 
 
 
Examples of quotes from CEOs on how they would approach decision making 
processes are shown below, with key concepts highlighted. 
Governance 
There needs to be clarity of objectives, clarity of process and above all, clarity 
of governance. Because when you’ve got multiple organisations collaborating, if 
you don’t have good governance and structures you end up with bits of work 
being done, that people are not sighted on. You don’t then formally sign them 
off, they don’t hang together well. And above all, the PCT boards become 
completely disconnected from the critical decision. 
CEO 3 
We also had a program board for the Collaborative Commissioning Intentions 
which comprised Board Chairs, PEC Chairs and Chief Execs from five PCTs. 
So, we’ve got a strong governance piece, so that nobody could walk from it 
when it was difficult.  
CEO 6 
Accountability 
Quite a lot of our partnership working is ...... single management with dual 
accountability, so we preserve quite a lot of the separate. 
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CEO 13 
Risk assessment  
The factors that I take into consideration are, I suppose, degrees of risk and 
opportunity and importance. And if it’s sort of low risk, it’s very important, then 
just get on and do it. If it’s, you know, a higher risk, less important, I’m not 
ashamed of not doing anything. I’m quite happy to see what happens. I have 
created this formula, high risk, high importance, that’s probably when I ‘d write a 
paper, and I do take the leadership role, I suppose. The factors then would be 
around describing the risks, and how we’re going to handle it.  
CEO 13 
There is also a thing about what might be discovered as collateral damage. 
There is no point getting a priority delivered, if the route by which you have 
done it caused such discontent and such unhappiness that it actually has a 
ripple effect onto other things that are your priorities. 
CEO 8 
Options appraisal 
We have got four PCTs involved in the consultation. We have four hospital 
merger models with different consequences for (borough). Therefore there 
would be risks, both about which option is in favour but also, it is about, in a 
sense, our own position amongst those other PCTs and with local trusts. Do we 
form an alignment with the other PCTs?  Do you form an alignment with the 
hospital trust, if you have got a good relationship? You look at patient flows, you 
look at activity flows, you look at population forecast, you look at needs 
assessment.  You look at how, in the different options, they would play out for 
local population as well as the population of (region).   
CEO 8 
We write a paper to the board that explains and puts forward the proposal. We 
do have to be pretty explicit about what are the other ideas that we had thought 
about and why they are not right, or not right for now. So, the board would like 
to see options. They, like every board –  actually won’t have a genuine choice, 
so they don’t like it if we work everything as it is appointed. That’s when they 
start to be suspicious about the decision making process of the organisation. 
CEO 14  
 198 
 
Expert views 
We’ve had an independent reviewer with expertise, you know, from one of the 
big national bodies to come in and review to make sure that our proposals are 
consistent with national policy, best practice and the evidence base. 
It is about using the resources of the organisations better to ensure that the 
decisions are based on evidence, so that the decision is as good as possible, 
and that the different perspectives of people who know an issue really well are 
brought in. 
CEO 6 
Do-ability 
It is no good saying the solution is all about closing X (hospital). If we closed X 
we can do all these marvellous things and here is the evidence that shows we 
don’t need X. Frankly if you espouse a strategic objective that just is completely 
undeliverable then you are going to waste your own and everyone’s time. 
CEO 16 
I would always prefer the high benefit, low risk, with low impact, and easy to 
achieve ones,  but that doesn’t mean you always choose the ones that are easy 
to achieve - but you need to understand the deliverability. 
CEO 24 
 
Opportunities 
When a new idea comes, I am far more interested in thinking how I can make it 
happen than the barriers that stop it happening. While that is useful, I also 
notice ....... chief executives who talk about ....... risks, and how they spot all 
those, while I’m thinking about the opportunities.  
CEO 19 
I actually believe I’ve got an entirely independent business and I see 
opportunities that it could be providing paid-for services for our wealthy 
population. 
CEO 14 
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Threats 
I had the acute trust saying – no it won’t, no it won’t. I had (SHA) sort of axes 
hanging there above us like a dagger saying, well it’s down to you and if you 
don’t do it, you know heads will roll. 
CEO 23 
At the same time, finance was one factor, the other compounding factor was 
they were losing clinicians. So you know we were in danger actually of having 
unsafe services. 
CEO 16 
I think also you look at any potential political fallout, if it is going to knock-off the 
director suite - to what extent you think it is going to get the support of the team. 
CEO 8 
Stakeholder engagement 
I work in a way that attempts to define the territory that the decision will impact 
upon, and then seek to identify very early in the process of developing the 
ideas, the plans. And to engage with those people who have a major stake in 
the issue, who have the potential to block, or indeed, who are potentially strong 
supporters.  
CEO 3 
It does lead to centralisation (of services) and it will be resisted. And we have to 
anticipate the resistance and deal with it 
CEO 9  
Paediatrics, AE and Obstetrics (centralisation) are the really big decisions. And 
the biggest problems are the emotions ......... very emotional for the local 
population.  
CEO 17 
Buy-ins 
We decided what the answer was, and then we worked on who were the 
stakeholders that we had to make sure were signed up, and what was 
supposed to happen and what we have to do about it. 
CEO 13 
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Framework for engagement 
I then did several things, I formally reviewed the project and produced a board 
report, which basically said these are the reasons why you failed, and, if you 
take this on, this is the way it’s going to be done.  
I recast the arrangements so that PCTs took the leading role. And by creating 
new governance structures and project management structures, and got SHA 
on the programme board with me to ensure that everyone behaved properly. 
And there is the other critical data about putting a framework around the things 
as you get co-design. Through co-design, you get a prospect of higher 
ownership. Not always, but by enabling people to influence the key decision, 
one, I think gets a better chance of getting a good decision, and two, also gains 
a critical mass of support for that decision. 
CEO 3 
Because then people own the framework and can move swiftly within the 
framework. When I have gone into new organisations that haven’t had clarity 
around the framework, you are negotiating every decision on a one off basis.  
CEO 6 
Champion 
He decided all of that, his name was C. He had been wanting to do it for about 
five years. He knew all the players, he knew all the facts, he knew everything 
inside out. 
CEO 1 
She is really good about thinking through what ...... will continue to give the 
board confidence even though the graphs from the data do not look right. She is 
very good about managing some of the internal politics at board level. 
CEO 23 
Negotiation 
Where there is strong evidence on the back of demographics and local factors 
that you are different, then there should be some flexibility locally i.e. with your 
SHA, in terms of how you work these. 
CEO 16 
According to the chief executive ...... he has written to (SHA) to suggest a new 
model that might buy the local authorities out. The real reason they wanted a 
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PCT for their borough is because they couldn’t get their hands on the money. If 
you give them the money anyway, you give them the element of the money that 
they have got some control over, you take away the argument. 
CEO 11 
I’m very much of the school of negotiating in more stages with the people for 
whom it is very important that we don’t close down any of the options.  
CEO 14  
Compromises 
We did have an issue quite recently about urological cancers where the 
decision of the council network board was to centralise at (trust X) but then 
(trust Y) were reluctant for that to happen. In the end we did force (Y) to agree 
to centralisation. We agreed a bit of a compromise on the centralisation which 
enabled them to do certain urological cancers which related to the kidneys. It is 
kidneys, so it is in relation to kidney transplants; there was a connection there 
which enabled them to do some, to continue to do some small amount of work 
at (hospital) which was quite important for them, in terms of their renal agenda. 
CEO 2 
Competing priorities 
I would expect in making those decisions therefore to have tested with 
colleagues here in public health and in commissioning - the relevant parts of the 
commissioning team and with management team colleagues - what their 
priorities are, and therefore what the context is for their decisions.  
CEO 6 
We have three big issues as far as I am concerned at the moment – improving 
performance management to improve performance; Healthcare for (borough) 
strategy, and then quality and world class commissioning and what are we 
going to do about that.   
CEO 18 
Clear process 
I would like to go through the process, depending on what the decision was, 
and how important it was. Obviously for less important decisions, we would 
scale that down and sometimes there were just internal and the board 
conversations. 
CEO 5  
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The principle role of the chief executive in all of that is not only orchestrating the 
process, ensure all the work is designed properly and delivered properly. But it 
is holding a critical mass of issues or interests together - long enough to enable 
a decision to be made.  
CEO 3 
We got those processes right and we involved a lot of people in them ….. But if 
you were told by (SHA) to deliver X by date Y, and it means you are just not 
going to be able to get absolutely everybody on board -  you hurry through an 
incomplete process to get there …... and hope you get away with it. 
CEO 16 
Pathway to decision 
The next meeting which is 20th May, would be when we hope we’ll get the “go 
ahead”. We will then map out next year to externalisation. We are going to 
approach each service, decide where we are going to go. This needs six 
months. Basically we need to know what would go to planning for 1st of April 
next year.  
CEO 14 
We have come up with an option which enables us to build the building, move 
the GPs with a certain amount of expansion space, and then for five years bring 
an independent partner in to do a limited range of things which will complement, 
not compete, with the hospital. We believe that buys us time then to get our 
provider arm to be separate and to develop the market.. 
CEO 24 
Structures 
And by creating new governance structures and project management 
structures, and got SHA on the programme board with me to ensure that 
everyone behaves properly. 
CEO 3 
We had all the project management structures in place. 
CEO 23 
 I am really concerned about putting programme management in, which is 
important. 
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CEO 18 
 
Clear objectives 
Ultimately it comes down to what we really need to achieve in terms of health 
outcomes and making a difference for our population. With all of the other 
pressures around - ...... a strategic plan for this...... to hit the trajectory for that – 
they should be by-products, rather than getting us blown off course. I have seen 
a lot of leaders get blown off course by doing that kind of “what has to be done 
today”. 
CEO 10 
To move the focus of service away from secondary care and then to primary 
care - the driver for that is about what advantages would a patient see.   
CEO 11 
The findings show the contextual factors and concepts involved in strategic 
decision making processes identified by PCT CEOs. The most critical is 
governance, cited by 95% (20/21) of CEOs. Although only 12 CEOs actually 
used the term governance, all mentioned one or more of the mandatory 
arrangements or structures in place for corporate governance in the NHS, such 
as the board, committee structure, reservation of power to the board, line 
management, accountability, business planning, and procedural guidance for 
staff, and risk assurance. The semi structured interview situation did not 
encourage the CEOs to elaborate on their personal understanding of 
governance. Nonetheless, it appears that PCT CEOs hold common views of 
governance which are associated with systems of control.  
Such control systems would identify and mitigate risks, hence the reference to 
risk assessment. For this reason, options appraisal is often an integral part of 
the business case process normally conducted in the NHS for strategic 
decisions. Structures such as programme management monitor progress and 
set out a clear decision pathway with time allowed for negotiations between 
interested parties. Engaging with stakeholders would be integral to the process 
to build support as well as to gain intelligence for better informed decisions 
Significantly, some aspects of governance are missing, namely those that relate 
to service delivery, such as objectives, quality, safety and value for money 
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(another reason for having a business case); and ethical values such as 
transparency, so that objectives, timeframe and decision pathways are clear to 
stakeholders to encourage involvement. While these should, and might still be 
important issues for CEOs, the coding tree reveals the limitations of CEOs’ 
conception of governance. 
14.2.3.3 Stakeholders 
Stakeholders were mentioned by three out of four CEOs (17/23, 74%). 
References to stakeholders can be grouped under stakeholder analysis, 
stakeholder engagement, and stakeholders support. Almost all CEOs (15/17, 
88%) would carry out some form of stakeholder analysis, targeting specific 
groups of stakeholders. This is likely to be based on local knowledge and 
personal experience rather than from a systematic stakeholder analysis 
exercise. There appears to be a hierarchy among stakeholders, with council 
executives, politicians, hospitals and clinicians being consulted as a matter of 
course, or as expressed by two CEOs, there are inner and outer circles. A 
minority of CEOs talked about listening for the patient voice. Thirteen CEOs 
(13/17, 76%) would engage with stakeholders to gather intelligence, check out 
issues and positions of key groups or individuals including their acceptable 
parameters for negotiation. One in three CEOs (6/17, 35%) would actively 
manage stakeholders by taking actions such as building links, have facilitated 
meetings, set up collaborations, negotiate with key protagonists, or simply to 
manage expectations. Examples of relevant quotes are shown below 
Stakeholder analysis 
You’ve got to talk to people and find out where they are and what their issues 
are. Then there are always those issues about what they find acceptable and 
what they won’t, but also how much they will run with things and how much they 
won’t. 
CEO 13 
Taking into account of the views of the patients and practitioners, you clearly 
have to take into account the both positive and negative views. 
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CEO 12 
Needing to be aware of where the Mayor is going, what approach he is taking 
about transport development for example in relation to this hospital 
development because it needs better transport. The other group that is 
pertinent and I think we struggle with, as much as everybody else, is the patient 
voice. 
CEO 24 
Stakeholder engagement 
The benefit of having spent so long on it and having gone through so many 
iterations with so much clinician involvement and so much forewarning of 
politicians and all of that, is that as much as any of these things can ever be 
relatively straightforward, it should be relatively straightforward to get through 
into implementation phase.  
CEO 16 
I talked to a lot of people. Listened to a lot of people, got to the heart of the GP 
community and found my way to about half a dozen putative leaders. This year 
we set up clinical roundtables - we had GPs, secondary care consultants from 
all the local hospitals, one commissioner and patients round the table. 
CEO 1 
I set up what we call strategic lock-ins  ...... quarterly meetings involving about 
15 senior leaders from across (borough) - PCT, the borough, acute trust, mental 
health trust, and the GP co-operative. We’re able to test out aspects of policy at 
a very early stage. 
CEO 15 
Stakeholder support 
All the issues are sort of stakeholder support which I guess play back to that 
first point about do-ability and the politics of it. 
CEO 16 
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You don’t need to have every GP behind you, but we need to have ...... two 
thirds behind it and by taking soundings, we found out about how far that we 
could take GPs with us on this. To be absolutely honest I think when this tanker 
started to turn, it wasn’t because some of the other initiatives were happening, it 
was because we had got real engagement by GPs and the GPs not did want to 
see this fail.  
CEO 24 
If it did not have the broad support of the clinical leaders in the trusts concerned 
...... if they were opposing, I want to know what was behind that, what was the 
clinical evidence here – were they really worried from a clinical point of view or 
was it an organisation worrying, which might be less concerning. 
CEO 8 
There are people that we very much have to take with us -  councillors, board, 
patients ......  higher up, it’s the chief executive, director of adult care whom we 
have to be very sure we are bringing with us. And particularly the chief 
executive of the borough who is on the NHS Management Board, so is a 
powerful character. 
CEO 14 
14.2.3.4 Environmental dynamism  
The term is used to describe factors in the local health economy such as 
geography, place (location), premises, and infrastructure as well as local 
population factors. Three out of four CEOs (17/23, 74%) talked about 
environmental factors. Examples of CEO quotes are shown below. Geography 
was cited most often (12/17, 71%), typically in relation to place, communities, 
and administrative boundaries applied by other public services. Location of 
building is an important consideration, as they can influence how services 
cooperate and work together, as well as frequently forming the starting points 
for strategic developments. The quality of existing building stock, as in the case 
of substandard primary care premises, might influence investment decisions. All 
of these factors, alone or combined, could have a significant influence on 
service strategies. 
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geography 
You can see from the map on the wall that we carved the borough into three 
...... we work through ...... and are sort of staffed around three localities. Within 
each of the three localities, we see two neighbourhoods as they have got a 
degree of coherence to them ...... and they have got a decent match with the 
way that the council chunks the borough. 
CEO 16 
The council divided the borough into four neighbourhoods. And that’s pretty 
geographical, so we may have something like four virtual hubs.  
CEO 15 
Environmental dynamism 
In providers terms it is less than two miles away from a PFI hospital that we run 
which is struggling to cover its costs and has got spare capacity. So as a 
provider, the last thing we want to do is increase competition. 
CEO 24 
place 
We are going to go into each of the local areas. Create the map for change and 
get sign off at the January board to then consult on these local areas. 
CEO 11 
If we have a situation where some of our residents have to walk past (hospital) 
on the way to a polyclinic, then that seems to be very stupid. .....nowhere over 
80,000 population, I’ll be mortified if we had three point polyclinics. So I think 
we’ll probably have (hospital). We’re doing major development in WC where 
there are sort of high level of need, and that is within WC and SB area  - that 
could have a polyclinic as well, I think. 
CEO 9 
buildings 
The general practice infrastructure is such that we have got 52 practices - 29 of 
whom are single handed and operating largely out of converted domestic 
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dwellings and 20 plus practices where there are only 2 doctors, and the balance 
are big practices.  
CEO 12 
There is land between them, and in hindsight ...... you would have integrated 
the practice with the community hospital.  Well, what you have got now is, on 
the same site, a new PFI developed community hospital and a GP practice. You 
know although they are twenty yards away they might as well be two miles 
away. 
CEO 2 
14.2.3.5 Time  
Temporal factors were mentioned by 61% (14/23) of CEOs, with timing (6/14, 
43%) topping the list and the commonest reason for delay. A third (5/14, 36%) 
referred to time availability in two different contexts – reactive decisions where 
by the time available dictated subsequent actions, and proactive decisions to 
set aside time for planned activities such as mobilisation or engagement. Four 
CEOs (4/14, 28%) said they would use timelines to set out key decision points, 
milestones and deadlines, while the same number would use it to record 
evolution over time. Pace affect people’s ability to cope with the speed of 
change. Examples of quotes from CEOs in relation to time factors are shown 
below. 
 
 
 Timing 
He was moving to what we now call World Class Commissioning but I think it 
was a bit too early and he anticipated quite a long way ahead. 
CEO 18 
The Department of Health had a major push back ...... because it was very 
pretentious with our staff unions. There was a bit of fudge for a short period of 
time ...... before the policy came back.  
CEO 5 
The people from (RHS) keep on telling us to slow down and not to do things, 
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they haven’t finished their blueprint yet and we will obviously make mistakes if 
we don’t wait for it.  
CEO 1 
Available time 
So it depends on how much time you’ve got for this decision. 
CEO 13 
If I had a lot more time I would have done things slightly differently, but we 
didn’t have the time so they were done the way they were. 
CEO 3 
Timeline 
The agreement has taken 15 months or so. In the future, with immediate effect 
for new practitioners, we will apply a set of quality expectations to any new 
service provider ......we will apply that to existing practices with the expectation 
that any shortcomings are responded to within 3 to 6 months.  
CEO 12 
Pace (speed) 
Of course sometimes you are moving at a pace that makes it difficult. The 
temptation, when facing that kind of pressure, is to cut corners in the process 
even though you kind of know intellectually it is probably going to make it much 
more difficult down the line in terms of implementation. 
CEO 16 
And local PCT colleagues who are quite a little bit irritated with the pace...... 
they have pushed us to taking the time to think the issues through very carefully 
over the next six months 
CEO 14 
Evolution (change over time) 
If you are prepared just to give it the time to bed in – you know, say, you have 
to put up with probably three or four meetings and quite a long time. 
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CEO 15 
 By the end of December, we were starting to see activity coming down ...... and 
by the end of the year, it had exceeded our expectations ...... but that period of 
three or four months was probably one of the most nervous periods I ever had 
in my career.  
In fact the data was right - it was the length of time it took to kick in.. 
CEO 24 
14.2.3.6 Other significant organisations  
These are influential organisations, or key players within those organisations by 
virtue of their positional power. Half of all CEOs (12/23, 52%) named at least 
one other significant organisation in their responses, as shown in Table 24.  
 
Based on the responses, the most influential organisations are the local 
council, which normally have several links with PCT strategy and operations, 
and providers, especially the local hospital. GPs are represented in three 
formal organisations: the Local Medical Committee (LMC) which is the local 
negotiating committee i.e. the union; the Professional Executive Committee 
(PEC), a subcommittee of the PCT Board, and practice-based commissioners 
(PBC) which are GP-commissioning structures. Other PCTs and the SHA form 
the rest of other significant organisations. 
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Table 24 Organisations (with key individuals shown in sub-categories) playing 
significant roles in PCT strategic decisions 
Local authority (council) 
Joint commissioning 
Local Strategic Partnerships  
Politicians 
 Mayor 
 Council leader 
Cabinet members 
 Councillors 
OSC chair 
Executives 
 CEO 
 Directors 
  
Hospitals 
 Medical Consultants  
 CEO 
 Medical Director 
GPs 
Local Medical Committee  (union) 
Practice Based Commissioning 
(PBC)  
Professional Executive Committee 
(PEC) 
LMC Chair 
PBC Chair 
PEC Chair 
Local GP leaders 
 
Other PCTs 
 
SHA 
Thirty per cent of CEOs (7/23, 30%) identified politicians as an important 
factor, as shown by the quotes below. Understanding the personal positions of 
councillors helps CEOs to build support. 
The ruling party is the liberal democrats, they’ve been very important to this. 
And there is a couple of very key individuals we wouldn’t normally think of - the 
two of them are married to each other - they are both councillors. One of the 
councillors, he also runs the church - he links into a lot of the others things ...... 
we’ve got to start working through some of those links. 
CEO 15 
Until very recently, the last local elections a couple of years ago, there was no 
overall majority.  Now there is an overall conservative majority ...... slightly 
unusual and against expectations when they came to power.  You actually can 
see some progress on strategic issues that previously was just going nowhere 
because it became much too political, too much noise. 
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CEO 12 
We actively sought the views of the council- the Leader of the Council. 
CEO 24 
14.2.3.7 Service users 
One in five CEOs (5/23, 22%) expressed difficulty in engaging with patients or 
service users. This may be because such exercises are usually conducted for 
specific purposes; instead of as ongoing dialogues, PCTs have a duty to consult 
when proposing significant services changes. 
I try to tune into patients’ views about what is wrong. That is more difficult 
through all the traditional NHS mechanisms, but I try to wherever I can. 
CEO 1 
Patients do not always see the positives when you make a service change, as 
you well know.  It is about being persuasive on the arguments and the best way 
to do that is having clinicians fronting them. But it is about coherence and clarity 
of the strategic direction and the why.  
CEO 12 
14.2.3.8 Organisational culture 
References to culture were made by five CEOs (5/23, 22%). They described an 
unforgiving, command and control culture that generally rewards conformance, 
with power wielded by the centre. The safe option is to keep one’s head down 
and not challenge the system. Resistance to change from staffs is not 
surprising, and in some PCTs, non executive directors have been brought in to 
challenge the culture. One CEO described his role as not really being free due 
to the constraints inherent within the system. 
It’s almost creating a climate of fear that you have to get it absolutely 
perfect. You are not to make any mistakes  ...... creates an environment where 
change is far less likely to happen. If we sat down and think about these things, 
you’d think, well it would probably increase my workload several times over. If I 
get it wrong, I will be blamed and no one will support me on it. I believe I’ve 
seen some colleagues, not all of them by any means, made that calculation and 
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decide, I think I’ll just keep my head down and ...... the organisation for a year 
or two .......give the impression of progress here and there. 
CEO 9 
I had the acute trust saying – no it won’t, no it won’t. I had (SHA) sort of axes 
hanging there above us like a dagger saying, well it’s down to you and if you 
don’t do it you know heads will roll. 
CEO 24 
And the decision of the chairman to deliberately bring in people who have got 
experience from outside the NHS. What we get from them is a real challenge 
about patient engagement around what are the alternatives. So they don’t sort 
of think of an NHS person or of a NHS provider as a second though.  When 
they ask us about a service ...... it is like ...... how do we tender this out or how 
do we compete ...... They may not understand what constraints are, what has 
been in the NHS ...... it’s been my job to help them to understand, we can’t be 
completely free. 
CEO 14 
14.2.4 Macro level factors 
None of the CEOs mentioned macro level contextual factors such as the 
economy or social trends, or any of the other broader and more general factors. 
This may be due to the definitions of terms used to code for citations. For 
example, when CEOs talked about population issues, it was always about their 
local population characteristics. This applies even when CEOs referred to the 
supra-PCT population at a sub-regional or sector level, as the aggregated 
demography still formed the local context. Accordingly they are coded as 
“environmental dynamism” within local factors rather than under “demography” 
within macro environmental factors. 
14.2.5 Summary 
Section 14.2 presents a comprehensive list of contextual factors PCT CEOs 
said they took into account in strategic decision making generally. Although the 
number of contextual factors identified is large, they were all supported by 
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quotes from the CEOs. Unlike business leaders who focused on macro level 
factors (Mayo and Nohria, 2005), the PCT CEOs did not mention macro level 
factors and instead, identified contextual factors that were either in the PCT 
organisation itself or were within the local health economy although there were 
few references to the TMT. Based on the number of CEOs whose response 
included each of the contextual factor, the most influential contextual factors 
guiding PCT CEO strategic decision making generally appear to be local goals 
and decision making process, followed by stakeholders, environmental 
dynamism, structure and temporal factors. The results suggest PCT CEOs are 
likely to be focused on the goals of the local heath economy when they take 
strategic decisions. They will want to ensure there are appropriate decision 
making processes, engage with key external stakeholders, take account of what 
is out there in the local environment that may affect the strategic decision, and 
temporal factors.  
14.3 Taking strategic decisions on national policies 
All PCT CEOs were asked what factors they would take into account when 
dealing with national policies. The findings below come from 12 randomly 
selected interview transcripts. A summary of the findings is shown in Figure 22 
and Figure 23. A breakdown by organisational internal factors taken into 
account by CEOs when responding to national policies is shown in Table 25. 
14.3.1 Organisational internal factors 
Figure 22  Organisational internal factors influencing CEO decisions on national 
policies show the distribution of organisational internal factors CEOs said they 
took into account when implementing national policies. The most frequently 
cited contextual factor was structure (9/12, 75%) for reasons of governance, 
especially the role of the board in providing legitimacy. Strategy was cited by 
two third of CEOs (8/12, 67%) in relation to strategic fit or synergy with local 
plans. Information factors (4/12, 34%) appear to focus on gap analysis, 
modelling of baselines and trajectories for implementation and expert advice of 
what worked. Last but not least were financial considerations, which tend to 
focus on costs and value for money. 
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Figure 22  Organisational internal factors influencing CEO decisions on national 
policies 
 
 
Table 25 Organisational internal factors CEOs took into account when 
responding to national policies  
Factors No of CEOs 
(%) 
Factors No of CEOs 
(%) 
structure 9 (75) culture 0 
strategy 8 (67) operations 0 
information 4 (34) system 0 
finance 2 (17) size 0 
staff 0 relationship 0 
time 0   
 
14.3.1.1 Structure 
The top organisational internal factor for PCT CEOs in national policy strategic 
decision making is structure, as cited by three quarters (9/12) of responders. 
This is not surprising as structures form part of the corporate governance 
arrangements such as the board, the PEC, reservations of power to the board, 
processes to demonstrate accountability and setting directions, and risk 
 216 
assurance. Quotations relating to structures and national policies are shown 
below. 
We ensure that council members are linked into ...... through the partnership 
structure in the main, but we also have members and officers co-opted onto our 
PCT board and we have officers from the local authority as proper paid up 
members of PEC. We have a joint post on the PCT’s PEC and also have a 
place for the local authority on our community health services governance 
board. 
CEO 20 
We call it a summit to achieve the implementation board. But basically, it’s a 
trouble shooting board between the hospital and ourselves – to manage 
performance ...... on targets. Then it gets on to the management team meeting 
and then we put to the board in the monthly information for the board. 
CEO 17 
We had a crunch point with the board in January when I alerted them that 
(hospital) was at that point unlikely to meet the 18 weeks target. And the board 
kicked off. Give them surprises and they get upset. “But you told me in 
December we were on target and now you are telling me it isn’t on target” and 
“we told you ...... should have been putting more in the private sector and you 
haven’t done it”. We had to listen and not treat them as critics as you must not 
disregard the board. 
CEO 14 
14.3.1.2 Organisational strategy 
The next most common factor is organisational strategy. Two thirds (8/12, 67%) 
of PCT CEOs expressed concerns about the strategic fit between national 
policies and local plans. The CEOs said they would look for synergy wherever 
possible, and see central directives as opportunities to drive changes locally. 
Should the two interests be incongruent, the CEOs would resolve the conflict by 
making local adaptations or doing the minimum to be compliant. Examples of 
quotes from CEOs on balancing top down requirements with local strategy are 
shown below. 
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I am thinking what is it we are trying to achieve for (borough), what are our 
strategic objectives and how might those things that come from the centre help 
us to achieve those objectives, or not, as the case may be. 
CEO 24 
What we found difficult with national deliverables is that they are of necessity 
needing to address the major gains for the most vulnerable in society ….... We 
find it hard to consistently perform well purely because our population is above 
average in terms of health and well being. 
CEO 20 
I will be asking - what is the link with what we are already doing; what is the 
opportunity if it does not give us a lever that we have been looking for. For 
example ...... I jumped on that because it enabled us to deal with some of the 
issues in primary care that we have been struggling with. 
CEO 18 
14.3.1.3 Information 
One in three CEOs (4/12, 34%) would ask for more information to inform their 
decision making. Examples given include conducting gap analysis, making sure 
that expert advice is available, ensuring data quality, and modelling 
assumptions. They would apply those insights to the information, so that they 
could be turned into knowledge and intelligence to inform strategic decisions. 
Quotes from CEOs on the use of information are shown below. 
We would analyse the gaps and call in experts who are in the PCT. If they were 
somebody who has a lot of information or who could access them, we would 
bring them in for the discussion. 
CEO 17 
We struggled for a very long time with the poor quality of information systems 
and particularly patient clinical systems. They didn’t have the systems which 
enabled them to create patient treatment list. 
CEO 14 
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14.3.1.4 Finance 
Financial consideration came up twice, both in relation to the cost of 
implementing a national policy, as seen in the quotes below.  
The initiative is loss making even if it redirects (patients) from AE. So, the 
question is, does it really stack up when it is not even paying for itself? 
CEO 14 
We put money aside for it and as we got through the year. 
CEO 24 
As before, no one mentioned macro level factors.  
14.3.1.5 Summary 
The findings so far on how strategic decisions on national policies affect 
organisational internal factors draw the following preliminary conclusions. Local 
issues relating to national policies are usually about implementation. For the 
CEOs, “central diktats” or “must dos” are easily recognisable by their key 
performance indicators (KPIs) and central monitoring of performance. In such 
events, the policy would receive the full governance treatment including the 
CEOs’ personal attention and board scrutiny. With new policies, the CEOs 
would start by checking their PCT’s current performance levels, and if they 
needed to, or could, negotiate with the DH or SHA for different delivery terms. 
Information plays important roles to support this as well as the subsequent 
monitoring. The CEOs would look for strategic fit with existing plans to improve 
the efficiency of implementation. They would focus their organisation on the 
task at hand, including re-directing resources to the new priority.  
14.3.2 Local contextual factors 
Table 26 and Figure 23 show the distribution of local factors CEOs said they 
took into account when implementing national policies. Compared to their 
earlier responses to generic strategic decision making, the findings are 
remarkable by the small number of local factors PCT CEOs would take into 
account overall.  
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Top among local factors was performance expectations or targets, as 
mentioned by 92% (11/12) of CEOs. Two thirds (8/12, 67%) would take account 
of relationships, and just over half (7/12, 58%) would consider stakeholder 
views. Two CEOs (2/12, 17%) would consider the requirements of regulators. 
Decision making processes and service user received one mention each. 
Interestingly, a number of external factors that CEOs in the business sector 
would normally take into account are missing from the responses. 
Table 26 Local factors CEOs took into account when taking strategic decisions 
on national policies 
Factors No of 
CEOs (%) 
Factors No of CEOs 
(%) 
performance 
expectations 
stakeholders 
11 (92) 
 
7 (58) 
goals 
resources 
pressure groups 
0 
0 
0 
time 
other significant 
organisations 
6 (50) 
4 (34) 
 
environmental 
dynamism 
service users 
0 
 
0 
relationships 
regulators 
politicians 
4 (34) 
2(17) 
1 (8) 
Industry culture 
public engagement 
0 
 
0 
decision making 
processes 
1 (8) goals 0 
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Figure 23 Distribution of local factors that CEOs would take into account in 
relation to national policies 
 
14.3.2.1 Policy context 
The importance of policy in guiding strategic decision making is raised here, to 
remind readers that policy is itself a context although the implications are 
brought by the PCT CEOs in performance expectations. The CEOs 
acknowledged that PCTs, being outposts of the DH are required to implement 
national policies, as illustrated by the quotes below.  
I would expect that if something is very clearly a must do from the Department 
then you are wasting time and energy, and actually possibly delaying things if 
you do not.  So, my advice to both myself and my board is, whether or not you 
agree, you just got to get on with it.  You then have to decide how you execute, 
and that is clearly based on your analysis of the position. 
CEO 8 
So we had to handle it sensitively, really making it clear that this was evidence 
based. Re-drafting some of the documentation as being partnership 
documentation - that almost made officers lose the will to live. It was so heavily 
biased and really overlooked the health gain, but that is the challenge.  
CEO 20 
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14.3.2.2 Performance expectations 
National policies, in particular central diktats, usually have performance 
expectations set out in the form of targets or Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs). As these are normally non negotiable, it is not surprising that PCT CEOs 
said they would prioritise KPIs for which they would be held accountable. They 
would seek clarification about the deliverables and their do-ability, and actively 
engage with relevant stakeholders who could help them achieve those targets 
and potentially ignore the rest. They would want to ensure compliance with 
regulations. Quotes giving examples of how CEOs deal with performance 
expectations or targets set in national policies are shown below. 
If it is a target, it is a must do. And it goes into our performance management 
systems. 
CEO 18 
If there is a target and they are must dos, we just get on and do it. The trust has 
tried to argue with us on varying occasions it is a milestone and not a target. 
Well, as far as I am concerned, it is the target, and if you don’t think it is a 
target, you’ll be shot.  
CEO 15 
Take 18 weeks, it wasn’t a negotiable target and a must do. People just got on 
and did it. 
CEO 21 
We took a view that the targets we had failed on the year before we had to 
address this year. We decided how much investment we could put in this year. 
We set up a project team that had internal project members and members from 
the major providers that we use. We set up regular reporting. We gave it a clear 
leadership at director and PEC chair level. We do monthly performance 
monitoring with our main provider so it was on the agenda every month. There 
was a structured process.  
CEO 24 
There is something about being absolutely clear what the starting position is, 
where we have to get to, was there a robust plan to start with and were the 
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people charged with delivering it people who had a track record of getting on 
with it.  
CEO 8 
14.3.2.3 Stakeholders 
With national policies, a major challenge for CEOs is to understand what they 
have to do to get a policy implemented locally. This is especially important for 
policies that require stakeholder support. Stakeholders are the second most 
often cited factor by CEOs (7/12, 58%), as engaging them demonstrates good 
governance as well as helping to gain support for a decision to be implemented. 
The CEOs said that simply imposing a diktat would lead to resistance from 
some stakeholders who would see it as taking away local autonomy. So they 
spend time anticipating, assessing potential risks, planning how to get support. 
The CEOs are likely to set up programme management structures and 
processes to involve stakeholders in the delivery of national policies. Examples 
of quotes from CEOs on stakeholder management and relationships in relation 
to national policies are shown below 
I will want to know, what are the views of the GPs and executives, what is it 
they are likely to buy into? I’d also want to understand it from my main 
providers’ perspective, so I know the difficulties. Not in detail, but I recognise 
that once you start sort of change systems like this, it is not an easy, 
straightforward thing to do.  
CEO 5 
If it is a target we can’t meet by the PCT alone, we need to bring in the local 
authority or the acute trust. Each director would bring that (policy) into whatever 
relevant meetings they were attending. If it is to do with partnership with the 
local authorities, we would share it at partnership meetings. If it is to do with a 
secondary care target, it would be raised at the commissioning meetings with 
the director of commissioning and their counterparts. And we also have, at the 
moment, with the hospital, a fortnight the summit meeting between the top 
teams. 
CEO 17 
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There was a lot of interactions with other PEC members and clinical leads in the 
mental health trust about whether we are going to do this, what are the options, 
and how might we deliver it.  
CEO 24 
14.3.2.4 Relationships 
This may partly explain why relationships are important considerations for 
CEOs.  References to relationships can be at one of more levels: personal 
between key executives, at organisational levels, in the forms of contractual 
relationship, joint working or partnership structures, as shown by the quotes 
from CEOs below.  
Council members are linked in through the partnership structure in the main, but 
we also have members and officers co-opted onto our PCT board and we have 
officers from the local authority as proper paid up members of PEC. We also 
have a place for the local authority on our community health services 
governance board. 
CEO 20 
We are working principally with the (hospital) Foundation Trust, and with the 
(hospital) that we also host. What actually solved the problem was us working 
pretty closely with the trusts to do everything we could do to support. 
EO 14 
You either develop an adversarial behaviour …… or go down the relationship 
route. 
CEO 8 
14.3.2.5 Other significant organisations 
The CEO quotes also refer to other significant organisations especially key local 
organisations such as the local hospitals, mental health trusts, councils and the 
SHA whose engagements are necessary for policy implementation.  
14.3.2.6 Time 
Temporal factors are important for reasons of timing, history in terms of what 
takes place before, and how the new policy relates to existing initiatives or 
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plans. It is also important to allow time for engagement prior to implementation. 
Examples of quotes from CEOs are shown below. 
At the beginning of the year the board wanted to make a snap decision about 
what to do about provider services. I sort of put them off, or held them off, and 
said this wasn’t the time to do that. 
CEO 24 
He was moving to what we now call World Class Commissioning but I think it 
was a bit too early and he anticipated quite a long way ahead.  
CEO 18 
In the seven years that we have been a PCT, we had two years in which we 
have had a deficit.  First was in ’04-’05 when the Health Authority at the time 
arbitrated in (trust)’s favour which left us with a deficit of £3.2m. We cleared that 
over two years and we got to a very small surplus by the end.  Then they top 
sliced us as they did everybody, £13.5 million.  We had a £6.3 million deficit at 
the end of ’06-’07 as a consequence.  Because we were in recovery anyway, 
that simply pushed us into more difficulty.   
CEO 12 
14.3.2.7 Regulators 
Meeting regulatory requirements is another consideration for CEOs when 
implementing national policies. Examples of CEO quotes are shown below. 
The thing that actually pushed the borough to engage with us on that was the 
fact that the performance review of X in the JAR (joint area review) wasn’t 
great. 
CEO 8 
My starting assumption would be that if it is policy then we do it. There are at 
times benefits in considering whether you are doing it at the right speed or the 
right amount. For example we had debated quite a lot with (SHA) and the 
Department about the scale and the size of the crisis resolution teams because 
we still remain unconvinced that there is that demand, but we have never 
disputed that we’d do it. A Healthcare Commission review of mental health back 
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in the back end of 2006 which reported in the second quarter of 2007 created a 
kind of external spur. If we hadn’t been doing this, if you’d like, now we had to 
get on and address it.  
CEO 24 
14.3.2.8 Politicians and politics 
Two CEOs mentioned politicians and decision making process, but these 
appear to be local issues, as shown by a quote below. 
In a pretty conservative borough, you’ve also got to understand the politics of 
the ward councillors. We recently faced a situation where the work we were 
doing with young people in relation to sexual health became a political issue 
because the ward councillor was catholic and it was desperately difficult to get 
over that. Because local government is not and probably won’t ever be the 
same as national government, by and large we are Liberal Democrat, so it’s 
pretty anti labour but it will be as anti Tory when the Tories probably get in at 
some stage. 
CEO 20 
14.3.3 Summary 
In summarising the relationship between national policies and local factors, the 
clear messages from the PCT CEOs are that “if it is national policy, just do it” – 
a phrase repeated throughout almost all the interviews. This applies especially 
to “diktats” or targets. For policies with strategic goals, the CEOs may decide to 
implement the policy at different speed to suit local circumstances. The 
important thing is to at least give the impression that the PCT is complying, 
even if it were “running on the spot” as described one CEO.  
14.4 Implementing regional strategies 
Figure 23 to Figure 26 examine the factors PCT CEOs said they took into 
account in implementing regional strategies that had differential impacts on 
PCTs. Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) are the intermediate tier between 
Department of Health and PCTs. SHAs are responsible for strategic leadership, 
regional coordination and performance management of the NHS within their 
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geographical region. Around the time of the study design, SHA was consulting 
on a long term regional health strategy which would be referred to as “RHS”. 
RHS had two key policy initiatives. One, centralisation of specialist hospital 
services onto fewer sites and two, shifting care out of hospital into community 
health centres called polyclinics. The former would have minimal impact on 
PCTs as the proposals to centralise only affect hospitals and a very small 
number of patients. The polyclinic policy, in contrast, would have a significant 
impact on PCTs as implementation requires investments in new infrastructure 
and changing the way services would be provided in the local health economy. 
 
RHS centralisation policy 
14.4.1 Organisational internal factors 
Because the SHA strategic proposals for centralisation did not have a major 
impact on PCTs directly, CEO engagement of their own organisation was low 
and was related to three main areas: one, ensuring there was evidence, 
particularly from experts, to publicly support the case for change; two, that the 
regional plans were compatible with local strategies; and three, that appropriate 
structures were in place to take those decisions. Table 27 and Figure 24 show 
the organisational internal factors CEOs indicated they would  take into account 
when having to implement RHS centralisation policy 
Table 27 Organisational internal factors influencing CEO decision making on 
regional centralisation policies 
Factors No of CEOs 
(%) 
Factors No of CEOs 
(%) 
information 8 (67) culture 0 
strategy 7 (58) time 0 
structure 4 (34) system 0 
operations 1 (13) size 0 
staff 0 relationship 0 
finance 0   
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Figure 24 Organisational internal factors influencing CEO decision making on 
centralisation policies 
 
14.4.1.1 Information  
Overall, very few organisational internal factors were mentioned by CEOs when 
dealing with policies that did not impact directly on PCTs. The top factor cited by 
three quarters of CEOs (8/12, 67%) was information, usually to support the 
case for change. The types of information that would be sought included 
published research data, expert views, practitioner views, user views as well as 
unpublished experiential evidence from places that had implemented those 
changes. Only one CEO said he would seek user views. Another expressed 
scepticism about giving too much weight to clinical views due to vested interests 
of different professional groups and subgroups. One CEO argued that clinical 
practice was ahead of published evidence. Overall, published evidence and 
expert advice carried the most weight in influencing CEO strategic decision 
making when it came to centralising services. Examples of quotes from CEOs 
are shown below.  
I do not think we can avoid, and should not avoid, appreciating the evidence in 
relation to improving and driving up service quality, and that evidence comes 
from experts in the field.  
CEO 20 
 228 
I would want to hear out the most important factors that clinicians and users 
consider in relation to reaching a decision about what is important for the 
hospital of choice. We can tell them how many more people are alive in 
northeast now as a result of ambulances taking heart attacks to 24/7 heart 
attack centres instead of the local AE - that’s a very powerful and compelling 
case for change. So having that evidence base and the story help reassure 
people, and gives me a strong starting point for centralisation.  
CEO 19 
The evidence base is moving so quickly and in some cases, I think the 
evidence base is behind.  
CEO 5 
I do not think we should listen too hard to clinicians. There are too many vested 
interests.  
CEO 18 
14.4.2 Organisational strategy 
The next commonest factor, organisational strategy, was cited by seven out of 
12 CEOs (58%) in response to the centralisation plans.  
Adaptation and compromises 
Our strategy has been to pilot a hub and spoke arrangement. The question is 
whether that is fudging the very thing that we are trying to do. 
CEO 20 
We may have to unpick decisions if people challenge them, and that may 
require some compromises, such as moving at a slower pace. At the end of the 
day, making changes in a multi- agency multi-professional community is usually 
about some sort of compromise. 
CEO 5 
Managing transition 
At the moment, it looks like, as a hospital, (trust) is pretty secure. I am clear 
services will continue there, but they are going to have to change. They just 
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can’t carry on doing exactly what they are doing, the way they’ve always done 
it. They now have to consolidate down to what they are good at, like maternity. 
But if they were to lose paediatrics, that’s going to affect what I can do with 
maternity, so there are some issues. 
CEO 15 
I think it is right to design around what works, but that’s it. Things like 
community services, if decentralised on a PCT basis, would threaten our 
collaboration with adult care and that would threaten our whole organisation. 
So, that is quite difficult, and we need to find a way to be collaborative without 
breaking that up. 
CEO 21 
I do believe in general in (RHS). (City) has to get on and be seen to be making 
some changes and having some early wins. But I don’t think that we should try 
to do everything at once, otherwise we will end up with an awful mess. 
CEO 5 
As with national policies but with less of an imperative, the CEOs would try to 
adapt the regional strategy with a view to achieve synergy with local PCT plans. 
Some talked of making compromises, or “fudges”, while for others, it was a 
matter of presentation. Several CEOs expressed concerns about the impact of 
centralisation, especially the domino effects on the viability of other services 
due to inter-dependency between services. As commissioning accessible safe 
services was fundamental to PCT strategy, the CEOs indicated they would take 
mitigating actions to manage the transition risks.  
14.4.2.1 Structures 
The third most common factor, structure, was cited by a third of CEOs (4/12, 
34%) mainly in relation to governance and decision making. Examples of 
quotes are shown below.  
I would expect the case to be fully discussed and debated, first with directors, 
and then the board. 
CEO 5 
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The board has a responsibility to ensure that it actually knows and understands 
the risks. 
CEO 20 
That only a minority considered internal structural factors to matter in 
centralisation decisions could mean either the majority of CEOs treated those 
decisions as givens (like national policies) and so did not feel the need to put 
them through internal processes, or that they regarded the decisions to 
centralise to apply to hospitals and therefore were irrelevant to PCTs. One PCT 
CEO commented that the professional backgrounds of non executive directors 
(NEDs) were not typical NHS service users, so instead of thinking of consulting 
NHS providers in the first instance on matters affecting provision, their 
responses would be “to go to the market”, reflecting their world view. This may 
be an isolated event, but the impact of NEDS’ backgrounds on strategic 
decisions is worth further exploration. 
14.4.2.2 Other factors 
Last but not least, operationalising policies were mentioned by one CEO in 
relation to the centralisation of maternity services. 
Our PEC chair, who is a midwife, set up a maternity choice program after she 
couldn’t explain to me how we gave mums choice in maternity despite showing 
me all those strategy documents. Since we set that project up, every mom is 
now meeting a midwife who advises her on where to have her baby. 
CEO 1 
14.4.3 Local contextual factors 
As was usual with any strategic change proposals, PCTs have to formally 
consult on the RHS centralisation policy, which might explain the local factors 
they said they would take into account in Figure 25. 
 Support from stakeholders could come in different forms: positive support in the 
form of expressed support from local stakeholders such as service users, 
voluntary sector, clinicians, and the Overview and Scrutiny Committee (OSC), 
neutral or negative support from disenfranchised parties, in particular local 
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opinion formers. The CEOs would translate regional policies into local 
implementation plans, taking into consideration the positions of stakeholders, 
environmental factors of geography and existing infrastructure as well as the 
views of users and the public. They would build on their relationships, engage 
stakeholders and put the decision through formal decision making processes 
such as public consultation and OSC. The local factors that CEOs would focus 
on in strategic change decisions are set out in Table 28 and Figure 25. 
Table 28 Local factors CEOs took into account when taking strategic decisions 
on centralisation policies 
Factors No of 
CEOs (%) 
Factors No of 
CEOs (%) 
Other sig organisations 
public engagement 
relationships 
environmental 
dynamism 
service users 
politicians 
7 (58) 
7 (58) 
7 (58) 
6 (50) 
 
6 (50) 
5 (42) 
stakeholders 
performance 
expectations 
regulators 
pressure groups 
goals 
3 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
decision making 
processes 
4 (34) industry culture 
time 
0 
0 
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Figure 25  Local contextual factors taken into account by PCT CEOs when 
implementing centralisation policies 
 
 
No critical factors stood out among CEOs and even the top three factors, other 
significant organisations, relationships, and public engagement, were only 
cited by seven out of 12 CEOs (58%). This was not a surprise as the 
centralisation proposals, although significant, would not have a major direct 
impact on PCTs. Understandably the CEOs focused on managing stakeholders 
and consulting the public. The other factors, environmental dynamism, service 
users, politicians and decision making processes, all related to implementing 
the proposals. Some contextual factors overlapped with others, for example, 
other significant organisations can be considered a subset of stakeholders, and 
there would always be an element of relationships. All factors will now be 
examined in turn.  
14.4.3.1 Other significant organisations   
Specific references to organisation, group or individual were coded to the 
named organisation, based on key words matching existing factors being coded 
to those factors. Otherwise, they would be categorised under “stakeholders”. 
The seven CEOs (7/12, 58%) who talked about consulting stakeholders 
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included three who remarked about stakeholders in general but all seven 
referred to at least one significant other organisation, including key individuals in 
those organisations. A selection of CEO quotes relating to centralisation is 
shown below, grouped under key stakeholder categories.  
General statements about stakeholders 
Of all the stakeholders really, clearly we’ll have to take into account patients 
views, our clients’ views,  the views of our staff, our board, our partners, the 
council.  
CEO 21 
Well obviously we are listening to the professionals, the experts and what the 
research is saying around outcomes, and what public health is saying around 
that. We are also listening to our community about their concerns, and our local 
authority about their concerns around centralisation. We are talking to our acute 
trust as well ….. and thinking about how to engage with our GPs, our politicians 
and ….. of course we are talking with our neighbouring PCTs. 
CEO 23 
We need to listen to local people, the board, local authorities - those three 
groups know about what is right locally and we need to understand that.  I do 
not think we should listen too hard to clinicians - there are too many vested 
interests. 
CEO 18 
Acute trusts (cited by 5 CEOs) 
We are talking to our acute trust about the impact that would have on the 
viability of the trust. Obviously, whilst we want to have specialist services, we 
also want to have a viable hospital.  
CEO 23 
The staff here had been very engaged in developing stroke pathways with 
(teaching trust). There’s a lot of buy in and a lot of professional clinical 
engagement, which is good. 
CEO 21 
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There’s something about the implications for our local hospitals. If and once we 
centralise the range of services and decentralise the rest to polyclinics, what’s 
left for the local hospitals? 
CEO 19 
Local authorities (cited by 5 CEOs) 
We need to listen to the local authorities. 
CEO 18 
We are also listening to our local authority about their concerns around 
centralisation. For me the signs that we were successful were the comments 
from our Overview and Scrutiny Committee backing (RHS). They said they felt 
that the case had been made for specialist services and specialist centres.  
CEO 24 
There is a need to properly consult with Health Overview and Scrutiny 
Committee, and that work is informed by our partnership structure with the local 
authority. We used the adult and older peoples’ joint commissioning group to 
feed into that work on stroke. 
CEO 20 
There are only six or seven councillors on the OSC panel and there is a 
massive agenda. Not just ours, it is also what the trust is doing, and the mental 
health trust, and the borough itself. We are overloaded, but we are relying on 
some formal mechanisms, because clearly if we don’t consult and we make 
decisions, they can object. 
CEO 15 
Neighbouring PCTs (cited by 3 CEOs) 
To make it work, of course we are talking with our neighbouring PCTs. 
CEO 23  
There were sector wide discussions to be had. 
CEO 19 
SHA (cited by two CEOs) 
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I do not think you can ignore the (city)’s strategic leadership – (SHA’s) strategic 
leadership. 
CEO 20 
The quotes show PCT CEOs relating to stakeholders in three ways. First, they 
identified the characteristics of people or organisations considered to be 
stakeholders in this issue. Second, the distinction between “stakeholders” as a 
generic group, and the different stakeholder groups, overlaps. Third, for obvious 
reasons, the most important stakeholders, or primary stakeholders, appeared to 
be the council and the local hospitals followed by neighbouring PCTs, which is 
not surprising as centralisation impacts beyond PCT boundaries, and requires 
PCTs to work together. The SHA was cited mainly for its strategic oversight role 
across the region. 
14.4.3.2 Relationships 
The role of relationships in service centralisation had many forms, with 
references to pathways or networks and partnerships, as shown in the quote 
below. 
In a place like (city), centralisation is absolutely the right thing to do provided we 
get the links right, and get the pathways right. The way people are fed in, if they 
don’t, you know, come off the streets – the specialist centres need to be 
properly connected and the pathways need to be clear, otherwise you will lose 
the advantage of having the centralisation.  
CEO 5  
Something like stroke will be governed by a pathway…… which we need to do 
and then reflect it in our contractual procurement with the appropriate hospitals. 
The work on this has to be led by a partnership between managers and 
clinicians. 
CEO 20 
14.4.3.3 Public engagement 
The focus on public engagement is not surprising as PCTs have a statutory 
duty to consult the public on proposals for changes in health services. Engaging 
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with the local community is part of that process. Quotations from CEOs in 
relation to public engagement are shown below.  
We don’t have a good enough system of, you know, ongoing engagements and 
involvements of the patients and public in the way we commission. It is pretty 
absent, I think, you know, it is weak around here. Our level of public 
engagement is definitely more reserved for the formal consultations. 
CEO 15 
I do not believe that you include the public in agreeing the position about where 
is the best place to run a stroke service. I don’t believe that is appropriate. It is 
absolutely appropriate that we engage with the public about what factors we 
have taken into account in reaching our decisions about where the stroke 
services would be. And then to consult with the public about whether we 
reached the decision in the right way, and to seek their views about the 
obstacles of accessing a centralised service and what we can do to help them 
overcome those obstacles. 
CEO 19 
The question really, is taking the time to explain to people why this 
centralisation is absolutely, clinically evidenced and better for people. People 
will express difficulties – difficulty to getting to visit their relatives at this hospital. 
And it is not about saving money, we probably won’t save money. 
CEO 14  
Unsurprisingly, most of the references to public engagement were in relation to 
community engagement or formal public consultation. It is noteworthy that the 
seven CEOs (7/12, 58%) who commented on this were from PCTs whose local 
hospitals would “lose” services to teaching hospitals under the proposals. 
14.4.3.4 Environmental dynamism 
One in two CEOs (6/12, 50%) highlighted the impact of centralisation on the 
local health economy. A selection of quotes from CEOs relating to 
environmental dynamism (see below) cover the following factors: premises, 
notably hospitals; population, location or geography of place; infrastructure such 
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as roads and transport. The main concerns were about what the proposal would 
mean for all hospitals, location of the centre, how patients would get there, and 
how the needs of the local population would be met.  
premises 
The work we have done in southwest ….. suggests that there isn’t the capacity 
at the more distant centre for everybody with a stroke to be treated. 
CEO 20 
This straight argument about efficiency - about which hospitals can carry out 
what functions, and how many hospitals there should be in (city) in the future. 
The questions keep cropping up.  
CEO 5  
population 
My role is to ensure that we have a properly informed commissioning cycle, 
where you go from understanding the background evidence from public health, 
taking views on the need, supply and demand issues on the population. 
CEO 20 
Geography 
If you look at all of the trusts which are nearest to (town), I think they are pretty 
strong. The bigger issue would be if (Trust X) wasn’t designated as a stroke 
centre, then our residents would have to go somewhere else.. 
CEO 15 
I would want to be reassured that the geography of the specialist unit was 
appropriate. 
CEO 5  
Transport 
For patient with stroke ….. we would commission the (area) Ambulance Service 
to take people in a particular fashion and direction. We may need to 
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commission a different type of emergency service for people who have had 
major trauma, for example, helicopter, to take them to a major trauma centre. 
CEO 20 
14.4.3.5 Service users 
Five CEOs (5/12, 42%) said they would consult service users and patients, as 
shown by their quotes below. One CEO suggested using routine practice 
registers to engage patients. Two others would want to engage users or 
patients in decisions about the change. (Later analysis showed the two CEOs to 
be from PCTs likely to lose local services to regional centres, which would 
explain why they felt the need to consult local patient and user groups.) 
Reasons given for not consulting users included letting the evidence “speak for 
itself”; support from key stakeholders; SHA proposal likely to be a foregone 
conclusion; the proposal was favourable to the PCT; or engaging with patients 
and users was not important to the CEO personally.  
Let’s say we’re going to have a centralised stroke service. What I would want is 
to hear out the most important factors that clinicians and users think about in 
relation to reaching a decision about which is the hospital of choice. 
CEO 19 
You cannot ignore what patients are saying about the kind of pathway they 
would actually find acceptable. Take stroke - our patients have said to us that 
they want ordinarily, as far as it is ever reasonable, to be able to access high 
quality stroke services locally, which, for them means at their DGH. It is only 
where that is impractical, unaffordable, all of those things, do they think it is 
reasonable that we should actually ask them to go to a more distant centre. 
CEO 20 
14.4.3.6 Politicians 
Five CEOs out of 12 (42%) mentioned politicians or politics when discussing 
centralisation. They differentiated between MPs, MPs who were ministers, 
mayors, and local councillors. Councillors were regarded according to the 
power of their political roles, for example the mayor, council leader, cabinet 
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member or OSC chair. As before, CEOs who would engage with politicians 
were from PCTs where the local DGH was likely to lose services to specialist 
centres, so it was to be expected that they would want to prepare the politicians 
at the early stage for the change. A selection of quotes is shown below. 
It is pan region, therefore, I would start to be thinking – who actually got a 
regional wide role. The mayor, for example, clearly has to play a role. And the 
regional assembly. And I think ….. the city’s MPs. That and well, I would say 
probably the city MPs and the national politicians. 
CEO 20 
Once we get into that deeper level of debate actually, involving the public and 
councillors and patients,….. need to work with Overview and Scrutiny 
Committees. 
CEO 14 
14.4.3.7 Decision making processes 
One in three CEOs (4/12, 33%) talked about having decision making processes. 
The issues were in two areas: one, having a decision making process that 
would incorporate relevant evidence including views of key stakeholders such 
as clinicians, and having a business case; and two, joint decision making with 
neighbouring PCTs. Centralisation of services require hospitals to co-operate 
across catchment areas, so it made sense for PCTs to work with their 
neighbours to jointly consult stakeholders. A Joint Committee of PCTs had been 
set up by the SHA to oversee the consultation across the region, which may 
explain why so few CEOs mentioned a local decision making process. 
Examples of quotes from CEOs relating to decision making process are shown 
below. 
I would expect the case to be fully discussed and debated.  I would first discuss 
with local clinicians, then have a wider discussion with the directors, and then 
go to board. By the time we go to the board, there will probably be, you know, a 
clinical advisory board case as well. So, I’ll be looking for all of that evidence 
that they will bring. 
CEO 5 
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But the difficult bit, which I don’t see, is we have a group of PCTs who really got 
to grips with how the decisions will be made. If we make decisions about 
trauma, make decisions about stroke care, and effectively that leads on to 
saying some hospitals are large acute and some hospitals are locals, actually, 
how do we manage that process? 
CEO 14  
In summary, the above findings describe how PCT CEOs were likely to respond 
to a top down regional requirement that, although not of the same status as a 
national diktat, was still regarded as such. While the strategic proposal would 
not impact directly on their organisation, it would affect other NHS organisations 
and the delivery of health services in the local environment, which meant PCTs 
would have to formally consult the public. There was little resistance among 
CEOs as the proposed changes would improve the quality of patient care and 
therefore aligned with PCT strategic goals. The CEOs’ involvement was largely 
confined to leading the local public consultation process, including engaging 
with key stakeholder groups, and to obtain formal board approval. 
14.5 Implementing local plans (RHS polyclinic strategy) 
In contrast to the centralisation strategy, the RHS polyclinic strategy required 
PCTs to develop their own local plans in response, so the strategy had 
significant direct local impact and will affect local plans. PCT CEOs would be 
expected to be more sensitive to local contextual factors when taking strategic 
decisions on local plans.  
14.5.1 Organisational internal factors 
14.5.1.1 Top Management Team 
There were in total just two CEO references to TMT in relation to polyclinics; 
both on task leadership as to who is going to lead. As it became apparent that 
this would be a major change programme, the CEOs made new appointments 
to lead the work. 
Table 29 and Figure 26 show the organisational internal factors CEOs said they 
would take account of when deciding on their response to the regional polyclinic 
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strategy. Overall, the most commonly cited factors were related to strategy and 
structure, followed by time and financial factors, which is not surprising as 
the polyclinic strategy had significant resource implications requiring board 
approval and will take time to implement. 
Table 29 Organisational internal factors influencing CEO strategic decision 
making on polyclinic strategy 
Factors No of CEOs 
(%) 
Factors No of CEOs 
(%) 
strategy 12 (100) culture 0 
structure 7 (58) information 0 
finance 5 (42) size 0 
staff 2 (20) relationships 0 
operations 2 (20) systems 0 
 
Figure 26 Organisational internal factors influencing CEO strategic decision 
making on polyclinic strategy 
 
 
14.5.1.2 Strategy 
The critical contextual factor, strategy, was mentioned by all of the 12 CEOs. 
The CEOs used the terms strategy, policy and plan interchangeably to describe 
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similar initiatives. Three quarters (9/12, 75%) saw the policy as an accelerator 
of change that PCTs had been planning for some time, so the PCTs should ride 
on the wave of the regional policy. For some CEOs, it provided an opportunity 
to change existing plans, with many saying that the strategy was pushing PCTs 
to be more bold and ambitious, both in the scale and pace of change. It helped 
that the SHA made some funding available to PCTs to support polyclinic 
development, and some PCTs took the opportunity to re-badge existing 
developments to access the financial support. A selection of quotes in relation 
to polyclinic strategy is shown below. 
Well, polyclinics sort of fit very closely with our existing primary care strategy. 
We’ve already made significant investment in primary care facilities so we have 
got seven biggish buildings that are either brand new or they have had major 
refurbishments. In them they have got some GP services and some community 
services and some of them have got some sort of specialist services. More 
recently two of them have got independent sector diagnostics in them as well. 
So those things are sort of heading us in the direction of polyclinics so we are 
already drifting. Well not drifting, but we are already going in that direction. So 
what we’ve looked it is how does the concept of polyclinics help us to go faster, 
are there any things in the polyclinic model which are better than what we’ve 
been trying to do. So what we see is that polyclinics enable us to accelerate our 
primary care strategy and perhaps be a bit more radical than we wanted to be 
in the first place. 
CEO 23  
Most of us by and large buy into the principles around polyclinics in some shape 
or form and there is no major dispute about those and therefore we were 
already doing them and all this is doing is speeding it up and badge-ing it 
slightly differently. 
CEO 8 
What we’ve done is, essentially, say to (SHA) that we will remodel the service, 
and I anticipate that we will remodel inside, to try and make it a polyclinic.  I 
think the polyclinic agenda fits fairly well with the strategy the PCT already had 
for a series of enhanced health centres like that….. That’s why, as soon as this 
was mentioned, we realise it could be a vehicle for moving forward for us, and 
we hope, you know, we do expect that it will be.  
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CEO 21 
In terms of polyclinics, ….. it was so close to the strategy that we had already 
agreed. 
CEO 19 
Before I arrived, we are talking about summer ’07, early ’07, the PCT went for 
consultation on a primary care strategy. Don’t be surprised, but in the borough, 
our single handed GPs are in really awful accommodation. And it’s a matter of 
available buildings, available land and where whole borough is landlord. So, the 
PCT took a decision that, in order to redress health inequalities, the way to do it 
is through primary care, so you know, we got there before Darzi did.  
And it has been in consultation, big consultation externally, with the GP 
community, and internally. They came up with a proposal for four clinics or 
centres and a number of practices, and we were going towards having local 
centres and those hubs then network with the rest of the practices. So, there is 
actually a plan for northeast, northwest, southeast and southwest health 
resource centres, and with borough-wide of networks around them. And some 
other practices are going into new premises. 
So, that was our policy, so when polyclinics came out, we were irritated by the 
name, but the policy, you know, polyclinics, just confirms our direction of travel. 
And I think, in fact, it has confirmed that direction is right. It means that we will 
move faster, because, you know, there is (region) wide policy, and national 
policy around this. And also, I think some of the policy thinking and the thinking 
which emerged subsequently have broadened our horizons in terms of what we 
will put into the polyclinic. 
CEO 5 
14.5.1.3 Structure 
The polyclinic model was synergistic with many PCTs’ own strategy to 
transform primary care, especially in getting GPs to aggregate in larger modern 
practices. But the strategy extended this change by recommending that GPs 
operate from large modern health centres call polyclinics that were linked to 
practices in a hub and spoke model. As polyclinic development would be a 
significant local strategic decision, board support was important. Altogether 
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seven CEOs (7/12, 58%) referred to either boards or board members, in 
particular executive directors who would lead on polyclinic development. 
References to boards were linked to governance and accountability, while 
references to executive directors were about work delegation. A number of 
CEOs recruited new staff to lead the new work while others reassigned the 
roles within existing staff. Examples of quotes from CEOs are given below. 
I had two informal discussions with the Chair, where this was very difficult 
information for her, because she is very closely identified with this project and 
then having done that, we then had an informal board briefing, although we had 
essentially made the decision. Then we had an informal briefing at the end of 
our board meeting in March, and that was really saying we have decided as a 
PCT executive that we need to change our tack on this, we need to drop the 
larger proposal rather than fight (SHA), we need to remodel it in the light of 
Darzi. 
CEO 21 
My director of clinical services retires at the end of July and we are recruiting 
now. Interview is next week for a chief operating officer and we are interested in 
somebody with very sharp business skills to essentially make collective 
decisions about where this (polyclinics) goes in the future.  
CEO 20 
We are about to appoint – should be a fortnight today – a Director of Healthcare 
Procurement and Performance. The interviews are set up 
CEO 12 
14.5.1.4 Finance 
Financial or resource factors were mentioned by five of the 12 CEOs (5/12, 
42%), in relation to affordability and how the capital investments would be 
funded. One CEO would use financial modelling, another talked about staff 
feeling unable to speak out about their concerns about value for money. 
Examples of quotes from CEOs on finance are shown below.  
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I do not think, if we replicate what happens in an acute hospital in a polyclinic, 
we will be able to afford this at all. 
CEO 20 
It was really around that – those issues about affordability and strategic fit. 
CEO 21 
There is evidence that around (region) that we have to be pretty careful, that 
some people have made very optimistic assumptions about finance about how 
much an urgent care centre will cost ….. Then we got to be really careful about 
balancing the money versus value to people. And an area that I don’t think we 
do, you know, develop decision making based on cost-benefit analysis…… And 
of course the scheme has grown from a year ago before anyone thought of 
polyclinics. 
CEO 14 
14.5.1.5 Other factors 
Two other factors that arose in the CEO interviews related to operations (2/12, 
17%) and staff (2/12, 17%) as shown in the quotes from CEOs below. The 
reasons why only two CEOs mentioned operational factors may be partly due to 
the internal organisation of those PCTs. One had a large provider arm so may 
have been thinking about the operational impact of polyclinic implementation. 
The other reference was about the Professional Executive Committee (PEC) 
which has been coded under operations rather than staff due to PEC GPs not 
being PCT employees. In contrast, references to Assistant Directors was 
categorised under “staff”. 
Operational factors 
We have the PEC which is meant to be the Commissioning Executive here but 
it does not work very well and we are just looking at that.   
CEO 18 
And the thoughts of how it will become an urgent care centre currently are that 
people going to the UCC for AE. We want to bring these three elements 
together - ambulatory AE and out of hours GPs and Minor Injuries, but with the 
GPs present all the time. 
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CEO 14  
Staff factors 
In the morning, we bring our Assistant Directors together with the Executive 
Directors and then in the afternoon we bring the GP members of the board 
together with Executive Directors.  We feel the issues are of both operational 
and strategic importance in that time but we do an agenda in advance to let 
them know what we want planned. Pool our energies, if you know what I mean. 
CEO 12 
When the GPs move into the polyclinic ….. We have put quite a lot of effort into 
explaining exactly what we are doing ….. And obviously, the trust sees this as 
an opportunity at the moment, (to engage with) our own board, our own staff. 
CEO 14 
14.5.2 Local contextual factors 
For polyclinics to fulfil their goals as NHS community services hubs, the 
development of the plans needs to engage with contextual factors in the local 
health economy Table 30 and  
 
Figure 30 give a breakdown of the local factors that PCT CEOs said they would 
take into account in developing their local polyclinic strategy. There was a 
consensus on the key factors, such as environmental dynamism and other 
significant organisations, which were mentioned by all or almost all CEOs. 
Other important factors were decision making process and goals as were 
mentioned by a majority of CEOs. The remaining factors were connected to 
stakeholder management activities such as relationships and engagement.  
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Table 30 Local factors CEOs take into account when taking strategic decisions 
on polyclinic strategy 
Factors No of 
CEOs(%)
Factors No of 
CEOs(%) 
environmental dynamism 
other sig organisations 
decision making process 
goals 
stakeholders 
time 
service users 
politicians 
12 (100) 
11(92) 
10 (83) 
8 (67) 
8 (67) 
5 (42) 
4 (34 
3(25)) 
public engagement 
relationships 
pressure groups 
performance 
expectations 
industry culture 
learning 
regulator 
2 (17) 
2 (17) 
1 (8) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
Table 31 Local factors CEOs take into account when taking strategic decisions 
on polyclinic strategy 
 
 
14.5.2.1 Environmental dynamism 
The SHA has set out specifications for buildings, catchment population and 
geography for polyclinics, so it is no wonder that environmental dynamism was 
mentioned by every CEO (12/12, 100%). But implementing the strategy 
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required PCTs to have a local plan. Two selected quotes from CEOs on dealing 
with complexity and pace of change in the environmental illustrate this point. 
It was very strongly influenced by my not wanting to throw things up in the air. 
We have got a major community hospital development in the south of the 
borough that has got huge GP buy in, the sort that might be destabilised. I am 
very worried about that. We’ve got a big development, all combined with a 
swimming pool and a leisure centre in another part of the borough. Again we 
wanted to continue with that. We’ve got 15 GPs going into there, you know, with 
a whole range of things where we had already got major improvements. So I 
was really obsessed that we didn’t derail all those. And then we have got other 
areas where actually I think the polyclinic concept would apply nicely. So it was 
about saying, that is our existing game plan, and this is how it fits, or how we 
could more fit into that, rather than, I have had an idea and now I am going to 
throw everything out the window that I was previously doing and bring in this 
new concept. 
CEO 8 
And so, it is being consulted. It’s in consultation, big consultation externally with 
GP community and internally, they came up with a proposal for four clinics or 
centres and a number of practices as we are going towards as local centres 
and then those hubs network with the rest of the practices in the area. So, there 
is actually a plan for northeast, northwest, southeast and southwest within 
health resource centres, and borough wide networks around them. And some 
other practices are going into new premises. We don’t have the buildings, 
unfortunately, and the first building is not going to come on stream until 
December ’09 at the earliest. We have a LIFT (Local Investment Finance Trust) 
company and we are doing it through them. We have other practices, but with 
the network practices which are doing their own mix in the traditional build. But 
we have a lot of work going through the LIFT company in the next five years. 
And we’re selling some of the land for residential housing. 
CEO 5  
Of the environmental factors that have major influence on polyclinics strategic 
decisions, the starting point seemed to be existing buildings notably hospital 
buildings or premises. 
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We’ve got this brand new big primary care centre in the under croft of the stand 
of the football stadium. ….. Then, the other one which I think we are going to 
have trouble with (SHA) but I think we are going to hold our ground on it, we’ve 
got two buildings, both of which are absolutely brand new. They are only about 
a mile from each other. Neither is big enough to have everything we want in a 
polyclinic hub but together they have got all the elements of a polyclinic hub.  
And the reason that we can’t is that one of them has got two GP practices in it, 
independent sector diagnostics and then a very large multi-agency children’s 
special needs clinic. It is a really big building but it’s got education staff, social 
services staff, health staff, and children’s special needs. The only way we could 
make it into a polyclinic is to move all those people out, but they’ve only been in 
there two years and it was purpose built for them so we’re not going to move 
them out.  
Then the other building a mile down the road has got another large and growing 
GP practice, specialist dental services, whole range of outpatient outreach 
services, leg ulcer clinic, phlebotomy - a whole range of different things in it. So 
between those two buildings, we’ve got a really good vibrant hub and so we’re 
going to go for hub and spoke model which builds on our existing buildings. 
 
CEO 23  
There is in south (region), X Community Hospital. X Community Hospital was 
part of Y and the PCT took it over a number of years ago. It is a Victorian 
hospital in the south of the borough. …..  
CEO 21 
The quote above highlights location or sites, which often for legacy reasons, 
accounted for the next most commonly considered environmental factor, as 
illustrated by the quote below. 
Well it’s on the old district general hospital site, so it’s a huge site and we have 
an existing health centre with a small subset of those 15 GPs in at one end of 
the site.  
 CEO 8 
We have to spend £15 million on renovating this site.  
CEO 14  
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We have some obvious sites where we would expect to locate those 
(polyclinics) – one of them is here (X Hospital, place). The local population now 
is very wedded to the site.  The second will probably be in (town centre).  We 
do not have a site for that yet and we are in dialogue exploring a number of 
options for that, although we do occupy a site in (town) which is close enough to 
the town centre but it has an old Victorian former hospital on it. …..There is 
another much more central site in (town) that we have been looking at. Z is the 
final one and we think that would be likely to be on the former W Hospital site 
and we still occupy some of that site ourselves because have the Disablement 
Services Centre located there.   
CEO 12 
Linked to sites is the geography of the area, as well as existing infrastructure, 
as shown by selected quotes by CEOs below. 
In deciding which way we went in terms of the health centre or the polyclinic, 
again we decided that the community hospital thing that we are doing in the 
south of the borough was so close to a polyclinic, in fact it’s got all the elements 
in because that has got urgent care…… So what we did about that was, we 
presented information about the whole geographical area.   
CEO 8 
(Drew a map and pointing to pictures on the map) You’ve got the motorway 
coming up here, and this is kind of (town centre) down here, and you’ve got a 
big main road that comes down here and you’ve got the river down here and 
you’ve got another big main road down there. So…..the whole of this area is the 
X estate and behind it you’ve got Y Park and main road is just around there. So 
you’ve got main road which goes down here and the hospital, I’ve got my 
geography slightly wrong but the hospital is about there…… The way the road 
system works, there is one road that goes into the estate and then it kind of, it is 
one of those kind of tree things. So it’s a classic how not to build an estate 
because you create that kind of doorway……It is a community and it is closed. I 
mean, if you shut that road, they would literally be shut in the estate. There is a 
little Sainsbury’s that has opened here recently so there is an element of traffic 
right there, but not much. So if we put a walk in centre here, I think they will use 
it. 
CEO 24 
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14.5.2.2 Public engagement 
Engaging the public is an important consideration for PCTs, as each polyclinic 
had to serve a set catchment. The local plans therefore needed to take account 
of the socio-demography and health needs of local communities, as illustrated 
by the quote from a CEO below. 
 Just down the south west, there is hardly anything there.  It is mainly brown 
field and this is where the population growth is – this is where all the 
regeneration will come …... That (pointing to an area on the map) is planned for 
a new facility and that is where new population will come so that could be 
polyclinic …... So then, it was a discussion about the existing population, which 
is mainly here.  These communities - this is the area of our poorest practices - 
with most deprivations and limited access. Down here, and over here, is a 
similar story. 
In places like Hertfordshire, there is probably limited health gain left …... But 
here, there is low incidence of cancer in the population which I think is mainly 
because the youngest population in the country but very high mortality rate 
because of poor prevention and cultural issues that presents late although a lot 
of that is poor identification in primary care.   
CEO 18 
14.5.2.3 Other significant organisations  
As a group, this factor was cited by all bar one CEO (11/12, 92%), with GPs 
(9/11, 82%), the local council (7/11, 64%) and NHS hospitals or acute trusts 
(3/11, 27%) most commonly cited. GPs were central to the delivery of 
polyclinics in their different roles as primary care provider, commissioner of 
secondary care and polyclinic anchor tenants. GPs were also influential with 
patients and the public. Some GPs saw polyclinics as providing opportunities to 
expand their business in provision. The local council had a number of key roles 
to play: providing support from local politicians representing the democratic 
constituency; as planning authority for approval of development proposals; as 
potential landlords of polyclinics; providing the statutory function of the 
Overview and Scrutiny Committee (OSC) to scrutinise proposed changes in 
health services; and support synergy by co-location of health and council 
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services.  Hospitals would also need to engage as a significant proportion of 
their outpatient business may have to relocate due to changes in care 
pathways. The examples of quotes from CEOs in relation to other significant 
organisations are shown below. 
We’ve got 15 GPs going into there, you know, a whole range of things where 
we had already got major improvements. We had some GPs who would move 
from the existing health centre into there, and we’d encourage others who were 
in difficult premises to come in.  
CEO 8 
I am now having a dialogue with the LMC (Local Medical Committee). 
CEO 18 
Our PBC consortium has got big ideas about elderly care, having their own 
geriatric consultant and completely changing the focus of our day 
hospital…...Our GPs are quite encouraged by the possibility of developing 
some teaching practices, as they don’t have the space to do that now. They 
don’t have the space to do minor procedures. They’ll have that advantage of 
working from the biggest centre. 
CEO 14 
In the work on polyclinic we have to do proper pathway work with acute 
hospitals. We certainly shifted work into the community hospital already pretty 
substantially for patients with diabetes. 
CEO 20 
Obviously we’ve also got the local authority, discussions with them as to what 
will they be prepared to sign up to. So, a lot of work with Overview and Scrutiny 
Committee and with the Director of adult services. We do not want to be 
pushing a model that actually our local authority is not going to support. 
 CEO 24 
We have four schemes at the moment where we are discussing land with the 
borough council planners…... I use those channels to unblock any issues and 
just to make sure that, you know, they’ve got the top person there and that 
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those decisions all to go to cabinet at the appropriate time and then on planning 
committee. …..The borough is very committed to making life significantly better 
for the local people. And we do quite a lot through our strategic partnerships 
with the borough council as well and I sit on their key strategic groups 
CEO 5 
14.5.2.4 Decision making process 
PCTs have to be able to demonstrate that they had consulted on significant 
service changes and that these have the support of key stakeholders. A 
common approach to achieving stakeholder support was to start engaging 
stakeholders before and as part of the formal processes. Not surprisingly, 
decision making process was mentioned by more than four out of five CEOs 
(10/12, 83%). The initial stages may involve taking soundings from key 
stakeholders, planning and preparing the business case (including verifying if 
there were a business case), and checking and assessing the likelihood of 
success. This planning period could be time consuming. As polyclinics would be 
major capital developments, the business cases would need to be approved by 
the SHA, so it was important to ensure that any local proposals had SHA 
support. The CEOs indicated that their PCT would try to “tick the box” in order 
to comply with SHA specifications. But where it would be difficult to do so, they 
would “dress up” or re-badge the developments so that they would be 
acceptable. A selection of quotes from CEOs relating to decision making 
processes is shown below. 
Informal process 
Basically the project is too big and it was committing our future revenue I 
thought in a way. We did get this informal feedback in a conversation in the 
corridor from their (SHA) nasty crew, but never mind. …..So what I am saying 
here is that we got a choice. We can carry on saying we want this business 
case that’s already been put off and have a fight about it. Or we can change our 
proposals and ask if we want a polyclinic.  What was planned was a bit like a 
polyclinic, you just didn’t have the word you know.  
CEO 21 
Formal decision making process 
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We’ve really got to make sure we build a proper business case for that and we 
are really careful about optimism bias.  
CEO 14 
One of things that I have used as a tool here to help refine and to take the 
vision into reality is the simulation exercises, which for me, is really a powerful 
tool and engages a much wider group of people.  
CEO 19 
I suppose you are beginning to feel that we are almost, in style, incredibly 
inclusive and that it can take, sometimes, a long time to get somewhere, but we 
don’t then generally have an argument when it comes to implementation, but 
you have got to have a fairly big capacity to handle things that were you not 
taking decisions by directing. If you take decisions through your programme of 
engagement, it is a slower process and you have to end up achieving results 
through influencing, through consensus, through compromise. 
CEO 20 
14.5.2.5 Goals 
While not directly cited, goals were referred to by two thirds of CEOs (8/12, 
67%) in relation to developing the local plans in response to the polyclinics 
strategy. While it was the SHA’s goal to have polyclinics in every PCT and 
therefore an objective for PCT CEOs, goals in this context refer to the goals of 
the local health economy although they usually align with PCT strategic goals, 
Not surprisingly, the PCT CEOs were counting on local GPs to drive this 
change and championing it to local stakeholders. The CEOs were mindful that 
in order to meet the SHA specifications, compromises may be necessary. 
Because of the goal’s importance, some CEOs were leading it personally, to 
make sure that risks were mitigated and the objective could be achieved. 
We have combined the in and out of hours, and the GPs think that probably 
what they will do is end up being almost a cooperative and deliver the GMS 
component of the polyclinic on a rotational basis. At the moment it is open 8.00 
am to 10.00 pm seven days a week but is not bookable for primary care 
appointments, and that is the gap in the current setup. So it does require some 
thinking and how they buy into that ….. question being whether we should be 
paying twice for something that we are already paying for, in private.  
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CEO 20 
We are in discussion with the GPs about what can go into the resource centres. 
So, there is a team very much managing the project and with key milestones, 
and I, in fact, am currently chairing the polyclinics program board, which I might 
not necessarily do under the other circumstances but I am doing that it as so 
much rests on me.  
CEO 5 
14.5.2.6 Stakeholders 
As discussed earlier, stakeholders could be a coded as an umbrella term (noun) 
or by their component constituents (e.g. politicians, other significant 
organisations, public).  As the systematic review had identified stakeholders 
both as a group as well as in individual groupings, the same categories were 
kept for analysis. In total, two thirds of CEOs (8/12, 67%) referred to 
stakeholders as a single group, in contrast to the centralisation policy where the 
same proportion of CEOs named specific stakeholder groups. This may be due 
to a much longer list of stakeholders being involved in the local polyclinics plan, 
hence the use of the umbrella term. Examples of CEO quotes that relate to 
stakeholders in general are shown below.  
We don’t develop policy by going out to ask the public what they think ….. 
Every quarter there is a meeting that takes place involving about 15 senior 
leaders from across (borough). So we’ll go, and the representatives of the 
organisations - from the PCT, the council, the acute trust, mental health trust, 
and GP Co-operative. You then get down to the very practical local level and 
discuss who is really going to make this happen.  
CEO 21 
You build up that kind of, over time, getting users, stakeholders, in gauging and 
shaping your strategic direction. The way to kind of reach decisions is through 
different ways of stakeholder engagement piece …..  to get the buy-in. 
CEO 19 
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14.5.2.7 Time  
Temporal factors were cited by just under half of CEOs (5/12, 42%). They were 
in relation to history and organisational memory, as well as allowing time for 
engagement during the planning phase.  
The local population is very wedded to the site.  Built in 1938, it was built by 
public subscription rather than being a property of NHS, therefore the current 
custodians and the borough still think that it is their hospital in effect when it 
should stay here.   
CEO 12 
If you take decisions through your program of engagement, it is a slower 
process ….. it can take, sometimes, a long time to get somewhere. 
CEO 20 
14.5.2.8 Service users 
As care pathways will have to change to take account of polyclinics, a third of 
CEOs (4/12, 34%) said they would involve service users in their redesigns. 
Unlike the corporate sector where customer satisfaction is prioritised, patient 
views appear to not count as much as those of the stakeholders mentioned 
previously.  
I would want to hear patient voice. I mean we have changed significantly the 
plans around B and NW during this year of consultation and that has been in 
response to the patient voice. 
CEO 24 
14.5.2.9 Politicians 
Of the rest of the local contextual factors, the few comments made reflect local 
rather than general issues. Key opinion formers such as local politicians were 
mentioned by a quarter (3/12, 25%) of CEOs so may be specific to local issues.  
I think it was driven by the desire of wanting to deliver a community hospital on 
the (town) site. (Town) does not need a community hospital. It seemed to me it 
was too politically driven by local issues. And it was very associated with the 
Chair and who is very political and wanted to deliver this. She lives down there, 
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she’s – well, she’s an ex-labour politician, has been in the labour party, it’s a 
labour constituency. 
CEO 21 
Our key partners in (borough) – I think I would say the borough council …... a 
number of the members have been influential, the ruling party being the Liberal 
Democrats, they’ve been very important to this. 
CEO 15 
14.5.2.10 Public engagement 
The same number of CEOs (2/12, 34%) talked about engaging with the public. 
There was a single reference to pressure groups; in this particular case it was 
the voluntary sector which sometimes plays significant roles in community 
service provision.  
It’s the balance between leading and listening, but actually stubbornly walking in 
the opposite direction and ignoring completely the public voice is not very 
advisable. We have a clear understanding now of what our public want in that 
part of the borough. Because we actually need them to use and benefit from 
whatever it is we are designing and building - if they are saying “we really don’t 
want that” ….. it is probably not the right way forward. 
CEO 24 
14.5.2.11 Relationships  
Relationships were cited by two CEOs (2/12, 17%) as playing an important role 
in getting decisions agreed, as seen in the quote from a CEO who had an 
unsatisfactory relationship with the SHA, and another who chose to use a 
stakeholder for lobbying purposes. 
 We put pressure on (SHA) for some information. We then got a conference call 
with the Head of the Provider Agency, which he knew nothing about. It was 
booked, he knew nothing about it! A meeting was then arranged with the 
Director of Finance and Director of Strategy and MS. It was clear he had not 
done much arrangement. MS came in, it was during a gap in a meeting of the 
PCTs. Actually we had a conversation in the corridor for about 10 minutes and 
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then we got a letter of about two or three lines. So, I think that’s what happened. 
So, that process wasn’t completely unsatisfactory. 
CEO 21 
The LMC will support me in that because we don’t want to do a polyclinic. 
CEO 1 
There was no mention of performance expectations, regulators or industry 
culture in relation to polyclinics. 
14.5.3 Summary 
In conclusion, unlike the centralisation strategy, the polyclinic strategy would 
have to be delivered locally, so had significant implications for PCT local plans. 
The introduction of polyclinics would affect every part of the local health system, 
which would explain why the CEOs were saying they would take into account 
many more contextual factors than for either the centralisation or national 
policies.  Environmental dynamism was a critical factor in this regard. That was 
to be expected, as the polyclinic service model was prescriptive about 
catchment population, building size and space usages. Understandably, for 
such a major strategic decision, other significant organisations and decision 
making process featured high on the CEOs’ contextual list – to ensure that key 
people and organisations work together to develop the plan, and that 
appropriate structures and processes were established to ensure governance. 
For PCTs whose existing local plans were similar to the polyclinic strategy, the 
strategy was a welcomed accelerator of change. For others they would try to 
rebadge existing developments. Finally, the PCT CEOs said they would want to 
involve all stakeholders to help shape the plans for implementation in the local 
health economy. 
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15 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
15.1 Summary 
15.1.1 Generic strategic decision making 
When taking generic strategic decisions, PCT CEOs said they would focus on 
the contextual factors needed for operationalisation. Of the organisational 
internal factors, strategy and structure were critical factors. Other important 
factors such as time, information, finance and staff were likely to be taken into 
account routinely, while operations, relationships and cultural factors may have 
local relevance but are not generalisable to all PCT CEOs. Of the local 
contextual factors, the CEOs would be most concerned about strategic fit 
between top down policies and existing local strategies or plans, and will seek 
synergy by linking any change to local goals  
15.1.2 Decisions on national policies 
Across the four different policy contexts, PCT CEOs would consider fewest 
contextual factors when taking strategic decisions on national policies. This is 
most likely because PCTs were expected or required to comply with national 
requirements, so there was no point wasting time deliberating which decision to 
take. This was noticeably so when dealing with key performance targets or 
national policy requirements, which were either tightly performance managed by 
the centre (the name the CEOs had for DH) or SHAs, or were assessed by the 
regulator in annual performance ratings. Usually it was both. The key national 
priorities or central diktats all had these features. It could be argued that the 
tight controls exerted on PCTs were not unreasonable as the NHS must be able 
to deliver a consistent and standard offering irrespective of local circumstances, 
especially on key national policy issues.  
The majority of CEOs expressed taking a common approach to deciding how 
they dealt with national policies. Central diktats were possibly the easiest 
strategic decisions for PCT CEOs, as they were usually clearly defined. 
Stakeholders, especially parties central to delivery, knew they were non-
negotiable so there would be less resistance and disaffections can be re-
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attributed to the centre or as one CEO said “blame upstairs”. Implementation 
tended to adopt a “command and control” approach from the DH through the 
SHA, with reinforcement from regulation. Key national priorities can usually be 
traced back to the national medium or long term NHS strategy published by the 
DH, and which may start out as manifesto commitments. One of the longest 
serving CEOs talked about expecting to see something promised in a manifesto 
to emerge later as a “must do”. National priorities are normally set out by the 
DH in December for the following financial year in the annual Operating 
Framework, but new requirements could be introduce at any time. This may be 
in response to significant reports or events that have drawn public or media 
interests, such as Baby P or Stafford Hospital, and the government has to be 
seen to be taking appropriate actions.  
Of the rest, the PCT CEOs indicated they would follow a routine to arrive at their 
decision. They would start by deciding on the degree of importance, and that 
often depended on the sanctions for non delivery and the performance 
management framework put in place to monitor progress i.e. the more serious 
the sanctions for failure and the more tightly a target will be monitored, the more 
weight it carries. If unsure, they would sound out the SHA or their peers. The 
CEOs would also assess the relative priority of the target against other national 
requirements, and whether it was do-able within the timeframe or available 
resources, or whether they could negotiate a more achievable milestone. They 
would consider the strategic fit with existing strategies or plans, and where 
possible, re-badge or adapt local plans to achieve synergy.  
Implementing a new initiative is likely to have resource implications, so the 
CEOs would be thinking about governance arrangements and ways to achieve 
board ownership without board members feeling bounced into endorsing a top 
down decision. They would also be horizon scanning for forthcoming policies 
with the advantages or disadvantages of being ahead, and likely resistance to 
change. Depending on the nature of the deliverables, CEOs said they were 
likely to use formal decision making processes, as well as relationships, to 
garner stakeholder support. They may set up decision making structures to give 
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legitimacy to decisions, and to stop unpopular decisions unravelling. They were 
also likely to use tools such as programme management, options appraisal or 
gap analysis to support implementation.  
15.1.3 Decisions on regional strategies  
Compared to national policies and especially central diktats which are tightly 
monitored and regulated, regional strategies do not have the same status. 
Regional policies or strategies are not equivalent to national policies in terms of 
sanctions and central performance management, and are not normally 
regulated. Due to the regional focus, they may be less clear cut in terms of 
goals from a PCT perspective, with performance expectations more amenable 
to negotiation with the SHA. So, unless tightly managed by the SHA, CEOs may 
regard regional initiatives as optional relative to the national “must dos” and 
local priorities. But once it had been made clear that these regional policies 
were also mandatory, the CEOs would regard them in the same way as national 
diktats. 
By their nature, regional strategies that make sense from an SHA perspective 
may not be of uniform relevance to PCTs due to PCTs’ differential local 
contexts, and unless a regional strategy can demonstrate clear local benefits or 
at the very least, no adverse local impact, PCT CEOs would find it hard to 
engage local stakeholders in regional plans. While such plans would not 
normally be regulated, strategic decisions of local importance would be 
subjected to scrutiny by the council’s OSC, whose members consist of local 
politicians. This formal process, as well as the duty to publicly consult on key 
strategic change, means CEOs had to ensure that due processes in 
consultation and engagement were followed, which required relationship 
building and an open and transparent decision making process. It also required 
PCTs to be able to demonstrate that they had taken into account the local 
contexts in arriving at their decisions. As regional policies can sometimes be 
problematic for CEOs, it was not surprising that of all of the contextual factors, 
the CEOs said they would prioritise, for most of the time, strategic and 
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information factors internally, to back up the rationale for these proposals, and 
on stakeholders and environmental factors externally.  
There was a further issue of agency conflicts. As accountable officers, PCT 
CEOs are directly responsible to their boards for delivery of the organisation’s 
strategic objectives, which by nature would include key national and regional 
requirements. But PCT CEOs are also accountable to the NHS CEO through 
the SHA CEO who, as “grandparent” in CEOs’ annual appraisal process, has 
the final say. The SHA CEO has the power of hire and fire, as well as over 
opportunities for promotion. It is not unusual for PCT CEOs to have to ask their 
boards to take strategic decisions on regional policies that board members may 
feel uncertain about. To help the decision making process, the CEOs may set 
up decision making processes and governance structures that engage the 
board. These same structures are also used by CEOs to fend off the SHA when 
they disagree with central directives. This chiasm between central control and 
local accountability would account for why the CEOs heeded local factors than 
internal organisational factors when taking strategic decisions related to 
regional requirements. 
15.1.4 Decisions on local plans (regional strategies with significant 
local impacts) 
The CEOs’ responses to regional polyclinic strategy is interesting from the 
perspective of understanding how regional strategies get developed and 
implemented at local PCT level. The SHA launched the polyclinic strategy as a 
sustainable solution to rising patient demand for care and prospective cuts in 
health service funding. The strategy was developed by an eminent doctor with 
the help of management consultants, on the assumption that health care 
provided outside of hospital would be substantially cheaper. The strategy 
development process examined international best practices and engaged 
stakeholders, in particular hospital consultants and patients, on how the patient 
journey can be improved. The plan was to shift services out of hospital settings 
to community health centre hubs called polyclinics that would provide a wide 
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range of services traditionally provided in hospital, as well as the primary care 
and community services.  
For obvious reasons, the polyclinics concept was unpopular with local district 
general hospitals. Hospital managers saw it as an unnecessary upheaval to 
services, with possible loss of business in an over saturated provider market. 
Many criticised the projected cost savings as over optimistic, since overheads 
still had to be maintained. Overheads accounted for 20-30% of a hospital’s non 
pay costs. Hospital consultants regarded working in the community as a 
downgrading in status, and believed decentralisation to polyclinics would 
increase costs. For polyclinics to be economically viable, there needed to be 
economies of scale, hence the requirements for catchment population and 
critically, for a large core of GPs to operate from the polyclinic. The latter was 
especially important as GPs are gateways into secondary care, and their 
involvement would be central to changing care pathways from hospital into the 
community. 
The polyclinic concept was also viewed with some scepticism by PCTs but 
because it was being driven hard by the SHA, a majority of CEOs saw 
implementation as inevitable. It was a case of, if we have to do this, we might as 
well use the opportunity to achieve long awaited change locally. In the past 
decade, PCTs trying to modernise primary care practices have found it difficult 
as GPs are independent contractors to the NHS and the current national GP 
contract, which is life long, does not facilitate transformational change. 
Premises are a particular problem. There is a long history behind the 
development of British general practices that explains why the situation is as it 
is today.  
From the inception of the NHS in 1948, despite various attempts to integrate 
GPs into the NHS, they have stayed as independent contractors. This has 
resulted in general practice not receiving the same degree of management or 
investment as hospitals. In some cities, there are still significant numbers of 
practices housed in sub standard premises that are owned by GPs themselves. 
There is also a cohort of GPs who came to this country in the 1970s from the 
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Indian subcontinent or East Africa who entered general practice because of 
limited opportunities in hospital medicine available then to non white doctors. 
Many independent contractors have invested their working life, as well as 
capital, in their practices which may explain the resistance to polyclinics.  
Although considered by the general public to be part of the NHS frontline, GPs 
are private small businesses that contract with the PCT to provide primary care 
services to a defined local population who register with the practice. Every year, 
the general public rates GPs as the most trusted of all professional groups. This 
makes a command and control relationship between the PCT and GPs difficult 
to implement. So PCTs have to try different ways to get GPs to change. 
Managing relationships and trying to influence by appealing to their 
professionalism may achieve better cooperation but history shows that it is 
really only through contract management or financial incentives that substantial 
change can be achieved.  
15.2 Implications of findings for strategic decision making in 
the NHS 
Project 2 findings illustrate the challenges facing PCT CEOs in trying to lead 
and manage their local health system where progress depends on influence 
rather than authority. In PCT CEOs’ world view, the parameters of their role 
means that their focus is local, and since the DH sets the rules and regulations 
as well as provides the funds by which the entire NHS operates hereby creating 
an internal health economy, there is no need for PCT CEOs to pay attention to 
macro level factors.  
In terms of strategic decision making, formalising decision making process has 
several advantages: They include: clarification of desired outcomes; 
demonstration of the problem with an evidence base; production of a plan with 
timetable; robust evaluation of options, which may include carrying out options 
appraisal and developing a business case; identification of risks and taking 
early mitigating actions; demonstration of governance and accountability 
structure; provision of a structured approach for obtaining stakeholder support. 
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Engaging with the local community as part of the decision making process is 
especially important when implementing changes affecting hospital services, as 
history shows that local communities always support their local hospital and will 
resist what they perceive as threats to their local hospital. It is however of 
concern that only a minority of CEOs indicated they would pay attention to 
service users. Paying lip service to engagement and consultation would lead to 
the PCT missing out on the expert patient input that would result in better 
designed services.   
The NHS has traditionally regarded itself as a scientific establishment in which 
objectivity is valued and where quantitative measures are regarded as more 
“true” than qualitative measures. Yet, despite the positivist culture that should 
encourage evidence based decision making, the majority of CEOs did not 
mention using information when taking strategic decisions. Not basing decision 
on evidence is likely to result in sub-optimum decisions  
While some strategic decisions have little to do with staff, for example capital 
investments, in practice, there are few strategic decisions that would not require 
staff engagement. Sadly, the majority of CEOs would not have involved their 
staff in the strategic decision making process. NHS organisations need to 
consider engaging staff from the start of any strategic change process, before 
or at least concurrent with engaging external stakeholders, as it promotes staff 
support and provides opportunities to deal with the interests of different staff 
groups, notably doctors and nurses. PCT CEOs have to balance engaging staff 
early to get their buy in, withholding information that could potentially jeopardise 
the change before it gets off the ground.  
It is surprising that financial factors were not mentioned more by the CEOs. 
While not all strategic decisions have resource implications, most strategic 
decisions tend to have some financial impact. It may be that PCT CEOs do not 
challenge top down requirements even if they have financial concerns, therefore 
making finance a less significant influence in strategic decision making, with 
associated financial risks. Another possible explanation could be that the 
interviews were carried out during a period of unprecedented funding growth in 
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the NHS (nationally, PCT allocations grew at an annual rate of 5.5-7% between 
2007/08 and 2009/10), when money was less of a concern.  
15.3 CEOs espoused decision-making context 
The analysis and discussion above have identified several concepts in PCT 
CEO strategic decision making which are drawn together by responding to the 
research questions set in paragraph 12.3 
15.3.1 How do PCT CEOs define their decision making context? 
The findings show that PCT CEOs do not take a blanket approach to strategic 
decision making; instead, they define their decision making context by the 
degrees of freedom to respond. To enable CEOs to decide on the appropriate 
response, they will ask themselves, or other people, for answers to the following 
six questions (in priority order): 
1. Who is the edict from?  
Policies from the DH, SHA, or regulators count the most, in descending 
order of priority. 
2. What is the goal or objective? 
The CEO will seek to understand what the “problem” is that requires 
solving. For that, they will ask themselves two subsidiary questions: One, 
is it a “must do”? If the answer is yes, then universally, the CEOs will not 
waste time – they will just get on and “do it”. If not, but the goal is aligned 
with PCT strategy, they would use the opportunity to step up the pace on 
local strategy plans. If no, and the goal does not support local strategy, 
they would then consider how to present things in such a way that would 
be acceptable to the centre. Two, is there a target or KPI? If yes, they will 
check information for levels of the current performance and decide 
whether to negotiate the baseline. If no, but is clear the requirement will 
be closely monitored, they will try to seek flexibility in terms of local 
interpretation to achieve synergy with local strategic goals. 
3. What is the timetable? 
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 If there is a deadline, is it “flexible” and is it negotiable? What are the 
milestones, for performance management purposes, to track progress. 
The issue here is to work out whether the goal is do-able within the 
timescale, and actions to be taken to mitigate the risks, for example a 
slower pace of change. 
4. Who needs to deliver this?  
Included here is a sub-question on who must be involved for the goal to 
be achieved.  This is where staffs, including the TMT, and stakeholders 
come into play. CEOs identify stakeholders by the impact the change will 
have on organisations or individuals. Internally, staff will start planning to 
operationalise the plans, under the executive leadership of TMT, who will 
also act as a sounding board for the CEO. The board will also need to be 
informed for governance purpose. Externally, the primary focus will be on 
organisations (so called “other significant organisations”) that will have to 
take actions, concentrating on key post holders whose support is crucial 
and might have to be won over. This includes GPs. The secondary focus 
will be on influential local groups, or individuals such as politicians. The 
final group are beneficiaries such as patients and the public.  
5. What needs to happen?  
There are three sub-questions: One, what are the dynamics in the local 
environment that are relevant? This will involve an assessment of the 
local environmental factors such as space, geography, facilities, 
infrastructure, local demography and the local health economy. Two, 
what are the resources required? The main concern will be financial, 
mainly about affordability. Three, how will the decision be taken? This 
leads to the establishment of structures and processes to enable the 
work to be constructed, stakeholders to be positioned in work streams or 
key decision points, and formal decision making by the board. 
6. What would success look like?  
Achievement of quantifiable results would be a clear demonstration of 
success. If the outcomes were less tangible, they would be judged 
according to their contribution to PCT strategic goals or objectives.  
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15.3.2 There is a hierarchy in contextual factors  
Based on the findings, there appear to be three levels of contextual factors 
relevant to PCT CEO strategic decision making: 
i) The first level consists of generic critical factors that are considered 
every time (or more than 90% of the time, in this study) the CEOs take 
a strategic decision, whatever the issue. The factors are: 
organisational strategy, internally within the PCT; and stakeholders, 
goals, and decision making processes, externally. Stakeholders also 
have differential status, which could be classified into three sub-groups. 
Primary stakeholders are usually statutory organisations such as the 
local council, NHS Trusts, GPs (as a professional group), and the SHA, 
who have key roles to play in implementation. Secondary stakeholders 
are those organisations or individuals with an interest in the outcome, 
such as GP trade unions, informal groups or networks, and politicians. 
Tertiary stakeholders are service users or patients and the public who 
are remote from the direct decision making process. 
ii) The next level consists of factors the majority (that is, more than half) of 
CEOs would take into account when faced with the same scenario or 
issue. These factors are structure, information, finance and 
operations, internally; and environmental dynamism, time, 
relationships, politicians and public engagement locally. 
iii) The third level factors are those that some CEOs will take account of but 
not others, due to unique local circumstances. The contextual factors 
are TMT, staff and culture, internally; and patients (service users) and 
regulators externally. 
It is noted that none (or less than 10% of respondents) of the following 
contextual factors were mentioned by PCT CEOs: all macro economic factors; 
size, system, and relationships internally; and resources, pressure/interest 
groups and industry culture externally revealing the parochial nature of CEO 
strategic considerations. 
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15.3.3 Espoused behaviour vs literature based model 
There is some degree of coherence between the literature based contextual 
intelligence model and the espoused decision making behaviour of PCT CEOs. 
Using the literature based model as a guide, one of the most significant 
observations was the complete lack of interest paid to macro economic factors 
by PCT CEOs. The CEOs paid differential attention to different contextual 
factors, and also consolidated the number of stand-alone contextual factors, by 
grouping (or merging) them or reducing them under an umbrella term. While the 
research did not identify new contextual factors, it did enable the contributions 
the TMT make to CEO decision making to be elucidated, including helping the 
CEO in the sense making process. 
15.3.4 Patterns of contextual factors and influence across CEOs 
A number of patterns are observed from the analysis, all of which would impact 
on the contextual factors that PCT CEOs would take into account in strategic 
decision making. First, the higher up the command chain the directive comes 
from, the less strategic and more operational would be the policy, and therefore 
the less need for strategic decisions by CEOs. Second, the higher up the origin 
of directive, the more likely it is to be accompanied by measurable targets, 
which also leaves less freedom for manoeuvre or negotiation, hence the “just 
get on with it” attitude of CEOs when dealing with central diktats. Third, the 
more strategic is the plan, the greater there is the need to engage with and 
consult local stakeholders, and to take into account local factors. Conversely, 
there is no need to consult stakeholders on central diktats. Fourth, the more 
contentious is the strategic decision, the greater is the need to be able to 
demonstrate governance and accountability, usually through formal decision 
making processes. Finally, the greater the anticipated resistance, the greater 
the need for formal decision making processes and structures. 
15.3.5 Different factors matter in different kinds of decision 
PCT CEOs indicated they would take different contextual factors into account 
when taking different kinds of strategic decision. Of all of the contextual factors, 
organisational strategy, stakeholders, goals, and decision making processes 
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appear to be generic critical factors which will be routinely considered in any 
strategic decision making. The rest of the contextual factors are situation 
dependent. With key national policies notably diktats and some regional 
policies, organisational strategy comes second to structure due to the focus 
then being on implementation, which involves engagement, operations, and 
governance. For other (non diktat) policies, because of organisational and 
executive accountability arrangements, the CEOs would usually try to comply; 
but where they felt it to be difficult to do so due to local circumstances or that 
the policy conflicts with the PCT strategic goals, they would use appropriate 
evidence to try to negotiate for changes in scope or pace. Regional policies that 
do not have significant direct local impact are regarded the same way. For 
regional policies with a significant local impact, CEOs would want to take 
advantage of the opportunity to expedite local strategy plans. The focus then 
would be on presentation, upwards to the SHA to show compliance, and 
outwards to local stakeholders to gain their support. Relevant contextual factors 
then would be about aligning strategic goals, managing key players and 
knowing about and dealing with relevant factors in the local environment, 
putting in place decision making processes to structure the work, to 
demonstrate governance and to lock in the strategic decisions. 
15.4 The evolved contextual intelligence model for PCT CEOs 
The contextual factors influencing PCT CEOs strategic decision making show 
different emphasis being placed on the contextual factors compared to the 
literature based model. The most obvious omission is the lack of reference to 
macro level factors. The other contextual factors that appear to play no or very 
minimal roles are interest and pressure groups, learning organisation, internal 
systems, organisational size and industry culture. In addition to individuals, 
groups and organisations being set out as discrete contextual factors in the 
literature based model, Project 2 introduces a new concept of stakeholders, as 
a group, as a contextual factor in PCT CEO strategic decision making. This has 
led to some refinements in the contextual intelligence model for PCT CEOs 
accordingly.  
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The results from Project 2 are shown in Figure 27- 
 
Figure 30.  Each one summarises the findings for a particular kind of strategic 
decision context, with the number of citations to each contextual factor included 
in the respective trapezium. Figure 27 shows the results for the generic 
strategic decision making context. Figure 28 shows the results for the 
contextual factors taken into account in strategic decision regarding national 
strategies. Figure 29 shows the results for the contextual factors taken into 
account in strategic decision regarding regional strategies with local impact.  
 
Figure 30 shows the results for the contextual factors taken into account in 
strategic decision regarding regional strategies that have significant local 
impacts.  
Figure 27 Significant contextual factors in generic strategic decision making 
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Figure 28  Significant factors of contextual intelligence in PCT CEO strategic 
decision making on national policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29  Significant factors of contextual intelligence in PCT CEO strategic 
decision making on regional strategies with little local impact 
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Figure 30  Significant factors of contextual intelligence in PCT CEO strategic 
decision making on local plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All of the models vividly illustrate the bounded decision-making context of PCT 
CEOs, as defined by factors reportedly taken into account. 
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16 CONCLUSION 
Project 2 findings provide a rich description of the environment that PCT CEOs 
have to work within and manage in the course of doing their jobs. It also 
illustrates the challenges facing PCT CEOs in trying to manage the local health 
system. In PCT CEOs’ world view, the parameters of their role meant that their 
focus is local, and since the DH set the rules and regulations as well as provide 
the funds by which the entire NHS operates hereby creating an internal health 
economy, there is no need for PCT CEOs to pay attention to macro level 
factors. The pursuit of PCT strategic goals - to improve the health of the local 
population and commissioning effective health services that meet the needs of 
local people - appear to act as a moral compass guiding CEO actions. This 
ranges from having the appropriate processes for decision making, engaging 
with stakeholders, and, as a statutory organisation, to be able to demonstrate 
effective governance. There is no command chain below PCTs, so progress 
depends on influence rather than authority, 
Compared to the literature based model of contextual intelligence, the findings 
show how PCT CEOs take strategic decisions, and how different contextual 
factors are taken into account depending on the presenting policy or strategic 
context, which also defines their decision making context. There is a hierarchy 
in contextual factors. While the contextual factors somewhat match the literature 
based model, the research reveals the irrelevance of macro level factors in PCT 
CEOs decision making in contrast to the corporate world where they are prime 
considerations. It also highlights the importance of stakeholders as a group, 
which is a new finding. Interest and pressure groups as well as the TMT appear 
to play negligible roles, in contrast to the corporate sector. The patterns of 
contextual factors and their influence in PCT CEO strategic decision makings 
confirm that PCT CEOs do take different things into account when taking 
different strategic decisions, resulting in a different contextual intelligence 
model.  
While this project reveals the rich and elaborate decision-making context of the 
PCT CEO it is based on what CEOs said they would take into account.  The 
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next step for the research will be to find out what these same CEOs actually 
took into account in these focal decisions. This is the focus of Project 3. 
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Appendix C 
Letter to PCT CEOs for participation 
Email letter to PCT CEOs confirming their participation in the research - 
sent following a telephone conversation about the research project. 
 
Date 
 
Dear  
I am ever so grateful to you for agreeing to participate in my research project.   
Background: I have been at the PCT for almost a year now. Before coming 
here, I was working towards a research degree on CEO and leadership, which I 
suspended after starting the job (which took over my life). I am now resuming 
my studies or at least trying to. There is no lessening in workload but I really 
should complete what I started and the university is threatening to kick me out if 
I don't progress. I should be most grateful for your help.  
The research is a qualitative study looking at how PCT CEOs make decisions 
and the range of contextual factors they take into account in making key 
strategic decisions. As a participant, you are asked to give two interviews, each 
lasting up to an hour and a half, two months apart, and to keep a diary log 
(using your electronic diary, no additional work involved).  I attach a 1.5 page 
briefing giving more information about participation in the project. The results 
should inform how the NHS could develop the quality of CEO decision making. I 
am the sole investigator, so will carry out the interviews and analysis myself, 
guided by my supervisor Dr Catherine Bailey. I will, of course, come to you and 
the interviews will take place in your office. 
On a related issue, it would be nice to meet up informally as colleagues. I would 
love to hear about and learn from your achievements and progress in your PCT. 
If you were interested in outsourcing/procurement or hearing about what it was 
like to go through the FESC process, I would be delighted to share our 
experience in the PCT. 
I will stop here. I will give you a call in the next few days to follow this up and to 
make arrangements for the first meeting. Many thanks. 
Yours 
Yi Mien 
office direct tel:  
mobile: 07956 115 773 
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Appendix D 
Participant Information Sheet 
Attachment 1 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Thank you very much for agreeing to help with my DBA research, which aims to 
explore the relationship between context and PCT CEO decision making. As part of the 
research design, I have developed this statement to provide you with further 
information about your participation in the project. 
 
1. Nature of the project 
This research is the second of three projects forming my DBA and has been 
designed to answer the research question: how does contextual intelligence 
influence NHS CEO decision making? Contextual intelligence (CI) is defined as 
paying attention to the information generated by the different contextual elements 
i.e. like spies get intelligence, and as a process within decision making rather than 
as a cognitive characteristic.  
The question arose from the first project which consists of a systematic literature 
review of how leadership differences impact on organisational performance; it 
found that some performance variation can be accounted for by non-leadership 
factors, one of which is context. A contextual intelligence model which attempts to 
describe the relationship and impact of context was developed from that work. This 
project will explore the dimensions of context with respect to PCT chief executives 
and their impact on CEO decision making by collecting primary data. 
2. Study design and method 
The research method consists of qualitative, semi-structured interviews which have 
been chosen to tease out the theoretical model and to elicit participant’s 
understanding of what you see as your decision making context, and the keeping of 
a diary to record significant events and insights. 
3. Project timetable 
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The project is expected to take six months. Data collection period will take place 
April-June 2008, followed by data analyses in July-August. I hope to write up the 
findings in August and submit the final report to the University in September.  
4. What is expected of you as a participant 
You are asked to give two interviews, each taking up to an hour and a half, in your 
office (or an alternative preferred location). The first interview will take place at the 
beginning of April, and the second, two months later, in early June. The format for 
both is that of semi-structured interviews, meaning that you, as all participants, 
would be asked a similar set of open questions that address the research question.  
You will be asked to provide basic personal background socio-demographic data to 
inform the data analysis based on a standard template. Standard information 
includes age and tenure (number of years as CEO), past experiences, functional 
background, significant development, and education levels. Alternatively you may 
wish to provide an up to date cv containing the information. 
You will also be asked to keep a diary log in the period between the two interviews 
of factors that have influenced your decision making with regards to HfL. A 
standard diary template will be provided for recording your insights. 
5. How the research procedures might affect you 
Participating in a research activity takes up time and effort which I truly appreciate. 
The benefit of taking part is that you will contribute to help colleagues and others 
understand what and how actions might be taken to improve strategic decision 
making by CEOs.    
You may feel uncomfortable sharing your insights, especially as the interviews will 
be taped, but I hope the assurance of confidentiality (below) will assuage this.  
Once I have completed the final report and it has been approved by the University, 
I am very willing to send you a copy if you wish.  
6. Assurance of confidentiality 
The interview is entirely private and confidential. Everything that you say will be non 
attributable. Although the interviews will be taped, it is purely for transcription 
purposes. The recording will be erased once data has been transcribed and if you 
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wish, I should be glad to send you a copy of the transcripts of our interviews.  This 
assurance is in line with the code of conduct for researchers of Cranfield University. 
7. Right to withdraw at any stage 
You have the right to withdraw your participation at any time. 
8. Approval of the Cranfield Research Ethics Committee (CREC) 
This project has been approved by the CREC as fully meeting the criteria for 
primary research. I will bring with me to our first meeting a copy of the letter of 
approval. 
Thank you very much for your help. 
Yi Mien  
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Appendix E 
Interview Protocol  
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in my research project designed to 
contribute to understanding how decision making context influences PCT CEO 
decision making. This project is the second part of a (three part) DBA research 
project which aims to identify whether contextual intelligence (CI) (defined in 
this study as paying attention to the information generated by the different 
contextual elements i.e. like spies get intelligence) has an impact on how CEOs 
make decisions. The first part consists of a systematic literature review on CI 
and CEO performance. CI is defined as a process within decision making rather 
than as a cognitive characteristic.  
You are one of the PCT CEOs in the region who have been invited to take part 
in the research. What I am asking you to do is to give two one hour interviews (I 
am making it an hour long for both interviews 1 and 2 to encourage sign-
up), two months apart, and to keep a diary in the intervening period. I will 
provide a diary template for recording data.  
 
I would like to ask you questions about how you make decisions with regard to 
implementing central policy. We understand that as PCT CEOs we often have 
to take many factors into account before arriving at a final position. Your 
answers will help me to understand the pattern of factors that you take into 
account.  All CEOs will be asked the same questions.  You will have the 
opportunity at the end of the research to see the results which we believe will be 
of value in understanding effective decision making in the NHS.  
 
I would like to ask you about what you take into account when you are making 
important strategic decisions. To enable comparison of the aspects of context 
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that PCT CEOs take into consideration when making decisions, I have chosen a 
common decision instigator, namely Regional Health Strategy.   
I will record your answers but assure you that that the interview will be recorded 
for data gathering purpose only and that data will be handled confidentially. No 
response will be attributed to any one individual or organisation. No one 
individual or organisation will be named and the data will be purely used for 
research purpose.  
 
Interview questions 
Question 1  
Please think about that aspect of your role where you are involved in arriving at 
a decision for the PCT which has strategic significance. (This could be a 
decision about direction, changes to provision; service levels, policy 
implementation etc). In such situations can you describe what or who you 
generally take account of in arriving at the right decision?  
(At the conclusion of the response – Are there any other factors that come into 
play? 
Question 2  
Can I ask you now about central DH policy implementation decisions? Can you 
describe what or who you generally seek to take account of in arriving at 
implementation decisions? 
(At the conclusion) – Anything else?  
Question 3 
 Can I ask you now about the current policy implementation decision around 
Regional Health Strategy. Let us first look at the “polyclinics” concept which has 
received a lot of attention.  
 So – in regard to the forming or taking decisions around polyclinics:- 
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 What do you expect to take into consideration  
 What needs to be done to inform the decision   
 How will you do so  
 Why have you selected those particular factors 
 Who do you expect to involve, in coming to a decision 
 Of those people you have identified, whose voices would you pay more 
notice to than others 
 What are you going to do to get these stakeholders’ commitment? 
 What do you plan to do to take forward the polyclinic agenda, if any 
Question 4 
Can I now ask you about the Centralisation agenda – the move to centralise 
specialist services in a small number of hospitals ……  
Repeat the questions as above. 
Question 5 
Can I ask you to maintain a diary about key activities and conversations in the 
decision making process on Regional Health Strategy for the next two months.   
This would really help the data collection to ensure we don’t miss out on 
significant influencers on your decision making process. I should be grateful if 
you could (please ask your secretary) to ensure that every activity (meeting, 
correspondence, internal or external) or conversations relating to RHS is 
entered into your electronic diary. When we have the second interview, we can 
then go through a print-out of the diary to check for completeness.  
Question 6 
I should also be grateful if you could complete this short questionnaire to 
provide purely factual information about your background to inform data 
analysis. 
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Appendix F 
 
Proforma (to be completed by CEOs after interview 1) 
 
Date of interview: ___ April 2008 
 
PCT : ____________________________________ 
 
CEO Name: ___________________________________ 
 
Sex: male/female 
 
Year of birth: _____________ 
 
CEO experience (total no of years, including previous CEO roles): ____ years  
 
Job title of the last post before appointed CEO (e.g. Director of Commissioning, 
Director of Finance etc): 
_____________________________________________ 
 
Management training and development (significant programmes/ courses 
attended) in last 10 years-
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Insights from significant experiences in last 10 years that has had an impact on 
how I approach strategic decision making now.  
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Other significant events that may have influenced your development: 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix G 
Ethics Approval Form 
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17 INTRODUCTION 
17.1 Statement of the issue 
PCT CEOs are responsible for taking strategic decisions that have not only 
short to medium term business implications but could have long term effects on 
the provision of healthcare for their local population. Research has shown that 
business leaders who are sensitive to context, what Sternberg (1988, p244) and 
Mayo and Nohria (2005) call “contextual intelligence”, are more likely to be 
associated with successful organisational outcomes. The aim of this study is to 
understand how contextual intelligence applies to PCT CEO strategic decision 
making in the NHS in practice. Project 3 is the second of a two part qualitative 
study to explore the decision making behaviours of PCT CEOs in terms of 
contextual factors they take into account in strategic decision making.   
17.2 Findings from Project 2 
The over-ridding research question for the executive doctorate is:  
What aspects of contextual intelligence are important for PCT CEO 
strategic decision making? 
 
To address this question, the research study is structured in two parts (Project 2 
and Project 3). The first part, Project 2, addresses questions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
(theory) out of a set of eight questions. Twenty four PCT CEOs within an 
English health region were interviewed about the contextual factors they take 
into account when taking strategic decisions in general, and specifically in 
relation to national policies, regional strategies and local plans. (The terms 
“policies”, “strategies” and “plans” are used interchangeably in this research.) 
The questions Project 2 addresses are as follows: 
1. How do PCT CEOs define their decision making contexts? 
2. Do certain contextual factors have greater influence than others in PCT 
CEO strategic decision making? 
3. How do the contextual factors identified by the CEOs match the literature 
based model? 
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4. Are there common patterns of contextual factors and influence across 
PCT CEOs in strategic decision making? 
5. Do PCT CEOs take different things into account when making different 
kinds of decisions (theory)? 
The results suggest that PCT CEOs define their strategic decision making 
contexts according to the following criteria:  Originator of the policy (who is the 
edict from?); goals (is it a “must do” and is there a target?); time (is it do-able 
within the timescale?); stakeholders (who needs to be involved?); resources (is 
it affordable?) and structures and processes (how will the decision be taken?). 
Compared to the literature based model, PCT CEOs do not take into account 
macro level factors when taking strategic decisions. Instead, they said they 
focused on a number of contextual factors within their organisation and in the 
local health economy.  The contextual factors that a majority of PCT CEOs said 
they took into account in different strategic decision types are as follows. 
a) For strategic decisions in general, organisational strategy, stakeholders, 
goals, and decision making, processes appear to be critical contextual 
factors that every PCT CEO said they routinely considered in any 
strategic decision making. 
b) As the performance expectations of national policies are usually set 
centrally, CEO strategic decision making takes notice of these. With 
national policies notably diktats and some regional policies, strategy 
comes second to structure due to the focus on implementation, which 
also takes account of stakeholders and time. 
c) National strategies without targets or performance monitoring 
mechanisms were not prioritised unless there was synergy or strategic fit 
with existing PCT plans. Then, they would be used to drive local plans. 
d) PCT CEOs said they treated regional strategies in the same way as 
national policies. The contextual factors identified by a majority of PCT 
CEOs in this regard were information and strategy internally and other 
significant organisations, relationships, and public engagement 
externally. 
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e) All PCT CEOs said they would take account of organisational strategy 
and environmental dynamism when taking strategic decisions about local 
plans. A majority of CEOs talked about engaging other significant 
organisations, decision making processes, stakeholders, goals and 
structure. 
Several patterns can be observed from the results with regards to contextual 
factors taken into account in PCT CEO strategic decision making. First, the 
higher up the command chain the directive comes from, the less strategic and 
more operational would be the policy, and therefore the less need for strategic 
decisions by CEOs. Second, the higher up the origin of the directive, the more 
likely it is to be accompanied by measurable targets, which also leaves less 
freedom for negotiation, hence the “just get on with it” attitude of CEOs when 
taking decisions on central diktats. Third, the more strategic the plan, the 
greater is the need to engage with and consult local stakeholders, and to take 
into account local factors. Conversely, there is no need to consult stakeholders 
on central diktats. Fourth, the more contentious the strategic decision, the 
greater is the need to be able to demonstrate governance and accountability, 
usually through formal decision making processes. Finally, the greater the 
anticipated resistance, the greater the need for formal decision making 
processes and structures. 
In summary, there appears to be a relationship between contextual factors, PCT 
CEO strategic decision making and the degrees of freedom they have in policy 
response.  In contrast to the literature based model, the contextual intelligence 
model as espoused by PCT CEOs shows fewer contextual factors being taken 
into account, and an absence of macro-level factors. The findings set the stage 
for Project 3 which aims to study the actual strategic decision making practices 
of PCT CEOs. 
17.3 Statement of scope and aims for Project 3 
Project 3 sets out to study the contextual factors that are actually taken into 
account by PCT CEOs in strategic decision making. The research has two 
aspects: 
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a) a retrospective analysis of actual decision making behaviours in relation 
to the three levels of strategic decisions previously explored in Project 2 
b) an analysis of a key strategic decision making event involving all PCT 
CEOs that took place during the study period 
A second-round of interviews was conducted with the same 24 CEOs based on 
their diaries covering a two month period. It seeks to answer questions 5, 6, 7 
and 8 from the original set of eight research questions. 
6. In practice, do PCT CEOs take different things into account when making 
different kinds of decisions?  
7. If they do, is it possible to explain how the common approaches came 
about?  
8. Are there any differences between what PCT CEOs say they do (theory) 
and what they actually do (practice)?  
9. What other factors play a part in CEO strategic decision making 
process? 
17.4 Making methodological choices 
The ontological position in Project 3 is interpretivism. As the purpose of the 
social enquiry is to understand how strategic decisions are taken by PCT CEOs 
in the NHS, multiple sources of evidence are used to obtain different 
perspectives and observations of reality as socially constructed (construct 
validity) and given meaning by the subjects. This choice of methodology does 
however limit the generalisability of the findings outside of the NHS (external 
validity).  
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18 METHODS 
18.1 Research strategy 
The main research strategy used in this project is abduction. As Project 3 seeks 
to examine CEO decisional behaviour with a view to understanding how 
contextual intelligence influences strategic decision making, an abductive 
enquiry will draw on the concepts and meanings used by the CEOs (as social 
actors) and the activities in which they engage. As Blaikie (2000) explains, 
interpretivism takes the meanings and interpretations, the motives and 
intentions (the author’s italics), which people use in their everyday lives, and 
which direct their behaviour.  
For interpretivism, the social world is the world perceived and experienced by its 
members, from the inside, and the task of the social scientist is to discover and 
describe this “insider” view. The interpretive approach therefore seeks to 
discover why people do what they do by uncovering the largely tacit, mutual 
knowledge, and symbolic meanings, intentions and rules that guide their actions 
(Blaikie, 2000). Blaikie describes mutual knowledge as the background 
knowledge that is largely unarticulated yet is constantly being used and 
modified by social actors as they interact with each other in cycles of production 
and reproduction in the course of their lives together. According to Blaikie 
(2000, p176), the abductive strategy has many layers to it which can be 
summarised as follows:  
 Everyday concepts and meanings 
provide the basis for 
social action/interaction 
about which 
Social actors can give accounts 
from which 
Social scientific descriptions can be made 
    from which  OR  and understood in terms of 
Social theories can be generated        Social theories or perspectives 
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In other words, it is the process of moving from lay descriptions of social life, to 
technical descriptions of that social life, that the notion of abduction is applied.  
18.2 Data sources, types and forms 
The study population consists of the same 24 CEOs who participated in Project 
2. Data sources are diaries and interviews with supplementary insights from 
participant observation. Data were collected personally by me, the author, from 
CEOs’ electronic work diaries and one to one interviews. When an opportunity 
arose during the data collection period to study a key strategic decision making 
event involving all of the PCT CEOs in the region, I was able to take advantage 
of my position as a peer to observe, firsthand, how the strategic decision was 
taken. Apart from simple frequency counts, the data were qualitative throughout 
all stages of the research. 
18.3 Data collection 
18.3.1 Diary based interviews 
In the first round of interviews (reported in Project 2), all 24 PCT CEOs agreed 
to keep an electronic diary for a period of two months - April to May 2008. The 
diary activities are taken to represent contextual factors the CEOs take account 
of in strategic decision making in relation to three different policy types – 
national, regional and local. National policies are requirements or guidance 
issued by the Department of Health (DH) or other national bodies that apply to 
the whole NHS. Regional strategies are issued by the Strategic Health Authority 
(SHA) for implementation within the region including sub-regional plans. Local 
plans are defined as those applying within the PCT or local authority 
boundaries. The second round of interviews took place in June to July 2008, 
mostly in individual CEO offices, although a few were held at venues chosen by 
the CEOs for convenience.  
At the start of each interview, I re-iterated the aim of the study which is to 
explore the range of contextual factors PCT CEOs take into account when 
responding to national policies, regional strategies or local plans. Paper copies 
of work diaries covering two months of activity, showing the duration (time in 
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hours) and title of each activity, were provided by the CEOs. I had explained 
that, after we have gone through the diary, I would like to return to the 14-15 
May, a key strategic decision making event where all of the PCT CEOs had 
attended, to hear of their experience of the two days. The diary analysis 
assumes that, by participating in an activity, it represents an opportunity for the 
CEO to take account of the contextual factor(s) surrounding the interaction.  
All interviews followed a standard format. Each CEO talked through their diary 
in chronological order, explaining each entry from the perspective of who was 
present at the activity, why it took place and what happened.  This was to 
enable me to understand what the CEO does in practice when taking strategic 
decisions and which factors play a part in their strategic decision making 
process. By themselves, the diary entries provide only a limited insight into why 
and with whom the CEOs had engaged in that activity. To obtain a more 
meaningful exposition of the activities, each diary entry was checked against 
the hand written notes taken at the time of the interview, as well as the interview 
transcripts. This corroboration of diary data with interview data improves data 
quality and provides further insights on the possible impact or influence of 
different contextual factors. 
As far as possible, data were collected on the following points: 
a) What was the activity i.e. meeting, telephone call, conference, social etc.  
b) Why (reason) the event took place, i.e. what was the activity for, and 
noting if the agenda fell under national, regional, local policies or plans, 
or internal organisational matters. This provides an indication of not only 
the amount of time the CEO dedicates to particular strategic decisions 
but also allows the contextual considerations around those events to be 
examined in more detail. 
c) Who was involved (who initiated the activity, who else was at the 
meeting, was the activity part of a formal structure or process). 
d) Why the CEO participated in the activity and what s/he hoped to achieve 
from that event. 
 300 
The interviews lasted between one and one and a half hours each. At the end 
of their accounts, the CEOs were asked to elaborate on their experience of the 
away day held on 14-15 May; at that point, I adopted a semi structured 
interview approach by asking a number of standard questions (see next 
section). At the end of each interview, I retained a paper copy of the electronic 
diary for subsequent analysis. Hand written notes were taken at each interview. 
All of the interviews were recorded and transcribed. The transcriptions were 
then verified against the hand written notes for accuracy. Both data sets were 
used to inform the coding of diary data, which were analysed using Microsoft 
Excel. 
18.3.2 An in depth exploration of a critical decision making event  
The 14-15 May was an important away day for PCT CEOs organised by the 
SHA. Lasting 24 hours (4pm to 4pm), the event, which took place in a city hotel, 
could be described as a “lock in”, as CEOs were asked to not communicate with 
work colleagues including their chairmen during this period that was spent in the 
company of SHA executives and management consultants. Unusually for such 
an important meeting, no agenda was sent in advance; instead a dossier, 
marked confidential, containing population and healthcare statistics for the 
region was couriered to each CEO’s office the evening before. On the day, the 
SHA CEO confirmed a desire to achieve consensus on the future configurations 
of PCTs in the region, an ambition long harboured by the SHA but had been 
resisted by PCTs.  
The study of the away day as a strategic decision making event was 
opportunistic as it involved all PCT CEOs participating in a common strategic 
decision making exercise during the data collection period. The SHA proposal 
presented a fundamental organisational strategic decision for individual PCTs. 
Legally, the SHA has no power to mandate PCTs to merge or reconfigure, as by 
statute, only PCT boards can take that decision. Because of the size and 
geography of the region, any decision to merge PCTs would require the majority 
to agree. The entire decision making episode from beginning to end took place 
over a defined period, during which its purpose and outcomes were sufficiently 
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clear to all observers to enable them to give an account of what happened. For 
these reasons, the event offered a unique insight into actual strategic decision 
making practice of PCT CEOs and the contextual factors at play on a common 
real time decision.   
To gather data on the away day event, I used a semi-structured interview style 
at the end of the diary-based interview and asked the following questions:    
a) what they thought happened at the event. 
b) whether their position (on PCT configurations) changed over the 
course of the two days, and the reasons. 
c) the event achieved a collective decision to pursue reconfigurations of 
the 31 PCTs into regional sub-sectors. From their experience, how 
they thought it happened. 
d) how they felt throughout the course of the event. 
The CEOs’ responses were recorded and transcribed in the same way as the 
diary based interviews. 
18.4 Data handling and analysis 
The process of data handling and analysis was carried out in two parts. 
18.4.1 Part 1: Analysis of diary data and interview transcripts 
Data from diaries, interview notes and transcripts were analysed in three 
sequential steps for every PCT CEO. For each diary entry: 
a) The first step was to appraise the reason(s) given for the activity and 
assigning that activity to one of the three decision making contexts 
below (this is to enable later comparison with Project 2): 
 national policies (national requirements including 
performance targets set by the DH or other national 
governmental bodies) 
 regional strategies (actions required by the SHA, including 
sub-regional plans or supra-PCT activities led by the SHA) 
 302 
 local plans (plans or strategies developed by individual PCT 
or the PCT in conjunction with its local partners within the 
borough).  
b) The next step involves allocating the contextual factors involved in the 
activity to contextual factors within the two sub categories - 
organisational internal and local (external) factors, from the 
literature based model from Project 1. Had new contextual factors 
emerged, they would have been coded separately with new 
categories.  
c) In the final step, a measure of time is allocated to each contextual 
factor, based on insights from diary data and interview transcripts. 
In order to maximise the insights from the diary-based interview data, activity 
data were coded by frequency (count) of the factor(s) involved and time spent 
(hours) on those factors. The three categories of policies, each with two sub-
categories of factors that are internal or external to the organisation, and their 
constituent contextual factors were plotted out on a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet. Each diary activity was entered onto the spreadsheet using the 
following protocol: 
 Count – for every diary activity, each identified contextual 
factor would be allocated one count. 
 Sum – time allocation (in units of 15 minutes/ 0.25 hour 
duration) was based on the my judgement of the time spent on 
that contextual factor from the CEO’s descriptions of the 
activity. A minimum time unit of 15 minutes was set as the 
quickest activity in all the diaries. The approach assumes that 
as PCT CEOs are busy people with high pressured jobs, 
duration of exposure to contextual factors can be regarded as 
those factors having commensurable influence on their 
strategic decision making behaviour. 
An example of how the coding rules operated: a two hour meeting with the SHA 
and other PCT CEOs on the regional health strategy (RHS) was coded under 
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the categories of “regional strategy” and “local factors” (as local refers to 
borough or supra-borough and smaller than a region) with quantitative time 
entries in the following cells: “other significant organisations” (1.0 hour), goals 
(0.5 hour) and decision making process (0.5 hour). This equates to three 
counts, one for each of the contextual factors listed, with the sum of the time 
allocated to each contextual factor adding up to two hours. Further details of the 
coding methods used are shown in Appendix H. 
18.4.2 Part 2: Analysis of strategic decision making event  
Narratives relating to the away day were extracted from all 24 interview 
transcripts and analysed using an interpretive approach. Using NViVo, relevant 
sections of the narratives were coded, with the codes representing concepts. 
Coding starts from a central theme of strategic decision making forming the 
core category. The core category is then linked to subcategories by means of 
relational concepts, such as the conditions in which the action took place, the 
strategies adopted for dealing with a phenomenon, and the outcome of the 
action. Through gaining access to multiple personal experience stories and 
accounts of the event, I built up a picture of the PCT CEOs’ strategic decision 
making context. Each CEO’s account of the event adds evidence to the central 
theme. From these, I was able to draw the concepts of strategic decision 
making context in the NHS setting to reveal the essential, recurring features of 
contextual intelligence in terms of PCT CEOs in the NHS. 
Research involving direct observation of the powerful in the field is rare due to 
problems with access, but I was accepted and trusted by peers who were willing 
to support my research. Being an insider, I was sensitive to the nuances 
expressed by PCT CEOs which, besides helping interviews go smoothly, also 
facilitated data interpretation and analysis. My complete immersion in the social 
setting enabled me to share the respondents’ experiences by not merely 
observing what was happening but also feeling it. The research therefore has 
features of participant observation. 
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18.5 Issues in qualitative research 
Qualitative research methods that enable me to get close to his or her subjects 
are known as ethnography. Ethnography is not a single method of collecting 
data; instead, it involves applying a range of approaches, the three main ones 
being observation, participation in the setting, and gathering reports from 
informants, to elucidate the subjective basis of people’s behaviour. In practice, 
the choice of techniques is largely governed by the type of “social” role to be 
adopted in the “field”.  According to Gill and Johnson (2002), such decisions are 
usually taken in the context of a researcher’s philosophical commitment to 
understanding the behaviour of subjects in their natural settings, through an 
inductive development of an empathetic understanding of those actors’ 
rationalities.   
The SHA-led meetings of PCT CEOs provided me with opportunities to directly 
observe while diary based interviews provided indirect observational data. The 
CEOs’ participation in the research itself meant that observations were overt, as 
the majority, the permanent CEOs, were aware that I was researching CEO 
strategic decision making.  No individual data were collected on non 
participants. The field roles I adopted have several advantages. The first is 
ecological validity. As I was already a member of their community, I was able to 
share the experiences of the CEOs, and could therefore check the truthfulness 
of their accounts. Second, being fully immersed in the culture of the NHS 
provided me with intimate knowledge of the CEOs’ frame of reference which 
was essential for deciphering their everyday behaviour (Adler and Adler, 1994). 
Third, my “insider” status allowed access to powerful people who are 
notoriously difficult to observe and participant observation provides a viable way 
of discovering what is actually happening. Fourth, the fact that the social 
phenomena are being studied in their natural contexts arguably reduces 
subjects’ reactivity to my presence and the data collection procedures. 
Nonetheless, there are limitations to using ethnographic research. First, there is 
always a concern in field work that the researcher “goes native” and the risk is 
compounded in this case by me being a native. Any potential bias can be 
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minimised by my being conscious of her own frame of reference, and 
intentionally taking a dispassionate view of events as a researcher (Gill and 
Johnson, 2002). Second, no matter how close the researcher is to her subjects 
and how overt the observation, collecting data is intrusive, and I need to be 
reflexive. Hammersley and Atkinson (1994) advise overcoming reactivity by my 
monitoring their effects and bringing them under control where possible. They 
also suggest collecting different kinds of data to allow comparisons. Third, 
covert observation can create ethical problems in relation to non participants not 
recognising my participant observer status. I therefore had to be careful on what 
and how I report on the behaviour of the non PCT CEOs in that situation.  
Fourth, indirect observation in the form of reports from informants, including 
data from the away day can be prone to misinterpretation and ethnocentricity. 
The semi structured interviews focusing on the CEOs’ experiences of the away 
day enable me to “get close to the subjects” (Bryman, 1989). Once assurances 
have been given of confidentiality and anonymity, the interviewee usually is able 
to recount his or her story. Although the accounts are retrospective, the fact that 
the event was a critical strategic decision making event means that the subjects 
usually have good recall. By collecting and analysing multiple CEO stories, I 
can look for commonalities in themes to increase generalisability. In this 
situation, I adopted an ethnographic approach although she did not interview 
herself. A further advantage of the approach is enabling me to relate context, 
strategy and outcomes, to look for repetition of patterns and thus to build up a 
picture of tactics for handling similar situations in the future (Chell, 2004). 
18.6 Expected outcomes and benefits 
The combination of methods has the potential to increase the reliability of the 
emerging theoretical concepts and reduce the effect of the particular limitations 
of each method. Potential findings from analysing data in the ways as described 
should one, produce a clearer understanding of the contextual factors PCT 
CEOs take into account when taking strategic decisions; two, show the 
differences between what CEOs say they do (theory) and what they actually do 
(practice) when they have to take important strategic decisions; and three, 
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enable the elucidation of a conceptual model of contextual intelligence in the 
PCT CEO context. 
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19 FINDINGS 
19.1 Results from diary and interview data 
This section presents the analyses of diary and interview data. It examines the 
local and organisational internal contextual factors that are considered to have 
influenced PCT CEOs strategic decision making across three policy scenarios.  
For each scenario, results are shown, first, by “counts”, which measures the 
frequency (number) of events CEOs had with the contextual factor over the two 
month data collection period, then  by “sum”, which measures the estimated 
total amount of time spent on that factor (in hourly units). A summary table of 
the average counts and time spent for the six scenarios is set out in Table 32. 
This shows significant differences between the time and frequency of attention 
paid to contextual factors across decision making scenarios. The following 
sections report the findings by counts and time in relation to each scenario. 
COUNTS (FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE) 
19.1.1 Local contextual factors and national policies 
Figure 31 shows the local contextual factors that CEOs took into account in 
dealing with national policies. Overall, PCT CEOs spent very little time on 
national policy matters, with average values for contextual factors hovering 
around zero. The findings are consistent with the pilot interviews conducted 
prior to the first round of interviews which showed CEOs delegating the 
implementation of national policies to their TMT and only get involved if 
performance is failing. Findings from Project 2 show national policies, especially 
the “must dos”, to be well defined, with measurable goals and underpinned by a 
national performance management regime - features that facilitate delegation 
and monitoring. The two factors that stand out by a small margin are other 
significant organisations and performance expectations, showing that CEOs get 
involved when necessary. Then, the CEOs’ efforts (which add up to an average 
of 5.38 encounters in the two month period) focused on interacting at the 
strategic level with organisations that play a major part in delivering the targets, 
or engaging with the SHA or in two cases, DH, on activities relating to  
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performance management. The results are not inconsistent with the CEOs’ 
accounts of notable contextual factors reported in Project 2. Project 2 did not 
find any first level or critical factors (defined as having been flagged up by >90% 
of CEOs), but identified performance expectations, stakeholders and time as 
second level or major factors (defined as having been flagged up by 50-90% of 
CEOs) and goals, relationships and stakeholders as the third level factors 
(defined as having been flagged up by 10-<50% of CEOs) in CEO decision 
making relating to national policies. 
Figure 31  Frequency of local contextual factors taken into account by PCT CEOs 
in relation to national policies 
 
 
19.1.2 Organisational internal factors and national policies 
Figure 32 shows the organisational internal factors that CEOs would take 
into account when implementing national policies 
PCT CEOs hardly engaged directly with their internal organisation on matters 
relating to national policies, with the majority of such activities taking place 
between 0-1 event, although four contextual factors show up to 2.5 events, over 
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the nine week period. One possible reason for this may be delegation of 
responsibility for implementation to TMT, as before. The contextual factors 
CEOs are marginally more exposed to are strategy, organisational learning, and 
operations, which make sense considering that the CEO role is strategic, 
although there will be occasions when they need to be concerned about 
operational matters. The reference to learning related specifically to an SHA 
sponsored organisational development programme as part of a particular 
national policy which several PCT TMTs, including the PCT CEOS, took part in. 
The findings here are similar to Project 2 which reported no first level 
organisational internal factors but two second level contextual factors, namely 
structure and strategy and two third level contextual factors in information and 
finance.  
Figure 32  Frequency of organisational internal factors taken into account by 
PCT CEOs in relation to national policies 
 
 
19.1.3 Local contextual factors and regional strategies 
Figure 33 below shows the local contextual factors that CEOs are most likely 
to engage with when implementing regional strategies 
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Figure 33  Frequency of local contextual factors taken into account by PCT CEOs 
in relation to regional strategies 
 
 
To get a sense of the relative importance of various contextual factors, the 
contextual factors can be divided into three main categories:  factors that lead to 
events taking place more than once a week, such as other significant 
organisations and decision making processes; factors that lead to events taking 
place once or twice a month – these being goals, stakeholders; environmental 
dynamism and performance expectations; and the remaining factors that are 
infrequent or never taken into account by CEOs. Over the two month data 
collection period, the majority of PCT CEOs took part in 30 events (average of 
three events per week) that involve other significant organisations, in almost all 
cases that was the SHA. Of these events, two thirds were about decision 
making processes. The next category consists of factors relating to strategic 
goals, engagement of stakeholders and environmental scanning in preparation 
for implementing the RHS. As performance expectations have to be met, the 
events take place about once a fortnight on these contextual areas. 
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The findings are again consistent with Project 2 in that there are no first level 
factors but there were five second level factors, namely, other significant 
organisations, public engagement, relationships, environmental dynamisms and 
service users; and three third level factors, namely politicians, decision making 
processes and stakeholders. Goals and performance expectations that were 
absent in Project 2 accounted for about around five events each in relation to 
regional strategies in Project 3. The reason why CEOs did not treat regional 
strategies in the same way as national policies is not clear but one explanation 
could be that the former rarely come with targets or sanctions for non delivery.  
19.1.4 Organisational internal factors and regional policies 
Figure 34 below shows the distribution of organisational internal factors 
CEOs personally engaged with in relation to regional policies. As with national 
policies, the CEOs interact directly with staff infrequently, with the average 
number of encounters per CEO ranging between 0 and under two events over 
the two month period. When the CEOs do engage with staff, the focus is on a 
mixture of operational issues, strategy development, engagement and 
dissemination of information. That can be for a number of reasons. First, it can 
be for the same reason as national policies, that is, the CEOs delegate 
implementation to the TMTs. Second, as is known from Project 2, the RHS at 
that stage was focusing on specialist hospital services; the proposed changes 
would have little impact on PCTs other than having to lead the public 
consultation exercise and getting PCT board endorsement. This may explain 
why the few activities there were are linked with: strategy, to demonstrate 
strategic coherence with local strategy; operations, to carry out the consultation; 
and engaging staff in implementing the strategic change. Structure was part of 
the decision making governance structure and information was used to support 
the change proposals. The findings are consistent with Project 2 findings in that 
information, strategy, structure and operations are the four contextual factors 
PCT CEOs mentioned in relation to regional strategies, although only the first 
three are second level factors and operations came up only once.  
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Figure 34  Frequency of organisational internal factors relevant to regional 
policies in CEO decision making 
 
 
19.1.5 Local contextual factors and local plans 
Figure 35 below shows the range of local contextual factors that CEOs 
engaged with most frequently in relation to local plans. On the basis of event 
frequency, there are four categories of contextual factors linked to local plans. 
Starting with the category with the highest frequency of interactions, the first 
category of contextual factors, which is associated with, on average, 1-2 events 
per week, is other significant organisations. There are three contextual factors 
in the second category, which are associated with, on average, 1-2 events per 
fortnight, namely relationships, stakeholders and decision making processes. 
The third category involves factors that are associated with, on average, 1-2 
events per month, these being goals, environmental dynamism and 
performance expectations. The remaining factors are associated with less than 
one event per month.  
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The pattern of events shows PCT CEOs to be, on average, engaged in up to 
two meetings per week with other significant organisations, the main ones being 
the SHA, local council’s Overview and Scrutiny Committees (OSC), and local 
acute trusts on RHS matters. Around half of the events were about planning for 
the formal decision making processes. The CEOs also attend on average 1-2 
events every fortnight, to build relationships with stakeholders. This may be due 
to the public consultation coinciding with Project 3 data collection period, during 
which the CEOs were asked by the SHA to engage with local stakeholders to 
gather support. The other events that took place 1-2 times a month related to 
goals in terms of strategic coherence between a top down strategy and local 
plans and, by their nature, may be linked to performance expectations.  
Figure 35  Frequency of local contextual factors taken into account by CEOs in 
strategic decision making on local plans 
 
As the RHS proposals would lead to the development of clinical networks in 
stroke and trauma across the region, issues about estates, facilities, population 
growth and health needs were all reviewed as part of environmental dynamism. 
The findings are again similar with those in Project 2 with the exception of time, 
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service users, politicians and public, which came up as third level factors in 
Project 2, but did not feature in the CEOs’ diaries in practice. It is not obvious 
why this is so, although a cynical explanation would be that the CEOs were 
paying lip service to wider stakeholder engagement activities but in practice 
focused their efforts only on other significant organisations.  
19.1.6 Organisational internal factors and local plans 
Figure 36 shows the organisational internal factors that PCT CEOs were 
most engaged in, in relation to local plans. 
Figure 36  Frequency of organisational internal factors taken into account by 
PCT CEOs in local plans 
 
 
Compared to previous figures, Figure 36 shows the widest range of results, I 
have categorised the contextual factors into five categories based on the 
frequency of CEO diary events: 
a) factors associated with greater than an average of two events each 
week, namely the TMT 
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b) factors associated with an average of 1-2 events per week – this  applies 
to structures and staff meetings;  
c) factors associated with an average of 1-2 events per fortnight – these 
being strategy, operations and a new factor of management consultants; 
d) factors associated with an average of 1-2 events per month – these 
being information, budgets and learning; 
e) the remainder are associated with fewer than one event per month.  
19.1.7 Travelling time (temporal) 
The diary data also showed some PCT CEOs spending a considerable amount 
of time travelling to and from meetings, averaging 10 hours in total for those 
who had accounted for travelling time in their diaries. Surprisingly, only a few 
CEOs had recorded travelling times. My own experience showed that it is at 
least two to three times for CEOs of PCTs located further away from the SHA. 
The same applies to administrative tasks like paperwork. 
19.1.8 Top Management Team (TMT) 
The findings reveal CEOs engaging frequently with their TMT (who are 
differentiated from staff in definition terms), averaging at least three events per 
week, which is substantially more than that reported from Project 2. It is not 
surprising to have structures recording the second highest count frequency, as 
decision making, governance and accountability structures are part of the 
structural landscape and account for up to two events every week. Coming third 
are staff related issues such as attending staff meetings and staff events and 
not for strategic planning purpose. It is to be expected that the CEOs would take 
part in events relating to strategy and operations at least once a week in relation 
to local plans, as the two contextual factors are relevant to strategy 
development and implementation. A new significant finding is the engagement 
of consultants (see Figure 38) 
While Project 2 identified five relevant contextual factors, namely strategy (the 
only critical first level factor), structure (second level or major factor) and 
finance, operations and staff (third level factors), the diary evidence shows PCT 
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CEOs to actually spend a substantial amount of their time with their TMTs, 
followed by, in descending order, structure and staff factors, strategy, 
operations, budgets, learning and information. It is in relation to local plans that 
the CEOs showed, for the first time, direct involvement in their internal 
organisation. Figure 37 shows that, as a group, the CEOs averaged just under 
30 events with their TMT over the two month period, although there is a three-
fold variation among CEOs. This may be due to a combination of how diary 
entries were recorded and CEO management practices. 
Figure 37  CEOs’ interactions (counts) with TMT over two months 
 
 
19.1.9 New factors 
The diary analysis also reveals a number of new contextual factors as shown 
in Figure 38, such as networking, meeting with social contacts and participating 
in personal development activities. A significant new factor is management 
consultants who came top with an average of five contacts over the data 
collection period. 
Figure 38  Frequency of other factors that could influence CEO strategic decision 
making not previously mentioned 
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SUMS AND AMOUNT OF TIME 
The following six paragraphs and charts relate to “sum” as in total number of 
hours spent on respective contextual factors by the CEOs. The results 
complement the quantitative “counts” data which measure time duration in 
contact hours as a proxy for intensity of influence.  
19.1.10 Local factors and national policies 
Figure 39 presents the local contextual factors that PCT CEOs spend the 
greatest amount of their time in relation to national policies. It shows that, with 
national policies, the local contextual factors that CEOs spend the greatest 
amount of their time are other significant organisations and performance 
expectations. These factors still only add up to, on average, three hours for 
other significant organisations and two hours for performance expectations over 
the two month period. This is consistent with the quantitative findings that PCT 
CEOs generally do not spend time on national policies if they can delegate to 
their TMTs.  
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Figure 39  Total number of contact hours (sum) across contextual factors on 
national policy 
 
 
Figure 40 below shows PCT CEOs spend very little time on organisational 
internal factors associated with national policies. This is most likely due to 
CEOs delegating operational matters to their TMT. On the few occasions when 
they did, the most frequently engaged organisational internal factors were 
strategy, operations, learning and staff, for reasons discussed earlier.  
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Figure 40  Total number of hours (sum) spent on organisational internal factors 
in relation to national policies 
 
19.1.11 Local contextual factors and regional strategies 
Figure 41 shows the local contextual factors that CEOs spend time on in 
relation to regional policies.  
Figure 41  Number of hours (sum) of local contextual factors in relation to strategic 
decisions on regional policies 
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It shows CEOs spending the greatest amount of their time on other significant 
organisations, with contact time averaging 31 hours over the nine week period, 
followed by 16.7 hours for decision making processes and 5.9 hours for 
relationships. The CEOs spend, on average, an hour per month on 
relationships, stakeholders, environmental dynamism and performance 
19.1.12 Organisational internal factors and regional policies 
Figure 42 shows the amount of time CEOs spent on organisational internal 
factors in relation to regional policies, which averaged between zero to under 
two hours during the nine week period. The high maximum values shown for 
operations are skewed by two CEOs with regional lead roles and who were 
spending relatively more time on internal operational matters linked directly to 
the regional projects. 
Figure 42  Total (sum) number of hours for organisational internal factors 
relating to strategic decisions on regional policies 
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19.1.13 Local contextual factors and local plans 
Figure 43 below shows the average total amount of time CEOs spend on each 
of the local contextual factors when taking strategic decisions on local 
strategies or plans 
Figure 43 Total number of hours (sum) PCT CEOs spent on local contextual 
factors in relation to taking strategic decisions on local plans 
 
 
Most local plans are on primary care developments linked to polyclinics. Of the 
local contextual factors, other significant organisations stand out, with the 
average CEO spending 13 hours in the two month period with local 
organisations such as the council, the local hospital and GP organisations as 
well as the SHA on the local plans alone. The spike was due to a small number 
of CEOs spending more time than usual with their councils, due to local 
operational arrangements or difficult local relationships, especially with the 
overview and scrutiny committee. The CEOs also spend, on average, six hours 
on decision making processes, five hours on relationship building and four 
hours on stakeholders. The rest of the time was spent on the other contextual 
factors, each, besides culture, lasting from half an hour to an hour on average. 
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This picture of how CEOs spend their time suggests that they believed their 
involvement to be helpful to those local factors, be it for monitoring purpose or 
to demonstrate visible leadership to the other contextual groups in the 
implementation of local strategies or plans. 
19.1.14 Organisational internal factors and local plans 
Figure 44 presents the amount of time (sum) the CEOs spend on organisational 
internal factors in relation to local strategies or plans. It shows that CEOs spent 
the greatest amount of their time on TMT (average of 36 hours) followed by 
structures (average of 19 hours) and staff (average of 13 hours), then strategy, 
operations, learning and budgets, which ranged between 2.3 and 4.5 hours on 
average. A substantial amount of time was spent on administration. The focus 
on structures and staff here and combined with findings in Figure 43 point 
towards the CEOs operating in a highly ordered environment with clear roles, 
processes and rules for engagement and taking decisions. 
Figure 44  Total number of hours (sum) by organisational internal factors on 
strategic decisions on local plans 
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19.1.15 TMTs 
Figure 45 shows, by PCT, the amount of time each CEO spent with TMTs. 
CEOs spent on average 36 hours (range 10-52 hours) with their TMTs over the 
data collection period, equating to four hours per week. (The CEO (no 6) who 
spent the least amount of time with their TMT was a very experienced CEO with 
an experienced deputy.) Yet TMT did not appear as a contextual factor in 
Project 2. This could be an oversight in Project 2 but the pattern is consistent 
across the majority of CEOs. Other reasons could be that the CEOs either did 
not appreciate their TMTs contribution as a significant contributing factor on 
their own or wanted to project a heroic leader image when they were 
interviewed. Whatever it is, TMTs clearly play a major and significant role in 
enabling CEOs to achieve their objectives. 
Figure 45  Histogram showing the amount of time (in hours) individual CEOs 
spent with their TMT during the 9 weeks data collection period 
 
CEOs (by PCT, n=24) 
 
19.1.16 Other factors not limited to strategic decision making 
Data analysis reveal a number of other factors, as shown in Figure 46, that 
were found in PCT CEOs’ diary activities The relevance and influence of the 
 324 
different factors to strategic decision making is unclear from the data, but 
consultants, mentor, conferences, coach, learning sets, and social contacts 
would provide external insights that could influence the world view of CEOs. Of 
the factors, the CEOs spent the greatest amount of time with management 
consultants, averaging six hours over the two month period. 
Figure 46  Average amount of time spent on new factors by CEOs 
 
 
19.2 Summary of findings 
Table 32 summarises the findings from Figure 31 to Figure 46 above, showing 
the actual values (based on averages) of both count (frequency of events) and 
sum (total number of hours) of all of the data from the 24 CEOs. Contextual 
factors displaying high or low counts also show similar proportions in terms of 
time duration spent by CEOs on those factors, reflecting the factors’ relative 
importance in strategic decision making. The results are colour coded to enable 
comparisons within as well as between categories. They can be summarised as 
follows: 
a) As a group, PCT CEOs behave in a similar way in how they deal with 
different types of strategic decisions. They are rarely involved in strategic 
decisions in relation to national policies as these are usually not 
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negotiable. On the occasions when they became involved in strategic 
decision making, and there were up to three events totalling 4.8 hours in 
the two month period, contextual factors that counted were other 
significant organisations and performance expectations. This is 
consistent with the uniform acceptance by CEOs that the best way to 
deal with national policies is to get on with it. Therefore national policies 
from the DH generally do not require strategic local decisions. From the 
CEOs’ accounts, they are most likely to delegate to TMTs for 
implementation. 
b) In contrast, the CEO diaries recorded far more activities in relation to 
regional strategies and policies, almost all of which focused on local 
contextual factors and with little involvement of the PCT itself. When 
dealing with regional policies, other significant organisations stands 
out both in terms of number of events as well as duration of events, 
indicating this to be a critical factor for regional decisions. It is also the 
most time consuming contextual factor across all scenarios. The 
most significant other organisation by far is the SHA. As regional 
strategies require collective agreement of not just PCTs but also 
stakeholders, it is not surprising that decision making processes takes 
up a substantial amount of CEO time, and is another critical factor. Other 
notable contextual factors are goals, relationships, stakeholders, 
environmental dynamism and performance expectations, all factors 
which are more outward facing and involve managing the dynamism of 
the environment [insert full stop] 
c) Activities relating to local strategies and plans occupy a substantial 
proportion of the PCT CEOs’ time. There are however notable 
differences between how CEOs deal with local versus regional plans, 
although there are also commonalities. One obvious contrast between 
the two is the extent to which CEOs are actively involved with their 
internal organisation. Of the organisational internal factors, structures 
and staff are the top two contextual factors both in terms of number of 
events and amount of time spent. They are followed by strategy and 
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operations which can be explained by the focus on operationalizing 
strategies and plans. Other regularly considered contextual factors 
include information, budgets and learning. Although other significant 
organisations emerges again as critical among the local factors, the 
cited organisations are different, with councils’ OSC, local hospitals 
and GP organisations playing major roles. It is also noted that 
individuals within those organisations, especially key post holders, local 
opinion formers and leaders, have their own influence, which might 
explain why relationships, stakeholders and decision making processes 
matter as they are about gaining support for decisions on local plans. As 
with regional strategies, goals, environmental dynamism and 
performance expectations were highlighted, although not to the same 
degree of importance, as relevant contextual factors. 
d) There are two other significant findings. The first relates to the roles 
played by the TMTs. From all accounts, all the CEOs hold routine 
meetings with their TMTs, both as a group as well as on a one to one 
basis. These executive team meetings are held at least either weekly or 
fortnightly to deal with both strategic and operational matters. In addition, 
one to one meetings are used, most commonly monthly but also on an 
ad hoc basis, to discuss functional issues. The findings show that, as a 
group, the TMTs have important responsibilities and the largest amount 
of contact time with the CEOs of any group. Their contributions to 
informing CEO contextual intelligence development are worth exploring, 
especially in the light of the upper echelons theory. The second finding is 
the emerging role of CEO adviser, a concept identified by Arendt et al. 
(2005) in the literature review. 
e) When the results of Project 3 are compared with those of Project 2, there 
are many similarities and consistencies in what was observed in practice 
versus what was espoused in theory. There are also notable differences. 
Where they are the same, Project 3 identifies different emphasis, 
nuances and magnitude or impact placed on different contextual factors, 
by how the CEOs deal with different types of strategic decisions.  On the 
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whole, with the exception of TMTs and consultant advisers, almost all of 
the contextual factors that emerged from Project 2 are found in Project 3.  
Because Project 3 is based on evidence, the data are more complete, 
therefore enabling new contextual factors to emerge.  
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Table 32 Summary of findings from diaries and interviews showing actual average values of counts and sum 
 
 National policy Regional 
strategy 
Local plans National policy Regional 
strategy 
Local plans 
Local Factors Counts Counts Counts Hours (minutes) Hours (minutes) Hours (minutes) 
goals 0.42 5.50 2.33 0.29 (10) 3.52 (211) 1.30 (78) 
relationships 0.96 7.79 8.13 0.86(52) 5.90 (354) 4.74 (284) 
stakeholders 0.75 4.83 6.04 0.59 (36) 3.33 (200) 3.91 (234) 
regulators 0.13 0.38 1.63 0.10(6) 0.30 (18) 1.36 (82) 
Service users 0.04 0.08 0.71 0.00 (0) 0.03 (2) 0.58 (35) 
Decision making  0.54 18.96 8.17 0.43 (26) 16.72 (1003) 5.91 (354) 
Pressure groups 0.08 0.46 1.54 0.06 (4) 0.30 (18) 0.96 (58) 
Public 0.00 0.71 1.17 0.00 (0) 0.64 (38) 0.82 (49) 
Politicians 0.21 0.33 1.46 0.27 (16) 0.24 (14) 1.25 (75) 
Resources 0.21 1.08 0.92 0.04 (3) 0.75 (45) 0.71 (43) 
Other sig orgn’s 3.25 29.71 17.04 3.23 (194) 31.11 (1867) 12.86 (772) 
Env.dynamism 0.25 5.58 2.46 0.20 (12) 4.05 (243) 1.51 (91) 
Performance 2.13 5.04 3.25 1.55 (93) 3.63 (218) 1.89 (113) 
Industry culture 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 (3) 0.00 (0) 0.02 (1) 
time 0.00 0.13 0.17 0.00 (0) 0.14 (8) 0.56 (34) 
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Internal factors       
Strategy 0.46 1.58 4.88 0.35 (21) 1.19 (72) 4.48 (269) 
Operations 0.29 1.58 5.92 0.26 (16) 1.88 (113) 4.40 (264) 
Structure 0.08 0.96 15.29 0.06 (4) 0.94 (56) 19.19 (1151) 
Information 0.08 0.67 2.08 0.06 (4) 0.40 (24) 1.41 (84) 
Relationships 0.21 0.29 1.33 0.08 (5) 0.10 (6) 0.90 (54) 
Staff 0.04 1.04 10.67 0.18 (11) 0.95 (57) 13.17 (790) 
Culture 0.00 0.08 0.21 0.02(1) 0.02 (1) 0.48 (29) 
Budgets 0.38 0.13 3.50 0.00 (0) 0.04 (3) 2.29 (138) 
learning 0.38 0.42 2.88 0.21 (13) 0.41 (24) 3.40 (32) 
Systems 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.06 (4) 0.04 (3) 0.00 (0) 
size 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 
TMT   28.83   35.9 (2154) 
Consultants   5.29   5.78 (347) 
 
Key for values 
Numbers calculated based of data collection period covering 9 weeks.  
 
Counts = average number of events  
 
>18.0 = more than 2 events per week 
Sums = average number of hours (in minutes)  
 
 >18.0 = averaged 2 or more hours per week 
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 >18.0 but >9.0 = 1-2 events per week 
 
< 9.0 but >4.5 = 1-2 events a fortnight  
 
 <4.5 but >2.0 = 1-2 events a month 
  
< 2.0 = less than 1 event a month 
 
 
< 18.0 and > 9.0 = averaged 1-2 hours a week 
 
< 9.0 and > 4.5 = averaged 1-2 hours a fortnight 
 
< 4.5 and > 2.0 = averaged 1-2 hours a month 
 
<2.0 = less than an hour per month 
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19.3 Strategic decision making at the away day 
During the data collection period, an opportunity arose to explore in depth a 
critical strategic decision making event involving all of the PCT CEOs in the 
region. The event consists of an away day organised by the SHA that provided 
an opportunity to gather insights about how PCT CEOs conceive of their 
strategic decision making contexts. The concepts and edited quotes relating to 
the away day were abstracted from the interview transcripts (with key concepts 
and key words in bold) with additional observations from me as a participant 
observer 
19.3.1  CEOs’ experiences of the away day 
Two relevant activities took place in the week leading up to the away day. The 
first consists of the couriering of a folder to CEOs the evening before the away 
day. Marked confidential and not for circulation, “A Case for Change” (folder 
title) contained a data pack that had been prepared by a management 
consultancy firm for the SHA. The second relates to information about how the 
event would be organised. Other than joining instructions, neither information 
nor agenda was issued despite repeated requests from the CEOs. Combined, 
the two events created an air of unease with the CEOs trying to second guess 
the aim of the event and feeling, in some cases, nervous with the mixed 
messages. 
When that original case for change came out ..... it made me cross all night and 
then sick. So the weekend of that 10th, 11th of May was miserable. I had a 
headache most of the time because I was worried.  
CEO 13 
The information sent out prior to the event ….. were selectively drawn together 
….. painted a picture of failure across (the region). Therefore, it clearly wasn’t 
going to be an event around staying as we were ….. the whole thing was 
primed around some sort of change.  
CEO 15 
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I picked up messages that we were not looking at structural changes ….. 
(instead) how could we work more collaboratively and more smartly across (the 
region). So that was the mindset that I took into the fourteenth and the fifteenth. 
CEO 5  
All the messages that I got from previous meetings with the SHA was that they 
were looking for PCTs to improve their performance.  
CEO 1  
The unusual environment of being closeted in an unfamiliar city hotel with 
peers, SHA executives and management consultants (around 50 people in all) 
for 24 hours was a stressful experience for many CEOs.  
The meeting was an alienating experience …..  the set up, the environment 
…..  psychologically we were …..  trying to converge into a southern position.  
CEO 21  
And then because we were all together, had been hot housed as we had ….. 
risk of turning into an evangelical meeting…… need pause and take stock in 
lesser brawl atmosphere. 
CEO 6 
Key influencers that helped that change or made that change, I think were the 
interaction and the place.  
CEO 2 
Several CEOs alluded to the event’s design as being a major factor in 
achieving its purpose. Many acknowledged being taken down a path by the set 
up. 
The methodology worked …..we got into it. I thought, actually, I have been 
locked in and made to focus on the issue. We reached an agreement in a day 
quite quickly.  
CEO 13  
I’m sure the whole process was a set up –we didn’t really put the options on the 
table and properly evaluate them.  
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CEO 21 
They didn’t ask the right questions …..  
CEO 5 
A number of CEOs used the word “hysteria” to describe the mood at the end of 
the second day that led to the consensus for PCTs to work in sectors. Cohen 
(1972) describes hysteria as “a state of mind of unmanageable emotional 
excesses, like a response to moral panic”. It is unclear if the majority of CEOs 
felt the pressure but some of the quotes clearly show a sense of surprise, albeit 
in hindsight.  
It was almost like some hysteria had got through and the whole thing had been 
planned …..whole thing was done to actually make people react like that in end. 
CEO 17 
Everybody ….. and nearly every other part of the southwest was talking about 
merger, merger ….. it was like, where did this come from….. (EA) I was 
flabbergasted at the merger – the merger fury that ran around the room at the 
end of the day, I didn’t want that. 
CEO 16 
It was okay …... until ..... at the end, it started to emerge that some of our 
colleagues were feeling that the pressure, the direction, required PCT mergers. 
At that point I began to wonder whether everybody had taken leave of their 
senses. At the end of Thursday, when there was a mass rush of the lemmings 
….. suicidal, to say...come on...I mean They're insane. ….. people were leaping 
to a conclusion ….. nobody really understood what the challenges were.  
CEO 7 
As no agenda was issued prior to the meeting, the CEOs interpreted what the 
agenda might be and prepared accordingly. 
I went into the meeting thinking…..that PCT mergers were off the agenda, it 
wasn’t politically acceptable.  
CEO 14 
 334 
The plenary seemed to bear no relationship to some of the other things ….. the 
SHA ….. had a fixed position ….. didn’t want to hear about difference.  
CEO 24  
The reason why I thought that was the real agenda ….. the whole thing was 
primed around some sort of change.  
CEO 15 
19.3.2 Rationale given for decision to form sectors  
The majority of PCT CEOs were able to explain how they arrived at their 
decision to merge to form supra PCTs, or sector PCTs. They include CEOs who 
had changed their minds during the event. 
As we went through the day, it really began to seem to me that anything else 
other than that would only feel like partial solutions anyway…… to try and do 
everything just to 31 boards was such a waste of time…… It was based on 
logic and there was a sort of emotional thing ….. merger seemed like sensible.  
CEO 20 
Over the day, interestingly when we had our breakout ….. two things did 
change for me. I had believed very strongly and still do believe that you can be 
a world class commissioner and run services ….. It is probably the critical mass 
issue.  
CEO 8   
The work we’ve done at the sector with (the consultants)  already had led me to 
the view that there were gaps …… I then had a view across the sector and 
thought, well if that’s true across (the city)…..  you need to do something. ….. I 
got a much clearer view that everybody needed to move at a similar pace. At 
the time, merger felt like the right answer …..that surprised me ….. I thought it 
was not acceptable.  
CEO 24 
It seemed to me inconceivable that we could progress (regional health strategy) 
without formalized collaborative endeavour as PCTs. I strongly held that view 
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when I went in. Most of what I heard reinforced that view that I had. I didn’t 
particularly change the view by the time I finished the day.  
CEO 3 
My view was always going to be if we’re going to move, we have to move by 
stealth. You can’t do radical or formal mergers upfront. So you have to leave 
formal merger to the end. Well, that has always been my position.  
CEO 13 
They drew on past experiences in forming their decisions. 
Because I had been through “Commissioning a patient led NHS” in another 
SHA …..a very gut reaction was that I can’t do this again. Actually that made 
me quite concerned about going to that event, but also I had seen that 
happened here.  
CEO 18 
I could see, from bitter experience, what the characteristics would be of really 
good collaborative working. And that (change) is not going to work.  
CEO 22  
My experience of actually having worked in those sorts of arrangements …..  
you’ve got external pressure.  
CEO 15  
They were aware of the personal implications of any strategic decision, in the 
sense of what the change would mean for them. 
I came away feeling very, very miserable; profoundly depressed really. And I 
thought ….. I am definitely in the wrong job with the wrong people. What am I 
doing here?  
CEO 21 
I knew that, immediately…..to centralize ….. my responsibilities as an 
accountable officer…..came into question. On that basis I was quite happy ..... 
to stay local but with no major budgetary responsibility ….. if that was the kind 
of decision or choice …..but I kind of felt that one had to go with the other.  
 336 
CEO 10 
I’ve been at the PCT for quite a long time, so it creates an opportunity to do 
something different on a purely personal level ….. it wasn’t going to be a major 
problem for me on a personal level. So, I was very open to some options.  
CEO 15 
19.3.3 What actually happened  
In the two days, the PCT CEOs were presented with further quantitative 
evidence, much of which was complex, and all drawing attention to weaknesses 
in the current organisational set up. There were large amounts of information for 
the CEOs to take in. As the CEOs were not allowed to discuss with colleagues, 
this could have adversely affected their sense making and therefore ability to 
take balanced decisions.   
The details of the case, then the change, presented ….. felt very blaming on 
one level.  
CEO 18  
A lot of time was spent on the case for change ….. to persuade there was a 
case of change. ….. no opportunity to discuss or debate a case of not changing, 
and the risks ….. only looking at a case with change as being a positive thing, 
not looking at the other side which is actually the way we set around 
organisational change.  
CEO 23 
You couldn’t argue with the facts and figures ….. from the interpretation of 
some of them. Some of the data was quite old as well as not relating to the 
current year.  
CEO 5 
A number of CEOs felt that they were set up by the SHA towards the eventual 
decision by the way the event was organised. One CEO (MC) claims to have 
foreseen the event as a psychological manipulation based on his past 
experience. The format of workshops, rotating stations, and concentrated 
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working into the night, created an atmosphere of urgency and pressure. While it 
was tiring, the CEOs appeared to be excited and energised by the experience. 
They are normally used to me talking. “Why are you so quiet, M?” ….. I said, 
“We are about to embark on the process of mass hypnosis that results in mass 
hysteria.” The process was designed to get everybody to say, “Yes, I will do 
this!” My colleagues could not see it. ….There was a process that was fumbling 
the sheep into decision making mode. They all went into the room where that 
was agreed at the end.  
CEO 1  
Some really good observations about the psychology of the whole event…..how 
chief executives were all voting for merger and everybody was quite gung ho, it 
was almost like some hysteria had got through. ….. They have done quite a lot 
of work ….. directing in the background ….. materials were focused …..to lead 
you to certain conclusions.  
CEO 17 
It was clearly crafted….. particularly the afternoon of the fourteenth and early 
evening, we all went round, looked at the various stations, then went and had 
dinner, then came back and did more. I felt that there was an underlying 
agenda and we were being led.  
CEO 5 
Key influencers that helped that change or made that change ….. were the 
interactions.  
CEO 2 
It was like a revival meeting…..  
CEO 21 
A number of CEOs described being locked-in as they were isolated from 
familiar territories against which they could sense check their evolving thinking. 
As the deadline loomed (the event was due to end at 4pm), the pressure to 
deliver gathered momentum, and what followed was a rapid escalation to get on 
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with the change, which, less than 24 hours ago, people were sceptical about, if 
not hostile.   
I have been locked in and made to focus on the issue. We reached an 
agreement in a day quite quickly.  
CEO 13 
The process helped ….. all the bad momentum gathered during the day. …..if 
we’ve done the same process, you know, in series of meetings, we would not 
got the same energy.  
CEO 21 
I was quite worried about where the lock in was taking us. It felt to me we were 
doing fine till about two o’clock on the final afternoon at which point the whole 
afternoon, the whole thing just seemed to run away in the blink of an eye.  
CEO 20 
The only way I can describe to you, sort of swept away ….. also the enthusiasm 
that seemed to be generated for structural change.  
CEO 5 
While no one was claiming to have been forced to support the decision for PCT 
mergers (which was subsequently reported as the decision of PCTs), 
descriptions of the away day experience reveal the covert coercion felt by the 
CEOs.  
When you’ve got external pressure coming right (at you) about the change ….. 
that is just about the bullet …..I say, okay, you want to change that, I actually 
agree with you.  
CEO 15 
 I wasn’t persuaded by the arguments, but I was persuaded that they meant 
business.  
CEO 8  
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I don’t think that we had a single discussion in the whole of that day and half 
that wasn’t minded. With hindsight, I think that last sector discussion, we were 
blocked in a difficult corner and we had some very strong steer. It was very 
difficult, very difficult.  
CEO 10 
(The SHA) is pushing us to reconfigure. But I don’t think (SHA CEO) is a 
manipulator at all. I would be quite shocked (if he were).  
CEO 16 
That last comment is interesting, as are others below, as they display a 
resistance among PCT CEOs to regard or speak of the SHA CEO in anything 
other than positive terms. He was treated as the sense giver and source of 
wisdom, at least overtly, although some CEOs qualified their comments. The 
responses could be due to the fact that the CEOs were being interviewed by a 
peer and were therefore careful to not make openly adverse comments 
although the responses were consistent across several CEOs. It is worth noting 
here that similar observations were made in Project 2. 
(SHA CEO)’s view was clear that the structural arrangements in place were 
partly contributing to the lack of performance across (the region).  
CEO 1   
We just got to the view about merger ….. (SHA CEO) suggesting that it might 
be possible. I’m not sure he had seen through or tested it ….. It was possible 
that he looked upwards, that none of us brought to the party thought it was 
possible as we looked downward and outward.  
CEO 24 
I don’t know whether (SHA CEO) did this deliberately, but throughout the day, I 
thought you could distinguish his line from the management consultants’ line. 
They were not the same line. Now, I don’t know whether (SHA CEO) had done 
that as a kind of having the provocation in the room or whether he didn’t quite 
agree with everything they were saying.  
CEO 14  
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I felt more – a bit more reassured when I heard (SHA CEO) speak, because I 
thought he had a broader view.  
CEO 18 
19.3.4 Rules and structures governing CEO decisional behaviours 
The quotes below (and others elsewhere in the report) give some crucial 
insights into strategic decision making in the NHS.  
There are so many things ….. that don’t require any change in structure. They 
just require …..to stop going to all these bloody meetings….. about structural 
change in the NHS. 
CEO 13 
The statement from IS relates to rules regulating individual behaviour. With PCT 
CEOs, the fact that meetings were led by the SHA and attendances were 
monitored meant they were in effect compulsory. I have seen a register being 
taken at the monthly PCT CEO meetings where absences were noted and 
remarked upon by the SHA CEO, thereby reinforcing the norms. The norms 
also guide behaviours in these meetings whereby open challenges to SHA 
executives are considered to be career limiting. 
I recognised it the minute (SHA CEO) said, you can’t recruit a new post at 
director level….. we are talking structural change. This is where we are at the 
ball game really.   
CEO 11 
The quote from TB relates to rules regulating organisational behaviour. Rules in 
the form of processes enable the SHA to retain control. In TM’s case, due to the 
steps in the recruitment process (from approving job descriptions and salaries 
to being on the interview panel) requiring SHA approval, they function as a form 
of control mechanism.  
Well we have got no headroom with our management costs, got to afford that in 
the first place.  
CEO 20 
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RI was referring to rules in the form of policies, in this case setting a limit on 
management costs expenditure, which constrains what the PCT can do.  
It is just artificial, the NHS’s determination to have their own relationship, which 
doesn’t bear any relationship to anything.  
CEO 21 
The statement from SO reveals the socially constructed world of the NHS, in 
which rules and structures, although man-made, are real. These rules and 
structures, observable or not, were created by figures in authority using power 
given to them through the NHS accountability framework (another set of rules) 
and exercised in the form of hierarchical relationships. 
19.3.5 How PCT CEOs felt throughout the event 
The away day was an emotional experience for the CEOs, who reported mostly 
negative feelings (misled, angry, depressed, disbelief, confused are some of the 
descriptions used). These emotions could have affected their ability to take 
rational decisions. 
I went into it thinking that mergers were off the agenda, because that’s what 
(SHA CEO) had said and that’s what I told everyone…… I didn’t really take it 
seriously. Afterwards I felt a bit stupid ….. (as would) any person who went in 
there believing what they had been told.  
CEO 21  
I left that evening feeling very...utterly and completely furious ..... and in despair 
with my colleagues.  
CEO 7 
As I sat in that meeting and just listened ….. we should merge and just walked 
away. I went home that night feeling really quite depressed.  
CEO 10 
I was very surprised at how quickly people jumped to the conclusion that there 
needed to be structural change. I was very taken aback by that actually. 
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CEO 2 
 
There are several references in the CEOs’ accounts expressing their concerns 
with the need to balance meeting the SHA’s goal against what they believed to 
be best for their organisation.  
I find it was quite confusing and it did not enable me to have a clear thought.   
CEO 16  
Everybody got very enthusiastic ….. I am still not sure whether that was (SHA 
CEO)’s agenda all along …… I try not to think that (SHA CEO) had taken us 
through a process.  
CEO 5 
I came out thinking how can I carry enough people? I was thinking, we have 
seen some improvement ….. and why are we throwing this away so soon? Give 
us a chance to prove. Well we have got no headroom with our management 
costs, got to afford that in the first place…... We’ve all got pressures of some 
kind. I think we are in a very dangerous place.  
CEO 20 
The CEOs tried to make sense of the context of what was happening. 
There is a real risk that we have set about the structure and lost sight of what it 
is we’re really trying to do. It was a very strong sense of wanting to hold on to 
the critical things.  
CEO 5 
I went in thinking ….. this is the opportunity to sense how hard (the SHA) is 
going to push on this. If they are going to push hard, what will I give and what 
won’t I give. And merger wasn’t, as far as I was concerned, something we were 
prepared to give.  
CEO 8 
Pragmatically, I thought that if (the SHA) really did mean business, we weren’t 
just going to be able to tweak things.  
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CEO 21 
The big question in my mind ….. was whether the political climate was right. 
(SHA CEO) had, I felt, skirted around that issue ….. Given the political climate – 
one, the position of the government, and secondly we just had seen the local 
government election had seen some significant labour loss to conservative in 
some councils. So my reading of that political situation was that structural 
change is just not going to be possible.  
CEO 5 
A number of CEOs found themselves in a dilemma of having to respond to two 
conflicting messages - one from the SHA about PCT merger and the other from 
their personal uncertainty about the benefits of such a restructure to their 
organisation. 
I came out thinking, how can I carry enough people? We have seen some 
improvement ….. why are we throwing this away so soon? Give us a chance to 
prove. Well we have got no headroom with our management costs, got to afford 
that in the first place ……  We have all got pressures of some kind. I think we 
are in a very dangerous place.  
CEO 20 
I wasn’t persuaded by the arguments there, but I was persuaded that they 
meant business. That is, (the SHA). And therefore doing nothing was not going 
to be an option. It wasn’t something that was going to go away.  
CEO 8 
Given that this seems to be inevitably where we would be going, I could dig my 
heels and resist that push for making some change ….. probably wouldn’t do 
my organisation any good. 
CEO 15 
19.3.6 Post event reflections 
Of the reflections from CEOs, the most frequently expressed are that of anxiety 
and regret at what they had done in terms of the decision taken, the 
consequences for them personally and for their organisations. They were also 
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concerned about how they were going to get the decision through their boards, 
and the possibility of undoing the decision.  
I came out of that feeling anxious. I always feel anxious at the end of those 
because I was thinking, it is very easy isn’t it, when you lock yourself right 
through a day, to get sort of gung ho and then you go back to the ranch and 
reality bites.  
CEO 6 
On reflection now I disagree with that as a way forward.  
CEO 17 
As I went home, I met a lot of people who were outside and they were all 
thinking, like, well, what happened to my job now?  
So, it’s quite interesting. I was on my phone to my chairman ….. to tell him that 
it is all ….. back to the sector. ….. I can’t help thinking that we had landed in the 
place that (SHA CEO) wanted us to land. It looks like he didn’t, but I know.  
CEO 21 
Had quite a lot of discussion with the chairman about what was his view, what 
was my view, boards’ view likely to be ….. I guess at that point it changed again 
…..There was a point probably early in the following week when it became clear 
there was still quite a lot to play out particularly once the chairs began to get 
involved. 
CEO 10 
As a participant observer, I was able to verify the accounts given are accurate 
descriptions of what happened at the away day 
19.3.7 Summary of findings 
The away day provided an extraordinary opportunity to study the strategic 
decision making behaviour of PCT CEOs, as the event shows how NHS 
management structures operate in a covert decision making context.  The key 
findings are summarised below. 
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1. The design of the event hindered proper decision making preparation 
by the CEOs. Information was used selectively to set the scene, and 
an isolated unfamiliar environment interrupted the CEOs’ normal 
sense making behaviour.  
2. The CEOs found themselves in a situation where they were observed 
constantly and prevented from discussing the evidence. This could 
have affected their sense making process, although it enabled the 
SHA CEO to be the sense giver.  
3. Over the two days, tacit rules and structures regulating individual 
behaviours reinforced the social pecking order of all the participants 
leading to the CEOs’ eventual collective agreement to support 
formation of sectors.  
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20 FINDINGS 
20.1 Relating contextual factors to policy scenarios  
The combination of diary and interview data show PCT CEOs taking account of 
fewer contextual factors in practice than they had espoused in Project 2. 
Comparing like with like across the three different strategic decision making 
contexts of national, regional and local strategies, the trends from both Project 2 
and Project 3 show the number of contextual factors taken into account by 
CEOs increasing as local autonomy in decision making increases. PCT CEOs 
are most likely to engage in local and organisational internal contextual 
activities if taking strategic decisions on local plans. In contrast, no contextual 
factor was taken into account routinely by CEOs when responding to national 
policies although performance expectations and other significant organisations 
matter when there are performance issues. Strategic decisions are rarely 
needed for national policies as national specifications mean PCT CEOs are 
bounded in their decision making. Regional policies fall somewhat in between 
the two. The summary results across the three decision scenarios are shown in 
Figure 47 to Figure 49, with contextual factors shown in colours reflecting their 
relative importance to contextual intelligence of PCT CEOs. 
20.1.1 Contextual factors and national policies 
Figure 47  shows the contextual factors relevant to PCT CEO strategic decision 
making on national policies. It shows CEOs spending very little time on national 
policy matters but they would do if there were performance issues. Then, the 
focus would be on meeting the performance expectations and engaging other 
significant organisations, this being the SHA, which is responsible for PCT 
performance management, and the other organisations whose cooperation is 
required for achieving the target. This finding contrasts with the findings from 
Project 2 which, although also showing performance expectations as a critical 
factor, followed by other significant organisations, the majority of CEOs 
indicated valuing stakeholders, information management, time and 
organisational strategy. 
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Figure 47  Contextual intelligence of PCT CEOs on strategic decision making on 
national policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20.1.2 Contextual factors and regional strategies 
Figure 48 shows the contextual factors relevant in PCT CEO strategic decision 
making on regional strategies. It is not surprising that “other significant 
organisations” is a critical factor, with 90% of the time and contact frequency 
being spent with the SHA. The next most important contextual factor is decision 
making processes, which can be explained by the need to demonstrate 
governance in strategic decision making as well as to engage stakeholders. The 
third group of contextual factors are in relation to local goals, gaining local 
stakeholders support and fit with existing environmental factors. 
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Figure 48 Contextual intelligence of PCT CEOs on strategic decision making on 
regional strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When the findings here are compared to that in Project 2, the most significant 
difference is the marginal presence of the SHA among the espoused views; 
only two CEOs had mentioned the SHA in Project 2, yet it was a critical factor in 
Project 3. The opposite was seen in public engagement and service users, 
which the majority of CEOs espoused taking account of in Project 2 but did not 
actually spend any time on the two activities in practice. Decision making 
process came out as a more important factor in practice than in theory. Finally, 
a majority of CEOs espoused valuing information and strategy, but in practice 
did not take the two factors into account, nor any other organisational internal 
factors. The discrepancies in the contextual intelligence models between the 
two projects would suggest that where regional strategies are concerned, the 
SHA plays a central role in influencing how PCT CEOs approach strategic 
decision making, more indirectly than directly. 
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20.1.3 Contextual factors and local plans 
Figure 49 shows the contextual factors PCT CEOs take account of when taking 
strategic decisions on local plans. The diagram shows that many more 
contextual factors were taken into account in local plans compared to national 
and regional policies.  
Figure 49  Contextual intelligence of PCT CEOs on strategic decision making on 
local plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is not surprising that TMTs came top as a critical factor as they would usually 
be asked to implement these plans. The other important contextual factors are 
structures for governance and implementation, and staff engagement. In the 
context of local plans, other significant organisations usually means the local 
statutory organisations, namely the council, the local hospital trust and GP 
organisations which would usually play significant roles in local NHS plans. As 
would be expected with strategic plans, in practice, the CEOs also spent time 
on strategy and operations (to operationalise the strategy) while engaging local 
stakeholders in the decision making processes.  
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Interestingly for local plans, the findings in Project 3 differ somewhat from 
Project 2 but not to the same extent as for national and regional plans. In 
Project 2, over 90% of the CEOs had identified other significant organisations, 
environmental dynamism and organisational strategy as critical contextual 
factors but in practice, the impacts of these factors on strategic decision making 
appear to be variable. A majority of PCT CEOs said in Project 2 they would take 
account of local goals, decision making processes, stakeholders and structures. 
No one mentioned TMT members. Yet, TMT came out as a critical contextual 
factor for all CEOs, with every CEO spending substantial amount of their time 
with their TMT. The rest of the factors show variable degree of differences, 
which may be simply reflect the differential situations in local health economies. 
Across all three strategic decision scenarios, the organisational internal factors 
of size, systems and relationships did not come up in theory or practice, 
showing they don’t count in PCT CEO strategic decision making. 
20.1.4 Summary of findings 
In summary, the frequency and duration of entries are indicative measures of a 
contextual factor’s impact on PCT CEO strategic decision making. The most 
influential and critical contextual factors are TMT, other significant 
organisations, structures and decision making processes.  The CEOs engage 
with their TMTs to delegate and review implementation as well as to get help 
with their own sensemaking. They engage with staff as part of visible leadership 
rather than involving them in strategic decision making but will want to involve 
internal organisational structures such as the trust board for governance 
purposes. The CEOs also engage with other significant local organisations 
whose cooperation is necessary for strategy implementation. Implementation of 
regional plans usually require engaging with stakeholders and other significant 
organisations, notably the SHA, as the nature of such plans often extend 
beyond PCT boundaries.   
In each of the three strategic decision making contexts of national, regional and 
local plans, the contextual factors that PCT CEOs take into account in strategic 
decision making differ, except for other significant organisations which as a 
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group remains constant throughout, showing the importance of relationships. 
With national policies, compliance is expected, and as the performance 
expectations are normally clearly specified, the CEOs rarely have to take 
strategic decisions other than to delegate implementation. However, should 
there be problems with performance, the CEOs would focus on the performance 
expectations and the significant organisation, such as the DH or SHA, to 
renegotiate the deliverables and seek support. The same applies to regional 
strategies, although there is usually more room to manoeuvre, so the CEOs 
may try to negotiate with the SHA on the deliverables and to win support. In 
return, the SHA expects PCTs to support its strategies.  
As regional strategies may not be relevant to local health economy plans, PCT 
CEOs would use formal decision making processes to engage key local 
stakeholders. In both scenarios, the tendency is to push back the top down 
strategies and policies. As PCTs still have to implement these requirements, the 
CEOs would delegate implementation to the TMTs. They will want to ensure 
that appropriate structures and processes are in place to deliver and to 
demonstrate governance and accountability. These factors also apply to local 
plans and strategies which are usually developed in conjunction with key local 
stakeholders, in particular other significant organisations, and have to take 
account of organisational internal factors for implementation. When PCT CEOs 
take strategic decisions, they will be mindful of the need to achieve through 
others, hence the importance of relationships both within and out of the 
organisation.  What the PCT CEOs attempt to achieve at each interface is 
summarised in Figure 50.  
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Figure 50  PCT CEO strategic intent at each interface with key contextual factors 
 
20.2 How contextual intelligence influences PCT CEO strategic 
decision making 
Project 3 set out to answer four questions which are addressed below  
20.2.1 Relationship between contextual factors and decision 
contexts 
Question 1 asked if PCT CEOs take different things into account when making 
different kinds of decisions. The answer is a resounding yes from the findings 
above. What is interesting about the results is that in all three policy contexts, 
the only contextual factor that is constant is “other significant organisations”.  
Table 8 in Project 2 lists the organisations and their sub- structures such as 
committees and partnerships that PCT CEOs said played a significant role in 
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local strategic decisions. The organisation that showed the biggest difference 
between Project 2 and Project 3 is the SHA - cited by one in six CEOs in Project 
2 but accounted for  the most time spent with an external organisation in all 
diaries. This suggests the SHA’s influence in PCT strategic decision making is 
not straightforward and is present even when it does not play a direct role.   
As for the other significant organisations, although not directly in the NHS 
structure, the council is  influential on a number fronts – as commissioner and 
provider of social care; its OSC has legal powers to hold local health services to 
account, are just some the influential roles. The list also reveals that these 
significant organisations are not one whole but consist of several key players – 
senior leaders and key office holders who play significant roles within their 
organisational structures, and have to be related to in different ways. Another 
complex group is GPs who are involved in the local health economy under a 
number of guises. The list shows the wide and complex scope of relationships 
on which a PCT CEO has to build in order to engage local stakeholders and 
knowledge about who matters for what contribute to contextual intelligence. 
20.2.2 Common approaches to decision making 
Question 2 asked if the PCT CEOs show a common pattern in approach to 
strategic decision making. National policies and regional strategies usually 
come with guidance on performance expectations or required actions which 
effectively set the boundaries for strategic decision making and a common 
approach. Decision making process was a consistent major contextual factor for 
CEO decision making on regional and local strategies in both Project 2 and 
Project 3. This is not surprising as, in addition to national policies setting out 
how strategic decisions are to be taken, the SHA also sets regional guidance 
and processes for reaching and approving such decisions. Add to that the 
PCT’s own governance structure, the constraints start to shape the pathway for 
PCT strategic decision making and may explain why decision making process is 
such a major consideration for PCT CEOs. For politically sensitive decisions, 
PCTs have to be able to demonstrate they have followed due process as failure 
to do so can result in their referral to the court for judicial review. Strategic 
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decisions on national policies rarely allow discretions in local decision making 
which may also explain the standard approaches. 
20.2.3  Differences between PCT CEO theories of action and practice  
Question 3 asked if there were differences between what PCT CEOs say they 
do ( theory) and what they actually do (practice). A summary of differences 
between espoused contextual factors versus factors in action is shown in Table 
33. Comparing the espoused theories with theories in use in strategic decision 
making by PCT CEOs, the following observations are made: 
On national policies, no single contextual factor stands out as critical, indicating 
that contexts as a whole do not influence CEO decision making in these 
instances. (A critical factor is defined as one that has been identified by at least 
90% of the CEOs. Major contextual factors are those that have been identified 
by a majority (>50%) of CEOs.) The only major contextual factor that is 
consistent across both theory and practice is performance expectations. It also 
tops the list in terms of frequency, which is to be expected. Differences in the 
rest of contextual factors may be due to the CEOs relegating responsibility for 
implementation, leaving them to engage other significant organisations when 
necessary. 
On regional strategies, other significant organisations, notably the SHA, and 
decision making processes, are critical contextual factors. This is to be 
expected, as the SHA sets the directive and holds CEOs accountable for 
delivery, and delivery requires decision making processes. The surprise is that 
these two factors are missing from CEOs’ accounts in Project 2, which may 
either be an oversight or reflect their tacit acceptance by CEOs. The major 
contextual factors that are consistent in both theory and practice in strategic 
decision making are environmental dynamism, relationships and stakeholders. 
Performance expectations and goals also influence CEOs strategic decision 
making, for reasons similar to national policies.   
When taking decisions on local plans, the critical factors espoused by CEOs – 
environmental dynamism and strategy – were different to those used in 
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practice, namely TMT and structure. The latter may reflect a focus on the 
organisation’s capacity for implementation, in contrast to the former which are 
more relevant during planning stages, although strategy is a major factor in 
practice.  The major contextual factors that are consistent between the two are 
other significant organisations and decision making processes. Differences in 
the rest of the factors again reflect a focus on strategy implementation. 
Table 33 Contextual factors taken into account by PCT CEOs in different 
decision making contexts: espoused factors versus theories-in-action (critical 
factors in bold) 
Decision context espoused theories theories-in-use 
National policies performance expectations 
structure 
strategy 
stakeholders 
time 
performance expectations 
other significant 
organisations 
Regional 
strategies 
information 
strategy 
other significant 
organisations 
relationships 
public engagement 
 
other significant 
organisations 
decision making 
process 
performance expectations 
goals  
environmental dynamism 
relationships  
stakeholders 
Local Plans environmental dynamism
strategy 
other significant 
organisations 
decision making process 
stakeholders 
goals 
structure 
TMT 
structure 
other significant 
organisations 
decision making process 
relationships 
strategy 
operations 
stakeholders 
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20.2.4  Other factors in PCT CEO decision making process 
Question 4 asked if other factors play a part in PCT CEO decision making 
process. There are two other notable observations. The first relates to the roles 
of TMTs, which although not elucidated in the study, show them to have 
important responsibilities and the most contact time with CEOs. Their 
contribution to CEO contextual intelligence development is worth future 
exploration in the light of the upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). The second concerns the role of CEO adviser (Arendt et al., 2005) as an 
intermediate model of strategic decision making.  Saxton (1995) described the 
contributions of consultants in these instances as expert, provocateur, and 
legitimizer. All three roles were observed in the study. The impact of third 
parties on strategic decision making has emerged as a potentially significant 
factor in the CEO’s advisory systems. It was mentioned by a minority of CEOs, 
but would be a factor worthy of further research 
20.3 Further insights on PCT CEO contextual intelligence 
development 
The away day provided an extraordinary opportunity to study the contextual 
factors in use by PCT CEOs when taking a critical strategic decision in 
response to a regional strategy. From the CEOs’ accounts, three contextual 
factors stood out as being most influential. The first factor being the 
environment for decision making, notably how, on this occasion, the event’s 
design and structure enabled the SHA to steer the decision making process. 
The second is information – ranging from what was presented (the information 
was selectively negative and out of date) and how it was presented, including 
the underlying messages that was not explicit. As the CEOs were unable to 
verify the data in their usual ways including checking with their TMT and board, 
their sensemaking could be compromised. The third consists of structures and 
rules guiding behaviour; some of which were explicit (for example the CEOs 
voting for PCT mergers) while others were less so (such as not openly 
challenging the SHA CEO, and herd behaviour).  In practice, a strategic 
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decision of this significance will have to undergo formal decision making 
structures and processes, even if an agreement has been reached informally.  
The most influential contextual factors, as defined by frequency and duration of 
activity, are structures, other significant organisations and TMT. What the diary 
and event have in common is identifying the SHA as the other significant 
organisation. Because of the way the away day was structured, TMTs were not 
accessible to the CEOs, which would explain their absence from CEOs’ 
accounts. For the same reason, individual CEOs were unable to consult their 
chairman and board about the decision to merge PCTs. So while the PCT 
governance and decision making structures may be absent, the accountabiity 
structure between the SHA and PCTs was clearly present at the away day.  
There are two particular observations from this event worth noting about how 
PCT CEOs take strategic decisions.  The first observation is about the 
underlying structures and rules governing strategic decision making in the NHS. 
There appear to be at least two decision making processes: formal procedures 
which operate in public, and informal processes that operate in private. The 
second observation relates to rules guiding individual decisional behaviour. 
From their reports the CEOs felt under pressure to behave in a certain way and 
the desire to comply led to acquiescence to the SHA’s tacit demand. While they 
overtly supported the decision that was taken, the CEOs were clearly unhappy 
with the situation they found themselves in and reacted to this, although most 
were unable to voice their frustration during the event and professed surprise at 
the eventual outcome. By virtue of not voicing their concerns, the CEOs 
colluded in a strategic decision that would eventually lead to the demise of their 
organisations as well as their own roles. It is clear from the CEOs’ accounts that 
they recognised this conflict, although some, at least, arrived at a resolution of 
the decision they had come to. As the decision is possibly one of the most 
strategic that could be taken by PCT CEOs, it is important to understand the 
reasons for their behaviour. It also reveals a deeper insight into the 
mechanisms that may underlay the influence of other significant organisations 
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(in this case the SHA) as a significant factor in CEO strategic decision making in 
practice. 
20.4 Theorising PCT CEO strategic decision making and 
contextual intelligence 
20.4.1 CEO decision making in a socially constructed NHS 
What the diary and away day data reveal about PCT CEO strategic decision 
making is that contextual factors that have the most impact, namely 
organisational structures, decision making process, relationships and 
behavioural norms, are social constructions of the system in contrast to macro 
level factors in the corporate sector. 
A significant finding in Project 3 is the rationale behind the relative influence of 
different contextual factors in PCT CEO strategic decision making. The results 
show how contextual factors operate is influenced by rules and structures 
governing strategic decision making. The Oxford Thesaurus (2007) describes 
structures as not only physical formation or construction, but also the 
organisation, system, arrangement, design, framework, and patterns of how 
things work. How structures work is determined by rules. While formal 
relationships between PCTs, the SHA and the DH are structured, those of 
interpersonal nature between senior leaders tend to be informal and 
unstructured. It is evident from diary and interview data that organisations and 
individuals who have a stake in PCT strategic decisions are also engaged at 
varying levels of structures and modes. The PCT CEOs may have agreed at the 
away day to merge PCTs but the decision still had to go through a formal 
decision making process by their boards as part of the governance structure. 
Even social norms have elements of structure, as seen in PCT CEOs regulating 
their behaviours at the away day and supporting strategic proposals that they 
disagree with but felt unable to speak out against due to the hierarchical 
relationship with the SHA. 
 360 
20.4.2 Structures and rules underlying Contextual Intelligence 
What is apparent from the data is that the structure of contextual factors can 
vary in their visibility. It is partly this differential level of visibility that affects how 
a structure works. In addition, how structures operate in practice and in theory 
are also governed by rules which also vary in transparency. Explicit or formal 
rules include policies and legal requirements that are usually put in writing but 
even then still may not operate accordingly. Formal structures normally have 
explicit rules but interpretation and flexibility of the rules may be known only to 
experienced insiders. The tacit knowledge of informal rules such as custom 
practice and norms are not usually written down but can be observable. The 
PCT CEOs knew from experience that new rules can be created, and existing 
rules changed or abolished, unilaterally and without prior warning by the SHA or 
Department of Health. The process for decision making provides further 
opportunities for tacit rules to be exercised. In order to understand the 
underlying mechanisms for the different conceptions of structures and rules, 
data analysis looked for patterns that had created these structures. From the 
findings, a two dimensional model of structures and rules influencing CEO 
strategic decision making on a regional strategy in this specific away day event 
is shown in Figure 51  
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Figure 51 A two dimensional model of underlying contextual factors of structure 
and rules 
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But first, the rationale for each cell in the model is explained. 
Cell 1  Interpersonal relationships 
All of the CEOs spend substantial amounts of time on relationship 
building activities, especially with key individuals from other significant 
organisations, their TMT and internal staff. The CEOs foster 
interpersonal relationships where there is common purpose, as was 
evidenced in both Projects 2 and 3. Berscheid (1983) describes 
interpersonal relationships as usually involving some level of 
interdependence.  As the NHS is one system, most things that impact on 
one part of the NHS is likely to have some level of impact on the others, 
especially in a geographical region.  For example, the SHA needs PCT 
CEOs’ cooperation to implement change across the region whilst the 
PCT CEOs need the SHA’s support to implement local change. In PCTs, 
CEOs count on their TMT for functional expertise, to implement agreed 
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plans and to engage staff in service delivery. The structures 
underpinning such relationships are usually not explicit by connections, 
ranging from engagement to strategic alliances, with rules being based 
on mutuality.  
Cell II  Custom practice, routines and norms 
Here, the rules may be explicit but the structures are implicit. An example 
is the social order operating between the PCT CEOs and SHA CEO. The 
Establishment Order for PCTs sets out the legal roles and responsibilities 
for the PCT Board and the CEO being accountable to the chairman of 
the board but the Accountability Agreement for PCT CEOs (Appendix I) 
cuts across this, with CEOs being held to account by the DH through the 
SHA CEO, in a grandparent role. While the two structures conflict in 
terms of accountability lines, the PCT CEOs know that staying in their 
posts requires the SHA CEO’s support. Tacit knowledge of expected 
behaviours, or norms, led to the “turkeys voting for Christmas” results 
which prepared the grounds for subsequent decision making in public. 
The CEOs’ behaviours reinforce the power structure which ensures that 
every player, PCT CEOs and SHA CEO included, knows their place in 
the organisational hierarchy.  
Cell III  Formal structures  
In contrast to personal relationships and networks conducted at 
individual levels, statutory public organisations like PCTs are legally 
constituted, with formal structures and explicit operating rules and 
regulations that are written down and published. The legal Orders of 
Establishment for PCTs define the governance structures and rules 
required to create lines of responsibility and accountability. As part of 
their constitutions, PCTs are required to implement top down strategies, 
policies and plans. The CEOs acknowledge they have limited discretions 
in decision making where there is a requirement to comply with national 
policies. Their focus is then on achieving the required performance 
expectations, which they appear to delegate in line with the 
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organisational structure. As such policies often require the cooperation of 
other statutory organisations such as councils and NHS Trusts as well as 
GPs, the CEOs’ diaries contain activities involving all these other 
significant organisations. PCTs also have statutory duties such as public 
consultations on strategic change that have to be met. 
Cell IV Decision making process 
As statutory public bodies, PCTs have to follow formal decision making 
process when taking decisions of strategic importance as would be in the 
case of PCT mergers. This is to ensure compliance with governance 
regulations as well as ensuring that critical decisions are given the due 
consideration and stakeholders consulted where necessary. In practice 
however, as is evident from the case of the away day, decision making 
processes can be either visible or invisible, or both, depending on how a 
process operates. The CEOs’ diaries show evidence of formal decision 
making processes and the holding of public consultation and stakeholder 
engagement on the regional health strategy. Further, even after the 
CEOs have agreed to PCT merger at the away day, the decision must 
still be formally taken by the PCT Board to fulfil governance 
requirements. The term “process” is both a noun and a verb. When used 
as a noun, processes are like recipes and can be treated like formal 
constructions. In contrast, the “processing” or operationalisation of 
processes contain elements of time and operator variability, meaning 
different rules could apply. Decision making processes may not be 
observable. The findings reveal time delay in the process is sometimes 
adopted as a less visible control mechanism. 
20.5 Conceptualising PCT CEO contextual intelligence 
20.5.1 Decision contexts and hierarchy of contextual factors 
By combining Project 2 and Project 3 findings, a summary of the key contextual 
factors forming the contextual intelligence of PCT CEOs in different strategic 
decision context is shown in Table 34 Matching strategic decision context with 
 364 
hierarchy of contextual factors-Table 34. A comparison of the findings from the 
two projects is presented in Table 33. 
Table 34 Matching strategic decision context with hierarchy of contextual 
factors- 
Policy context Contextual factors – 
first level (critical) 
Contextual factors –second 
level (important) 
National   Performance expectations 
SHA 
Regional  SHA 
Decision making 
processes 
Performance expectations 
Relationships 
Stakeholders  
Environmental dynamism 
Local goals 
Local TMT 
Other significant 
organisations 
Structure 
Decision making processes 
Relationships 
Stakeholders 
Strategy  
Operations (implementation) 
 
 
 
 
  
   
Table 34 summarises the key contextual factors that PCT CEOs take into 
account in strategic decision making for different policy contexts. The contextual 
factors have been categorised here into two levels: first level or critical factors 
are those which more than 90% of CEOs have identified as being critical to 
strategic decision making; and second level factors which were deemed 
important by the majority of PCT CEOs. Both were evidenced by citations in 
Project 2 and diary activities related to the relevant factors.  
For national policies, there were no critical factors but performance expectations 
and the DH and SHA have been identified as important factors. This can be 
explained by the PCT CEOs accepting compliance with national policies as 
standard practice, but becoming involved personally in managing performance if 
necessary. On occasions of underperformance, the CEOs would usually be 
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held to account by the SHA in its regional head office role as system 
performance manager.  
For regional strategies, the SHA is understandably a critical factor; however, its 
strong presence in PCT CEOs’ strategic decision making context warrants 
assigning the SHA to be a contextual factor by itself, rather than grouping it with 
other significant organisations. Decision making processes are clearly central to 
strategic decision making, as they enable PCTs to demonstrate good 
governance and to engage local stakeholders to win support. As regional 
strategies come from the SHA, there would usually be elements of performance 
expectations. When regional strategies are supportive of existing local plans, 
many CEOs would use this opportunity to accelerate their local plans. The 
corollary is that when regional plans contradict existing local goals and 
strategies, the PCT CEOs would try to negotiate with the SHA on a compromise 
if possible. In all cases, the engagement of key stakeholders especially other 
significant organisations, and taking account of  environmental dynamism in the 
local health economy are significant factors in implementing regional strategies.  
For strategic decision making on local plans, a number of organisational internal 
factors play critical roles, specifically TMT and structure. Work to do with 
operations or implementation usually falls to TMT so their capacity and 
capability are priority considerations for CEOs, all of whom spent substantial 
amount of contact time with their TMTs. TMTs sometimes act as a sounding 
board to the CEO but their main contribution to strategic decision making is less 
about the strategic decision itself and more about supporting the decision 
making process and then taking the work forward. For local plans, other 
significant organisations are no longer the SHA (although the SHA still has an 
oversight role) but those in the local health economy, especially the council, the 
local hospital and GPs. At the local level, relationships are important, especially 
at the inter-personal level and with key office holders and politicians. For local 
plans to be implemented, they often require the cooperation and support of 
these organisations and individuals. Formal decision making processes are 
used to engage stakeholders for their support. 
 366 
To summarise, as a group, PCT CEOs demonstrate a common approach to 
strategic decision making. Other than specific local issues, they are likely to 
take account of similar contextual factors when responding to similar strategic 
decision making scenarios. Ironically, the CEOs focus on inward and upward 
rather than outward is contradictory to the national policy direction to put 
patients first and to prioritise the patient experience. For the conflict to be 
resolved, it will require a different approach to policy formulation that changes 
how the structures and rules work in practice. 
20.5.2 PCT CEO Contextual intelligence – a new conceptual model 
The research draws the following conclusions. One, the contextual factors taken 
into account by PCT CEOs relate to the author of the policies, strategies or 
plans. Two, PCTs are required to implement national policies, which the CEOs 
prioritise over any other decision trigger. Three, the most important contextual 
factors for regional strategies are the SHA due to reporting lines, and decision 
making processes to demonstrate governance. When taking strategic decisions 
on local plans, the CEOs’ focus is on having the right structures for decision 
making and engaging stakeholders, especially significant local organisations 
such as the council, local hospitals and GPs. In all cases, the CEOs delegate 
implementation to their TMT. Finally, as a group, PCT CEOs demonstrate a 
uniform pattern of strategic decision making behaviours that reflect contextual 
intelligence as summarised in the new conceptual model in Figure 52. 
The new PCT CEO contextual intelligence model for strategic decision making, 
which I call the new rainbow model, is drawn from the findings of both Projects 
2 and 3. It shows the functional world of PCTs, and therefore PCT CEOs, to be 
based entirely on what is set out in national policies. National policies can range 
from legislations to guidance, but all seek compliance or actions in one way or 
another. National policies are usually issued by the DH but can also be from 
arms-length bodies such as regulators. The DH not only allocates annual 
budgets to PCTs, it also sets prices and pay, as well as the operating rules for 
the whole NHS. It therefore replaces the external world faced by the corporate 
 367 
sector with an internal market, which removes the need for PCTs to pay 
attention to macro level factors.   
Figure 52 A new model of contextual intelligence for PCT CEO strategic decision 
making (new rainbow model) 
 
I have already discussed the criticality of the SHA and decision making process 
in 20.5.1 above. 
Project 2 (Table 18) includes a list of key stakeholders in the local health 
economy. The most important organisations, other than the SHA, are the 
council, the local hospital and GPs. All these organisations contain important 
individuals, who, due to their positions, expertise or portfolio, the PCT CEO 
need to engage in the strategic decision making process. There is a duty of 
partnership on PCTs and other statutory organisations including councils. 
Effective partnerships require the CEO to invest time in building constructive 
relationships with these local stakeholders.  
Last but not least are the three contextual factors within the PCT itself. I have 
explained the TMT contributions above. PCT strategy is included as it and local 
goals overlap and both were identified as important contextual factors by a 
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majority of PCT CEOs as well as being relevant to strategic decisions. Structure 
was also identified by a majority of CEOs as a major factor but its significance 
as a critical factor is compounded when considered in its two dimensional forms 
as an contextual factor underpinning PCT CEO contextual intelligence.  
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21 CONCLUSIONS 
The research set out to answer eight questions relating to contextual factors 
that NHS PCT CEOs take into account in different strategic decision contexts. 
The research has enabled the following conclusions to be drawn.  
PCT CEOs define their strategic decision making contexts by where the 
policies, strategies or plans come from. They take different contextual factors 
into account when making different kinds of strategic decisions. There is also a 
hierarchy in contextual factors which can be categorised into critical and 
important, depending on their influence on strategic decisions. The number of 
contextual factors CEOs are likely to take into account is far fewer than the 
comprehensive literature based model although there are similar patterns of 
contextual factors and influence across CEOs. These help shape a common 
model of PCT CEO contextual intelligence in strategic decision making. The 
CEOs are likely to follow a similar decision making process as their rationalities 
are bounded by NHS rules and structures regulating their behaviours. The 
implications are that PCT CEOs need to be sensitive to the nuances and 
subtleties of the relevant contextual factors to understand their decision making 
contexts, enabling mitigating actions to be taken to achieve effective decision 
outcomes. However, the maintenance of the necessary awareness requires a 
major focus of activity and attention on inwards (downwards) and upwards at 
the expense of outwards.  
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Appendix H 
Approach to coding diary events - examples 
 
1. All routine meetings with board and chairman  e.g. 121 with chairman, 
attendances at board meeting and subcommittees are coded under 
“organisational internal factors/structures”, with 100% of the time allocated 
to that factor 
 
2. All routine121s with Executive Directors and direct reports are coded under 
Top Management Team (TMT), with 100% of the time allocated to that 
factor 
 
3. Performance review meeting with a local acute trust, lasting 1.5 hours – 
coded under  “local plans/ local factors” and subcategories of 1.0 hour for 
other significant organisations and 0.5 hour for performance expectations. 
 
4. Quarterly 1 hour meeting with chair and CEO of neighbouring acute trust 
who is a major provider of acute services to a number of PCTs in the 
sector– coded under “regional strategy/ local factors”, and 0.5 for “other 
significant organisations” and 0.5 for “relationships” 
 
5. Attendances at Local Authority Overview and Scrutiny Committee for 1.5 
hours – coded under local factors, local plans, and allocate 0.5 to other 
significant organisations, 0.5 to politicians, 0.5 to performance expectations 
 
6. SRO or CEO Lead for regional project – 121 with project manager, coded 
under local factors, regional strategy and allocate time to other significant 
organisations, goals, and decision making process 
 
7. Joint chair (with acute trust CEO) of programme board for strategy – 2 hours 
coded under local factors, regional strategy, with time allocation 0.5 other 
significant organisations, 0.5 decision making process, 0.5 goals, 0.5 
relationships 
 
8. South West region CEOs Forum – all provider and commissioner CEOs – 2 
hours coded under local factors, regional strategy, and 0.5 other significant 
organisations, 0.5 decision making process, 0.5 stakeholders, 0.5 
relationships 
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9. Meeting an Assistant Director on primary care strategy for 30 mins- coded 
under organisational internal factors, local plans/ 0.25 for strategy and 0.25 
for staff 
 
10. Meeting with MP – coded under local factors, local policy/politicians 
 
11. SHA chair visited to find out about commissioner and provider relationships 
locally involving two specific sites – 4 hours visit coded under local factors, 
local plans/ 2 for other significant organisations, 1 for environmental 
dynamism, 1 for relationships 
 
12. Cardiac network meeting, chair for 2.5 hours – coded under local factors, 
regional strategy, as 1 for other significant organisations, 1 for decision 
making process, 0.5 for goals 
 
13. Decontamination project board 2hours – chair – coded under local factors, 
regional strategy/ 1 as other significant organisations, 0.5 for decision 
making processes, 0.5 for goals 
 
14. Chair the Prison Partnership Board 2.5 hours – coded under local factors, 
national policy/ 1 for other significant organisations, 0.5 for decision making 
processes, 0.5 for goals, and 0.5 for resources, all under national policy 
 
15. Chair Regional Provider Board 2 hours – coded under local factors, regional 
strategy as 1 for other significant organisations, 0.5 for decision making 
processes, 0.5 for goals 
 
16. Supporting interim PH director in a meeting of PH leads internally –1 hour 
meeting coded under organisational internal factors, local plans/ 0.5 staff 
and 0.5 operations 
 
17. LIFT strategic partnership board 1.5 hours coded under local factors, 
regional strategy/ 0.5 other significant organisations, 0.5 for decision making 
processes, 0.5 for resources 
 
18. SW region PCT CEOs 3 hours – coded under local factors, regional strategy 
/1 other significant organisations, 1 decision making processes and 1 
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relationships 
 
19. SW region PCT CEOs and Directors to discuss World Class Commissioning 
development 4 hours – coded under local factors, national policy/ 2 hours 
on other significant organisations, 1 each on stakeholder and performance 
expectations 
 
20. Professional Executive Committee/SMT – 3 hours coded under 
organisational internal factors as 1 for stakeholders, 1 for strategy and 0.5 
each for SMT and structure 
 
21. Non routine telephone call with chairman to discuss personnel issues – 
coded under organisational internal/ 0.25 as structure and 0.25 under staff 
 
22. Strategic Board for children and young people – 2 hours coded under local 
factors, national policy/1 for other significant organisations, and 0.5 each for 
decision making process and stakeholders 
 
23. Joint Committee of PCTs (JCPCT) – 2 hours coded under local factors, 
regional strategy / 1 for other significant organisations, and 0.5 each for 
decision making process and stakeholders 
 
24. Emergency planning – meeting for 30 minutes with trust Emergency 
Planning leads regarding SHA policy for staff- coded  under organisational 
internal factors, regional strategy/ 0.5 to staff 
 
25. Learning Organisation development programme supported by NHSL – 3 
hours coded under organisational internal factors, regional strategy /2.5 for 
learning and 0.5 for consultants 
 
26. Regional PCT CEOs business meetings (routine) -1.5 hours coded under 
local factors, regional strategy / 1 other significant organisations and 0.5 
decision making processes 
 
27. PCT CEOs monthly meeting with SHA CEO – 2 hours coded under local 
factors, regional strategy /1 for other significant organisations, and 0.5 
decision making processes and 0.5 relationships 
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28. SHA organised Chairs and CEOs lunch 1.5 hours – coded under local 
factors, regional strategy /1 for other significant organisations, and 0.5 for 
relationships 
 
29. Telephone call with a Community leader – 0.5 hours coded under local 
factors, local plans/0.25 each for relationships and pressure groups 
 
30. Tel call with CEO of neighbouring acute trust that didn’t get Monitor 
approval – 0.5 hours coded as other significant organisations 
 
31. Joint Staff committee 2 hours – coded under organisational internal/1 each 
to staff and relationships 
 
32. Networking interactions or events coded under local factors, regional 
strategy or national policy/relationships 
 
33. A meeting with local trust CEO to discuss strategy jointly with PEC chair and 
chair for an hour – coded as 0.25 each for other significant organisations, 
goals, relationships, and stakeholders 
 
34. Anything to do with personnel issues is coded under staff 
 
35. Annual leave – items in diary are not coded 
 
36. Strengthening commissioning meetings  2 hours coded as local factors, 
regional strategy /1 to other significant organisations, 0.5 to goals and 0.5 to 
environmental dynamism 
 
37. Working from home is treated the same as at work. 
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Appendix I 
PCT Accountability Framework 
 
October 2006 
 
 
 
ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF EXECUTIVES OF 
PRIMARY CARE TRUSTS 
 
1. You are hereby appointed as the NHS officer responsible and accountable for 
funds entrusted to your Primary Care Trust (PCT). This memorandum describes 
your responsibilities as an Accountable Officer, and relates them to my overall 
accountability for funds voted by Parliament for the National Health Service. In 
fulfilling your role as Accountable Officer you will also wish to bear in mind your 
responsibilities to the PCT Board of which you are a member. The corporate 
role of the Board is clearly set out in the Codes of Conduct and Accountability 
issued by the Secretary of State in April 1994 and subsequent revisions within 
the Corporate Governance Framework. 
 
Functions of Primary Care Trusts 
2. The functions of PCTs are:- 
 
(a) to improve the health of the community; 
 
(b) to secure the provision of high quality, safer services; 
 
(c) to integrate health and social care locally. 
 
3. A PCT will combine primary care development and the commissioning of 
hospital and community health services with the provision of community health 
services. 
 
4. The essence of your role as Accountable Officer is to see that the PCT carries 
out these functions in a way, which ensures the proper stewardship of public 
money and assets. The paragraphs below set out this responsibility in more 
detail. 
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Relationship between the Accounting Officer and Accountable Officers 
 
5. My responsibilities as Accounting Officer are set out in a memorandum sent to 
me on appointment. In essence, I am responsible for the propriety and 
regularity of public finances in the NHS; for the keeping of proper accounts; for 
prudent and economical administration; for the avoidance of waste and 
extravagance; and for the efficient and effective use of all the resources in my 
charge. 
 
6. Your role as Accountable Officer for your PCT is very similar to mine as 
Accounting Officer for the NHS in England. I require you to observe the same 
general requirements as are laid on me, and to ensure that the primary care 
trust's officers also abide by them. 
 
7. This memorandum deals with the relationship with the Secretary of State and to 
Parliament, to whom PCTs are nationally accountable for the performance of 
their functions and for meeting statutory financial duties. 
 
8. PCTs are accountable to the Strategic Health Authority and hence to the 
Secretary of State for Health, who delegates to me responsibility for supervision 
of performance. 
 
9. I am accountable both to the Secretary of State and, in my Accounting Officer 
role, directly to Parliament. A similar dual accountability applies to the Chief 
Executives of PCTs, who are responsible both to their Boards and, as 
Accountable Officer, via the Accounting Officer, to Parliament. You are 
therefore accountable through me to Parliament for the stewardship of 
resources within your PCT. 
 
Statutory Accounts 
 
10. I sign the Summarised Accounts of health bodies in England and by virtue of 
this responsibility I can be summoned to appear before the Committee of Public 
Accounts (PAC) to deal with questions arising from those accounts or from 
reports made to Parliament by the Comptroller and Auditor General. 
 
11. The summarised accounts are derived from the statutory accounts of individual 
PCTs. You are, together with the Director of Finance, responsible for ensuring 
that the accounts of the PCT which are presented to the PCT Board for 
approval are prepared under principles and in a format directed by the 
Secretary of State with the approval of the Treasury. These accounts must 
disclose a true and fair view of the PCTs income and expenditure, and of its 
state of affairs. You will sign these accounts, along with the Director of Finance, 
on behalf of the Board. 
 
 377 
12. Reflecting your role as Accountable Officer, you will sign statements in the 
accounts (as indicated in the Manual for Accounts) outlining your 
responsibilities as Accountable Officer and with respect to Internal Control. 
 
13. The PAC will continue to regard me as the main respondent to any enquiries, 
especially where the issues are wider than an individual health body. The 
Committee may however call other witnesses, and I may require you to 
accompany me at a hearing. I shall in any event look to you for support and 
information in my dealings with the PAC. 
 
Effective management systems 
 
14. You should ensure that the PCT has in place effective management systems 
that safeguard public funds and should assist the Chairman of the Board to 
implement the requirements of corporate governance as exemplified in the 
Codes of Conduct and Accountability. 
 
15. Managers at all levels should:  
a) have a clear view of their objectives and the means to assess achievements 
in relation to those objectives;  
b) be assigned well-defined responsibilities for making the best use of 
resources; 
c) have the information, training and access to the expert advice they need to 
exercise their responsibilities effectively. 
 
16. Managers should be appraised and held to account for the responsibilities 
assigned to them under (a) and (b) above. 
 
17. You are responsible for achieving value for money from the resources available 
to the PCT and for avoiding waste and extravagance in the organisation's 
activities. You are responsible for following through the implementation of any 
recommendations affecting good practice as set out on reports from such 
bodies as the Audit Commission and the National Audit Office (NAO). You are 
also responsible for using to best effect the funds available for commissioning 
healthcare, developing services and promoting health to meet the needs of the 
local population. 
 
18. You should provide such information as is requested by the NAO. You should 
co-operate with external auditors in any enquiries into the use your PCT has 
made of public funds. I may also ask you to provide information on any points 
raised by external auditors that generate public or Parliamentary interest. Your 
arrangements for internal audit should comply with those described in the NHS 
Internal Audit Manual. You must ensure prompt action is taken in response to 
concerns raised by both external and internal audit. 
 
19. Effective and sound financial management and information are of fundamental 
importance. Whilst this is the operational responsibility of the Director of 
Finance you, as the Chief Executive and Accountable Officer, have a primary 
duty to see that these functions are properly discharged. You should also 
ensure that the assets of the PCT are properly safeguarded. 
 
Regularity and propriety of expenditure 
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20. You have a particular responsibility for ensuring that expenditure (discretionary) 
by the PCT complies with Parliamentary requirements. The 
 basic principle which must be observed is that funds should be applied only to 
 the extent and for the purpose authorised by Parliament. You must:- 
 not exceed your cash and resource limits; 
 
 draw the attention of Parliament to losses or special payments by 
appropriate notation of the statutory accounts; 
 
 obtain sanction from the Department of Health for any expenditure which 
exceeds the limit delegated to the PCT; this includes any novel, contentious 
or repercussive expenditure, which is by definition outside your delegation; 
 
 ensure that all items of expenditure, including payments to staff, fall within 
the legal powers of the PCT, exercised responsibly and with due regard to 
probity and value for money; 
 
 comply with guidance issued by the Department of Health on classes of 
payment which you should authorise personally, such as termination 
payments to general and senior managers; 
 
 have systems to ensure that payments to all contractors are properly due; 
 
 ensure that all expenditure is correctly attributed, in particular that 
expenditure which is subject to a cash and resource limits is accounted for 
against the relevant budget; 
 
 ensure that the PCT has appropriate systems in place to counter fraud by 
patients or contractors, in accordance with SofS Directions, the NHS 
Counter Fraud and Corruption Manual and with such other instructions on 
countering fraud and corruption against the NHS as may be notified by the 
Counter Fraud and Security Management Service, an independent Division 
of the NHS Business Services Authority. 
 
21. The Codes of Conduct and Accountability incorporated in the Corporate 
Governance Framework manual issued to NHS Boards by the Secretary of 
State are fundamental in exercising your responsibilities for regularity and 
probity. As a Board member you have explicitly subscribed to the Codes; you 
should promote their observance by all staff. 
Advice to the PCT Board and Executive Committee 
22. As the Accountable Officer you have a responsibility to see that appropriate 
advice is tendered to the Board and Executive Committee on all matters of 
financial probity and regularity, and more broadly on all considerations of 
prudent and economical administration, efficiency and effectiveness. The 
Director of Finance has a special responsibility to support you in this role; you 
should ensure that he or she is fully aware of this obligation, is professionally 
qualified and has the requisite skills and experience. 
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23. If the Board or the Chairman of the Board or Executive Committee is 
contemplating a course of action which you consider would infringe the 
requirements of propriety and regularity, you should set out in writing to the 
Chairman of the Board and the Board your objection to the proposal and the 
reasons for it. If the Board decides nonetheless to proceed, you should seek a 
written instruction to take the action in question. You should ensure that the 
audit committee, which has specific terms of reference and delegated powers to 
inquire into matters of propriety and regularity, and which may require your 
attendance before it at any time, receives copies of the documents that 
describe your objections. 
 
24.  You should also inform the Strategic Health Authority and Department of 
Health, if possible before the Board takes its decision or in any event before the 
decision is implemented so that the Department of Health can if necessary 
intervene with the Board and inform the Treasury. 
 
25. If the Board or Executive Committee is contemplating a course of action which 
raises an issue not of formal propriety or regularity but affects your 
responsibility for obtaining value for money from the PCT’s resources, it is your 
duty to draw the relevant factors to the attention of the Board and Executive 
Committee. If the outcome is that you are overruled it is normally sufficient to 
ensure that your advice and the overruling of it are clearly apparent from the 
papers. If exceptionally you have given clear advice that the course proposed 
could not reasonably be held to represent good value for money and the Board 
seems likely to overrule you, you should inform the Health Authority and the 
Department of Health so that it can intervene if necessary. In such cases, and 
in those described in paragraph 24 above, the Accountable Officer should as a 
member of the Board vote against the course of action rather than merely 
abstain from voting. 
 
 
 
 
DAVID NICHOLSON 
ACCOUNTING OFFICER 
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